PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

NOVEMBER
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1956: A MEMOIR

KHRUSHCHEV BEFORE & AFTER

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1956—A Memoir

By Joseph Starobin

Ten years have passed since those fateful ten months which began with the Soviet Communist Party's 20th Congress in February 1956, witnessed the upheavals in Poland the following October, and came to a climax one month later with the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Many of the issues in contention at the time appear to have been resolved. New ones, of greater dimension, have arisen. Certainly, the Sino-Soviet rupture originated in those days, although it flowered in its own hundred ways several years later. The Communist world has been transformed beyond recognition. But the ideological and political detonations, like delayed-action mines, still thunder. Nothing seems so hollow today as the characteristic boast of a decade ago that the Communist countries had become a stable world system, destined to refashion, if not inherit, the globe. Communism has been anything but stable. And it no longer constitutes a system at all.

Half a century earlier, a wandering American had discovered Russia in revolution and had put his idealistic hopes into the "ten days that shook the world." What would this same John Reed have written had he been able, by some merciful resurrection from his grave in the Kremlin wall, to "cover the story" of the ten months of 1956? And what classic of our time might Reed have given us if he could have looked back on those months in the perspective of the ten succeeding years?

Each of us has his personal prologue, some moment of illumination, some particular setting which, in afterthought, appears meaningful. The year 1956 cannot be understood, I think, without recalling the months preceding the 20th Congress, beginning with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade and the apology to the Yugoslavs. I knew good men in that time who did not grasp what had

(continued on p. 64)

Mr. Starobin, onetime Foreign Editor of the US Daily Worker, *is presently Senior Fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, New York, where he is completing his Ph.D. thesis on the American Communist Party, 1943-57.*

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The New Revolution

EDITORS' NOTE: The events that have taken place in Communist China in the past year have posed a host of bewildering and complex questions. What was the genesis of the current "great proletarian cultural revolution" and the far-reaching political purge that evolved from it during 1966? What inspired the rise of inner-party opposition to Mao, and who were the personalities involved? What have been the respective roles of Mao, of Liu Shao-ch'i, and of Lin Piao, the army chief who has now emerged as Mao's heir apparent in place of Liu? These are some of the questions which Mr. Gelman attempts to clarify in the first of the three articles that follow. In the second, Mr. Chen analyzes the broader significance of the cultural revolution in the framework of the Communist effort to remold "the minds and hearts" of the Chinese people. Finally, Mr. Freeberne looks at the bemusing (or amusing?) episode of Mao's spectacular swim in the Yangtse last July, and the way it has been used to bolster the "cult of Mao."

Mao and the Permanent Purge

By Harry Gelman

In his seventy-third year, his health failing, his country almost totally isolated and alienated from the rest of the world, capitalist and Communist alike, and his most ambitious domestic program a long since abandoned disaster, Mao Tse-tung now has turned on the Chinese Communist Party itself. Mao has found treachery in the party from top to bottom: trusted leaders who, he discovered, had been shielding critics who surreptitiously mocked him, opposed his policies, pointed to his errors, and praised his enemies; leaders who loudly professed to obey him but did not; leaders who sought behind the scenes to minimize as best they could the personal glorification he desired; leaders who tolerated among the intellectuals and youth of China an individualism, a respect for the inviolability of truth, and a longing for "liberty, equality, and fraternity" [1] which Mao finds intolerable.

Mr. Gelman is an American specialist and writer on Communist affairs. He last appeared in these pages with "The [Sino-Soviet] Conflict: A Survey" (March-April 1964).

[1] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily—Peking), June 4, 1966.

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Since the fall of 1965, Mao has been drawing ever sharper lines of demarcation between himself and the rest of erring humanity. In some cases recent Chinese conduct toward the Communist world has represented simply an exaggeration of previous tendencies, in others a sharp break with cautious precedent; but in every case the screws were being tightened, new lines drawn, issues forced, and parties and persons compelled to choose sides. All who were not totally with Mao and obedient to his will were ruled against him, and the list of "true Marxist-Leninists" by Peking's definition shrank accordingly. At the same time, revolutionaries everywhere were told that Mao is "the leader of the world revolutionary movement," the "greatest Marxist of the present era," the "greatest genius," "the Lenin of today." Claims such as these had not been heard about any individual leader in the world Communist movement since the death of Stalin. Their mere enunciation was a sign of Mao's indifference to the views of other Communist leaders. If former Communist allies and Communist neutrals were alienated by these claims, Peking was quite prepared to accept it. As the Chinese kept repeating in the fall of 1965, the world was entering upon a period of great upheaval, great division, and great realignment.

A quite analogous process has also been going on within China over precisely the same period, *i.e.*, since September 1965. Here, too, there was a tightening of the ideological screws, a sharper insistence on absolute loyalty to the person and thought of Mao. One after another, in several stages, subordinates whom Mao had long trusted and raised up were subjected to a final test, found wanting, and purged. First to go, in the winter, was Army Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, whom Mao had installed along with Defense Minister Lin Piao in 1959 when Marshal P'eng Te-huai and his friends were purged for opposing Mao. The next to vanish, in the spring, was P'eng Chen, sixth-ranking Politburo member and Peking party first secretary, the apparently loyal courtier whom Mao had given the exalted title of "comrade in arms of Chairman Mao" and charged with remaking China's intellectual life to Mao's satisfaction. Together with P'eng fell Lu Ting-yi, alternate Politburo member and chief of the party's Propaganda Department; Chou Yang, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department, who for many years had been gauleiter of the nation's cultural affairs; and then a host of smaller fry—members of the Peking party apparatus, provincial cultural officials, and provincial party editors.

At last, in August, Mao downgraded chief of state Liu Shao-ch'i, his long-designated heir, and party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing; he publicly proclaimed a new heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao; and he raised to the Standing Committee of the Politburo a trio of second-rank figures: T'ao Chu, Ch'en Po-ta, and Kang Sheng. These three men—assisted (and probably watched) by Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing—were given primary responsibility along with Lin Piao for accomplishing Mao's purpose. This purpose was not merely to purge, but actually to terrorize, the party's central, regional, and provincial apparatus in a manner that would leave a permanent imprint and ensure an atmosphere in which footdragging or hidden opposition to Mao's will would no longer be conceivable. The objective was a party Bolshevized beyond the wildest dreams of the Bolsheviks, a party of obedient worshippers at the altar of Mao's cult, a party that could be relied upon to carry through the Maoist blueprint of revolution even after Mao is gone.

The Disloyal Opposition

The story may be most conveniently traced back to the confrontation between Mao and P'eng Te-huai at the Lushan plenum of the CCP Central Committee in August 1959. It has long been credibly surmised [2]—and the regime has by now pretty well confirmed—that Marshal P'eng personified and spoke for the grievances of two separate but allied groups which had become critics of Mao: first, those who objected to Maoist foreign and domestic policies primarily because they obstructed the rapid equipment of the Army with advanced weapons; and second, those who decried the blunders and self-delusion of the "Great Leap Forward" and the commune program because of the damage they did to the Chinese economy and the sufferings they caused to the Chinese people. The first group consisted mainly of professional army officers; the second of intellectuals of every variety—economists, literary men, party theoreticians, journalists, and officials of the cultural apparatus.

A point that has been repeatedly emphasized in the regime's published pronouncements over the last year is that the P'eng Te-huai case did not end with his dismissal and replacement by Lin Piao. On the contrary, it has been made clear that as the party retreated from the Great Leap—and particu-

[2] See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 8, Oct.-Dec. 1961.

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larly in 1961-62 when economic and other pressures forced the regime to admit some mistakes and loosen the reins considerably—a number of critics took advantage of the opportunity to go beyond officially-sanctioned limits and make covert attacks on the entire Great Leap concept and—most notably—on Mao Tse-tung personally.

This covert opposition was apparently centered in two party organizations—the Peking Municipal Party Committee and the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee—with sympathizers in many provinces and organizations throughout China. The chief culprit in Peking was Teng T'o, a writer and a secretary of the Peking party committee responsible for supervising the cultural life of the city. Closely allied with him were Wu Han, historian, playwright, essayist, and deputy mayor of Peking; Liao Mo-sha and Li Chi, Peking party functionaries under Teng T'o; and a variety of lesser lights in the Peking party apparatus, the Peking newspapers, publishing houses, and universities. The chief culprit in the Central Committee's Propaganda Department was its veteran deputy director, Chou Yang, one of the top overseers of China's cultural life.

Wu Han took the lead in February 1961 by writing a play entitled "Hai Jui's Dismissal." Ostensibly telling the story of an "upright official" of a past dynasty who was dismissed from office by the Emperor after he had defended the peasants against powerful oppressors, the play was actually intended as an allegorical attack on Mao's 1959 purge of P'eng Te-huai and was among the first of a series of similar veiled criticisms of Mao published by Wu Han, Teng T'o and other members of the Peking "establishment" during the 1961-63 period. In June 1961 Wu pursued a similar theme in an article about an ancient official who was wrongly dismissed from office but later "rehabilitated" and made "Secretary of War," and in 1962 he published still another allegory dealing with a past military leader who became the victim of "false charges" made against him by the Emperor because the latter "did not trust his generals." Wu made his 1962 story doubly pointed by alluding to dogmatists who "suffered great setbacks because they paid no attention to the objective situation and to advice given by those who had actual experience." [3]

While using the same allegorical method of attack, Teng T'o was, if anything, more prolific and outspoken than Wu Han. In two continuing series of essay-columns published in Peking newspapers between 1961 and 1963 (under the titles "Evening Chats at Yenshan" and "Notes from the Three-Family Village"), Teng made repeated critical allusions not only to Mao's purge of P'eng Te-huai but also to Maoist policies, theories and methods of leadership. Lengthy excerpts from Teng's writings in this period, cited by the regime last spring, leave little doubt of this. On four occasions he wrote symbolically of cases in which good officials were arbitrarily dismissed, praising the "rebellious spirit" of those who continued their opposition despite dismissal. On another occasion he wrote of "boastful and conceited" people who "make all decisions themselves and reject good advice from below," giving "flatterers" the upper hand. Some of his essays were readily transparent parodies on Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and the boast that Communist China would overtake Britain economically in ten years. One told the fable of an athlete who bragged of his ability to make "a long jump" "unequalled" in history but failed to carry out his boast —Teng appending the remark, "even now one can always and everywhere find such braggarts." Another told of "a greedy man" who "completely substituted illusion for reality" and concocted plans to build up great wealth in ten years starting with a single egg—only to wind up losing even the egg.[4]

Not all of Teng's attacks on Mao were so easily recognizable as the examples just cited; indeed, most of them were written in ambiguous, Aesopian language intended to be read between-the-lines and understood by a limited circle of like-minded intellectuals. Moreover, Teng was in a particularly advantageous position to get away with what he was doing—at least for some time. Not only was he, as a municipal party secretary, in charge of Peking's cultural life, but he also seems to have had the protective backing of P'eng Chen, the Peking party first secretary and a member of the central Politburo. In addition, it is now apparent that some of the Central Committee's watchdogs charged with keeping an eye out for subversive tendencies in the

[3] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 6, 1966.

[4] "Teng T'o's 'Evening Chats at Yenshan' Is Anti-party and Anti-Socialist Doubletalk," first published in *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (Liberation Army Daily—Peking) and *Kwangming Jih-pao* (Kwangming Daily—Peking), May 8, 1966; reprinted in *The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China* (2), Peking, 1966. This article provides substantial excerpts from Teng's writings, identifying when and where the cited materials originally appeared.

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press—most notably, the deputy director of the Propaganda Department, Chou Yang—were themselves inclined to sympathize with Teng's viewpoint and hence reluctant to denounce him.

Because of his former position as a top overseer of cultural life throughout China, Chou Yang is now being pictured as the chief villain responsible for the dissemination of "anti-party" views in literature and art, as a two-faced person who "supported Mao Tse-tung's thought in large meetings but attacked it at small meetings" and who, in the current stock phrase, "waved the red flag to oppose the red flag."[5] In view of Chou's long reputation in the West as a hard-line spokesman for the regime, the current charges against him require critical examination. In large part, they doubtless represent a typical Stalinist resort to vilification designed to dissociate Mao retroactively from certain of his own past policies—policies which Chou faithfully executed at the time but which, in today's context, are being officially identified with Mao's "revisionist" enemies. Thus, Chou has been made the chief scapegoat for the relaxation of controls over the literary, artistic and technical intelligentsia tolerated by Mao during 1961-62 as a matter of practical necessity, but now repudiated and laid at Chou's door.

On the other hand, the detailed evidence that has been marshaled against Chou suggests that there is some truth in the official charge that while supporting Mao in public he sometimes did otherwise in inner-party meetings. In particular, he seems to have shared the dissatisfaction of Wu Han, Teng T'o and others with the ill-conceived policies of the "Great Leap" and the excessive glorification of Mao—and to have voiced it on various occasions. At certain meetings held in northeast China in mid-1962, for example, he is said to have declared that the victory allegedly scored by the Leap was "a false one," and that it was "impossible to build socialism by relying only on mass movements."[6] Again, at a writers' meeting at Dairen in August 1962, he allegedly delivered a lengthy report in which he assailed the Leap as "subjective idealism" and deprecated the homage paid to Mao's thought, stating that "mere theories will not work; you have to show results."[7]

In addition, the regime has produced a mass of further detailed evidence purporting to show that Chou waged a continuous behind-the-scenes battle with zealous provincial party officials and the Army's General Political Department in an effort (a) to curb the increasingly extravagant worship of Mao and (b) to defend his own protégés against political reprisals. The evidence of Chou's activities under these two headings is convincing.[8]

Mao's Counteroffensive

It was at the Tenth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in September 1962 that Mao launched his counteroffensive against all this covert opposition within the party. From that time on, both the Peking party organization and the Central Committee cadres around Chou Yang were forced into retreat, and Chou's published speeches over the next few years dutifully echoed the prescribed line. However, when Mao began insisting on the exposure and punishment of all those who had surreptitiously opposed him in 1961-62, Chou was faced with a dilemma since he was being asked to uncover a trail that led back to himself.

Mao gradually stepped up the pressure. In December 1963, he set in motion a new mass campaign to propagate the theme that the whole country, and the party cadres in particular, should learn from the PLA (People's Liberation Army). This was a message which was to be repeated again and again in the next three years, constantly becoming louder and more insistent until it became a deafening shout in 1966. The party organization was thus enjoined to emulate the simple-minded fanaticism, the intolerance, the supine acceptance of Mao's cult, and above all the blind obedience which Mao felt were all more highly developed in the PLA than in any other segment of Chinese society.

Mao kept noting that the party's cultural cadres were more deficient in these PLA virtues than anyone else. In December 1963, Mao told the Union of Chinese Writers that in every field of art "very little has been achieved so far in socialist trans-

[5] An article in *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), No. 9, July 3, 1966, described Chou Yang as "the ringleader of the black gang of literature and art against the party." It claimed that he used his leading position to install his own men in literary and art organizations and also to obstruct the exposure and purging of this revisionist network.

[6] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Aug. 7, 1966.

[7] *Ibid.*, July 30, 1966.

[8] *E.g.*, evidence has been advanced showing that Chou defended "revisionist" Shanghai motion-picture writers such as Chu Pai-yin against the ultra-Maoist Shanghai municipal party committee, and similarly-inclined Changchun film writers such as Li Shan against the Kirin provincial party committee. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 19, July 27, and Aug. 7, 1966.

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formation." He complained that "the 'dead' still dominate many departments" and that "many Communists showed enthusiasm in advancing feudal and capitalist art, but no zeal in promoting socialist art." [9]

Seven months later Mao was still dissatisfied, and in June 1964 he warned leaders in the literary and artistic fields that in the past fifteen years they and "the journals controlled by them . . . in the main have not carried out the policies of the party." In recent years, he said, "they had even slid to the verge of revisionism," and "if they did not take serious steps to remold themselves, they were bound at some future date to become groups like the Hungarian Petöfi Club." [10]

According to the recent Chinese disclosures, these personal threats from Mao "came like a thunderbolt out of the blue," and Chou Yang is said to have responded with a "sham self-criticism" in which he confessed to having "committed errors of bureaucracy and failed to maintain close contact with the masses." Slowly the cadres retreated, evidently trying to gauge the degree of self-abasement necessary to appease Mao's wrath and save their skins.

With his enemies in retreat, Mao proceeded to tighten the screws still further. In midsummer of 1964, he summoned officials of the Central Committee's Higher Party School to a conference, following which the party press unleashed a concerted and ferocious attack on a former head of the school, the philosopher Yang Hsien-chien, also a member of the party Central Committee. Yang's alleged crime was a peculiar one. He was denounced for upholding the philosophical doctrine that "two-merge-into-one" and thus opposing the inspired Maoist teaching that "one-divides-into-two." Despite Yang's protestations that his philosophical tenet had no hidden political meaning and that he had merely sought to demonstrate the "inseparable connection between opposing aspects," Mao's press spokesmen strenuously insisted that Yang's "two-merge-into-one" theory was intended to symbolize proletarian reconciliation with capitalism and revisionism as against Mao's "one-divides-into-two" theory symbolizing the endless class struggle between the masses and the bourgeoisie, between the "revolutionary peoples" and imperialism, between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism (*i.e.*, between Mao and Khrushchev.) In other words, Yang was accused of using philosophical theory to oppose Mao's ideology and support the revisionists.[11]

Whether Yang was guilty or innocent was probably quite irrelevant. For Mao, the real purpose of the action against Yang was undoubtedly to drive home two important lessons to the leading cadres of the party apparatus: first, that Mao was willing to reach as high as the Central Committee to purge those he found insufficiently loyal; and second, that the struggle against heresy within the party was to become more uncompromising, with Yang's fate awaiting those found guilty of disobedience or opposition.

These steps by Mao to intensify the pressure on the party and non-party intelligentsia were accompanied, in the late summer and early fall of 1964, by an extraordinary rise in the stature of P'eng Chen. In September the party press for the first time bestowed on P'eng the highly selective designation of "close comrade in arms" of Mao Tse-tung. In the same period, P'eng became extremely active—more so than any other Politburo member—in public condemnation of "bourgeois" and "revisionist" influences in Chinese life. He was particularly prominent in the purge of the personnel and repertoire of the Peking opera, as a result of which this traditional Chinese art form has since been devoted largely to events of the civil war, feats of the PLA, and glorification of Mao.

A former Chinese Communist diplomatic official who sought political asylum in the United States in July 1966 has stated to the press that party documents to which he had access indicated that P'eng Chen had been "designated by Mao to make the cultural revolution." [12] Both the public role P'eng played and the signal marks of favor he received in 1964 make it credible that he did, in fact, receive this assignment from Mao. And this, in turn, goes a long way to explain the venom which has been poured on P'eng since the regime confirmed his downfall and revealed that he, too, had resisted Mao's intentions.

[9] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, June 6, 1966; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 30, 1966.
[10] *Ibid.*

[11] The campaign against Yang provided a small-scale preview of a process that was to be repeated in the fall of 1965 and the spring of 1966. What started out in May 1964 as a two-sided philosophical debate was transformed by fall into a unilateral campaign of denunciation against Yang. Like the defenders of Wu Han in 1965-66, those who thought the party had given them license to defend Yang and did so presently found themselves also under attack.
[12] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 4, 1966.

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你追我赶（油画） 李泽浩

On the back cover of its December 1964 issue, the Chinese Communist Youth League magazine *Chungkuo Ch'ing-nien* printed a color reproduction of a painting depicting young commune farm workers harvesting cotton. Weeks later the Communist authorities suddenly discovered that the painting, originally exhibited in Peking, contained a number of hidden anti-Communist and anti-Maoist symbols, and all copies of the magazine that could be found were seized. The symbols reportedly discernible in the original painting were: (1) concealed Chinese characters reading "kill communism"; (2) the faces of Mao and Lenin being trampled underfoot; (3) a procession of workers carrying the Communist "Three Red Banners," of which the second, symbolizing Mao's "Great Leap," has fallen to the ground; and (4) the fact that the cotton stalks are shown bending before the east wind (the east is always to the right in traditional Chinese paintings), whereas the clothing and hair of the workers are streaming in the opposite direction, as if to ridicule Mao's slogan that "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind." Of these symbols, only the last is clearly visible in the reduced black-and-white reproduction shown here. The alleged visage of Mao is barely discernible at the extreme right; that of Lenin appears in the middle foreground (both circled). Below, at left, is the title of the painting: "You press on, I shall overtake"; at right, the artist's name: Li Tse-hao.

In late 1964 and early 1965, it would appear that Mao still thought that the key officials of the Central Committee apparatus who had been in office for many years could be relied upon to stamp out intellectual dissidence, and that he selected P'eng Chen from among the Politburo members to direct the attack, much as Stalin designated Zhdanov to perform an analogous task in the Soviet Union in the 1940's. Similarly, although a purge of the Ministry of Culture headed by the writer Mao Tun was carried out in January 1965, Lu Ting-yi, the head of the Propaganda Department and an alternate member of the Politburo, was given Mao Tun's ministerial post as well.

In December 1964, however, an incident occurred which must have shaken Mao and strengthened his suspicions of the reliability of the propaganda apparatus as a whole. As an enterprising Canadian journalist in Peking later discovered, the December 1964 issue of *Chungkuo Ch'ing-nien*, monthly organ of the Communist Youth League, reproduced on its back cover a painting which contained several anti-Maoist symbols cleverly concealed in an otherwise orthodox scene of young Communists at work on a farm. Millions of copies of the magazine reportedly had already been distributed throughout the country before the authorities finally discovered the deception, recalled all copies of the issue, and subjected both the members of the journal's editorial board and the original artist to "strenuous investigation." [13] This incident certainly must have influenced Mao's later decisions not only to purge the leadership of the Communist Youth League and suppress its publications, but also to bypass the organization entirely in the creation of a new youth corps, the Red Guards.

During 1965 Mao showed signs of mounting concern and dissatisfaction. He obviously felt that he was approaching death and feared that he would be unable to bind his successors to his policies. In a January 1965 interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow, Mao remarked sardonically that he was preparing himself for "facing God." He told Snow that after his death the Chinese revolution might continue to develop toward communism, but that it could also happen that Chinese youth would

[13] Charles Taylor, in *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1965.

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disavow the revolution and make peace with capitalism and imperialism.[14]

It was evident that by this time Mao was becoming increasingly impatient with the performance of those he had charged with remaking China in his own image. And with good reason, for the key cadres to whom this responsibility had been delegated—P'eng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, and Chou Yang—were apparently dragging their feet in carrying out Mao's orders for a thorough purge of anti-Maoist intellectual dissidence. As far as they felt that it was safe to do so, they sought surreptitiously to avert or slow down disciplinary action, and they often had pressing personal reasons for doing so. One such instance was revealed in the Hunanese provincial press last June. According to this report, Hunanese party officials initiated a movement in the first part of 1965 to criticize the "reactionary views" of Kang To, a leading local writer, particularly certain anti-Maoist opinions Kang had expressed in August 1962, but "the materials on his anti-party activities were withheld from publication due to pressure from certain 'authorities' in the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee." [15]

It may be surmised that Chou Yang, Lu's deputy in the Propaganda Department, was one of the obstructing "authorities," and his reasons for doing so are understandable since he had been guilty in 1962 of voicing much the same criticisms of Mao and Maoist policies for which the Hunanese party now proposed to denounce Kang. Chou may well have felt that he could not "carry out Mao's instructions" without eventually placing his own position in jeopardy.

Recent evidence suggests that P'eng Chen and party propaganda chief Lu Ting-yi were in much the same sort of dilemma. According to the former Chinese diplomatic official already mentioned, secret party documents he saw before his defection charged P'eng with having declared at an unpublicized conference of provincial party propaganda cadres in September 1965 "that everyone in the face of truth is equal, that everyone should be given freedom to speak, and that even if the Chairman [Mao] is wrong, then he, too, must be criticized." [16] It is probable that the last remark was either distorted or exaggerated by the party, for it seems unlikely that P'eng would have dared to go so far. However, it does seem likely that on this occasion he advocated more restraint toward dissidents than Mao was willing to tolerate. This is in fact one of the main charges that were repeatedly hurled at P'eng and his "black gang" by the Chinese press in the spring of 1966 after they had fallen. According to the defector, the party documents he saw also accused Lu Ting-yi of having delivered a speech attacking Stalin at the same conference. No details were given, but almost any criticism of Stalin's methods, no matter how adroitly worded or hedged with orthodox phrases, would certainly have been resented by Mao as an indirect rebuke to himself.

Prelude to the Purge

In November 1965, Mao began a determined drive to separate the sheep from the goats, both internationally and in China itself. Externally, the Chinese press bluntly told the CPSU that there are "things which divide us and nothing that unites us." [17] At home, the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" was launched, setting in motion the process that was to lead to the unbridled lunacy of the summer of 1966.

On November 10 the Shanghai municipal party committee placed an officially-inspired article in the local literary journal *Wen Hui Pao*, underlining its importance by having it republished two days later in the official Shanghai party organ *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*. Written by a journalist named Yao Wen-yuan, the article for the first time attacked Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal" as a "big poisonous weed" serving the ends of class enemies who had been attacking the party since 1961. The attack did not go beyond Wu Han, but in view of his position as Deputy Mayor of Peking, it inevitably posed an implicit threat to Teng T'o and the Peking municipal party organization, particularly to P'eng Chen, its top official.

The Chinese press not only has stated repeatedly that Mao "personally organized and led the great proletarian cultural revolution" [18] but also has intimated that he privately instructed the Shanghai municipal committee to publish the Yao article. This is completely credible—indeed, inescapable—because Mao in early November had not yet disappeared from sight and would naturally have had

[14] *The New Republic* (New York), Feb. 27, 1965.
[15] Changsha Radio Domestic Service, June 8, 1966, reporting an article published in the *Hunan Daily*.
[16] *The Washington Star*, Aug. 31, 1966.
[17] *Jen-min Jih-pao—Hung Ch'i* joint editorial, Nov. 11, 1965.
[18] *E.g., Hung Ch'i*, No. 11, Aug. 21, 1966.

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to approve a step with such grave political implications. Teng T'o and P'eng Chen apparently were alarmed by the attack on Wu Han. The Chinese have since revealed that a representative of the Peking party organization called the Shanghai committee afterward and demanded to know the reason for the publication of the Yao article, as well as why the Peking authorities had not been notified in advance.[19]

About two weeks after this initial attack on the Peking establishment, Mao suddenly vanished from public view—and evidently from Peking—to remain out of sight for more than five months. Some time earlier, Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's long-time crony, former secretary, ghost-writer, and editor of the Central Committee organ *Hung Ch'i*, had also disappeared from view, and it seems probable that the two men were together during this interval, for both reappeared simultaneously on about May 10, 1966, just after P'eng Chen had finally been purged. This sequence of events and Ch'en Po-ta's subsequent elevation to a key position in the party hierarchy suggest that Mao's disappearance was not because of illness.[20]

A few days after Mao's last appearance in November, the army newspaper *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, the central party daily *Jen-min Jih-pao*, and the Peking municipal party organ *Peking Jih-pao* all reprinted the Yao Wen-yuan article. The army organ significantly accompanied it with an editorial endorsement of Yao's charges against Wu Han, whereas *Peking Jih-pao* and even *Jen-min Jih-pao* merely attached non-committal editor's notes calling for open debate. This unusual discrepancy left the provincial press understandably confused and divided as to which line to follow. Indeed, it was this confusion, coupled with Mao's prolonged absence from public view, that led to rumors in the West that Mao was dead or dying and an intra-party battle for the succession under way.

Actually, it now seems clear that by November 1965 Mao had become aware that there were persons holding high positions in the Peking party organization and Central Committee apparatus who had been covertly opposing some of his policies, and that he instigated the attack on Wu Han in order to identify them more clearly by putting them to a final test. The most important of the suspects was P'eng Chen. What Mao evidently was most anxious to determine was whether P'eng, given a clear lead by Yao Wen-yuan's article, would follow the indicated path to his own municipal party committee and purge it.[21]

This P'eng obviously felt that he could not do. He had long been permitted to run the Peking party organization as an "independent kingdom" with considerable autonomy from Central Committee control,[22] and if he were to admit and expose the surreptitious opposition to Mao that had been going on there for so long, he could not evade responsibility himself, and his own position in the party would have been imperiled. P'eng therefore chose to brazen it out and, according to information later published by the regime, even attempted—with the aid of Teng T'o and Chou Yang—to sidetrack the campaign against Wu Han and softpedal its political significance.

Thus, on three occasions in December 1965, Teng T'o is said to have spoken in defense of Wu Han at meetings in Peking, arguing that Yao's viewpoint was not yet the party line, demanding a free debate, and attacking the PLA organ's editorial support of the charges against Wu as reflecting a lack of democracy in the army. Similarly, Chou Yang, allegedly "acting on the orders of the chieftain of the counterrevolutionary sinister gang" (P'eng Chen), is claimed to have advanced "such arguments as 'everyone is equal before the truth' and 'avoid one-sidedness' . . . in a vain attempt to subdue the mighty tide of the proletarian revolution."[23] Meanwhile, from December through March, the Peking press published articles of ostensible self-criticism by Wu Han, and of ostensible criticism of Wu by Teng T'o and others, all apparently designed to divert the discussion away from the alleged anti-Maoist intent of Wu's writings into the non-political framework of "academic error."

[19] *Ibid.*, No. 7, May 15, 1966.

[20] Ch'en was later designated by Mao to head "the cultural revolution group" of the Central Committee, thus assuming the task which Mao had earlier entrusted to P'eng Chen.

[21] That this was the purpose of Mao's maneuver was intimated in an article published in the Central Committee organ *Hung Ch'i* after P'eng's fall (No. 7, May 15, 1966). Addressing P'eng without explicitly naming him, the article said: "In November 1965 a drastic change took place on the front of the socialist cultural revolution. A new counter-attack began, and Teng T'o's collaborator Wu Han was exposed. If you had really wanted to expose Teng T'o, . . . *you still had a last chance to take the initiative, and yet you failed to do so.* Instead, you continued to ask Teng T'o to make reports and write articles in support and defense of Wu Han." (Italics added)

[22] See editorial in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 9, July 3, 1966, regarding the previous autonomy of the Peking party organization.

[23] *Peking Review*, Aug. 19, 1966.

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The Closing of the Trap

In March and April of 1966, there were indications that the trap Mao had laid for his suspected enemies was at last being sprung. P'eng Chen appeared in public for the last time in late March, and on April 16 *Peking Jih-pao* printed the first public criticism directed at municipal party secretary Teng T'o. It is clear that the Peking party organization's own official newspaper would not have done this unless some crucial new development had occurred behind the scenes, and in fact the regime later indicated that *Peking Jih-pao*'s action had followed criticism by Mao of the Peking party committee and was really a final effort to evade this criticism by minimizing Teng T'o's guilt.[24] It would appear from this that sometime in late March or early April Mao finally called P'eng Chen to account, probably at an unpublicized high-level party meeting, for the latter's failure to purge his own municipal party committee.

There were other signs of mounting pressure. On April 2 *Jen-min Jih-pao* belatedly joined for the first time in denouncing Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal," as "a poisonous weed." Three days later an editorial in the PLA's *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* called upon old comrades in high places to engage in self-criticism, while another editorial in the same paper quoted Mao on the responsibility of a party secretary for the mistakes of his party committee.

Still another ominous portent was the appearance in the press on April 14 of a self-abasing speech by Kuo Mo-jo, Communist China's leading "official" intellectual and well-known sycophant of Mao. Responding to a report delivered by the Deputy Minister of Culture (whose remarks were not reported but evidently assailed China's intellectuals), Kuo figuratively prostrated himself at Mao's feet and acknowledged the "worthlessness" of everything he had written to date. This astonishing performance presumably was not demanded of Kuo by way of punishing him (in fact, he became still more active immediately afterward), but rather seems to have been designed to set the tone for the forthcoming humiliation and terrorization of all intellectuals who, unlike Kuo, still dared to indulge in independent thought.

During the next two months, events moved rapidly toward a climax. In early May the PLA organ *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* and the Shanghai party press took the lead in a concerted campaign which first attacked the Peking municipal press, then exposed in long-prepared detail the sins of Teng T'o and the Peking party apparatus, and finally began to point the finger more and more directly at P'eng Chen. P'eng and his closest associates were formally replaced in office sometime before May 25, for by that date—as the regime belatedly made public in early June—a new Peking party committee was already in office and engaged in reorganizing the municipal press. It seems likely that the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee was also purged at about this time, although announcement of Lu Ting-yi's replacement as director by Tao Chu was not made until early July.

Very probably the central party daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* also underwent a housecleaning of its editorial staff near the end of May, for the tone of the paper abruptly changed from the beginning of June. As noted earlier, the paper had shown evident reluctance to back the charges against Wu Han in November 1965, and ever since it had lagged conspicuously behind the PLA's *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* and the Shanghai party organs in pressing the campaign to expose alleged anti-Maoist elements in the party. Soon after the ouster of P'eng Chen and the probably coincident purge of the Central Committee Propaganda Department's top officials, however, the paper on June 1 started a series of authoritative editorials, published on several consecutive days, which spoke out in peremptory fashion, using approved Maoist terms of vilification and intimidation, against the bourgeois-revisionist "freaks and monsters" seeking to undermine the revolution.[25] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, on June 6, underscored the change by referring to these editorials as marking *Jen-min Jih-pao*'s entry into battle and calling them "important instructions on the current struggle"—a remarkable obeisance in view of the different roles the two papers had played up until then. All this suggests that here, too, those who had failed to meet Mao's test had been replaced.

The Role of the Army

The purge of the Peking party committee and the Central Committee Propaganda Department represented, among other things, the culmination of a

[24] See *Hung Ch'i*, No. 9, July 3, 1966.

[25] These editorials appeared in *Jen-min Jih-pao* from June 1 through June 5. They were later included in the compilation of authoritative materials on the cultural revolution published by the regime (*The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China*, Peking, 1966).

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long behind-the-scenes struggle between these two organizations on the one hand, and the PLA's dominant Lin Piao leadership and General Political Department on the other. As far as we can determine, the issues in contention were whether there should be greater or less regimentation of thought, greater or less uniformity in discussion and art, and greater or less pandering to the cult of Mao. Lin Piao and the PLA stood for the enforcement of absolute conformity, and the party intellectuals despised and feared the PLA as the "cudgel" with which Mao was belaboring them. As mentioned earlier, for example, Peking party secretary Teng T'o is claimed to have instructed cadre meetings in Peking in December 1965 to ignore the PLA's public support of the charges against Wu Han on the ground that "there was no airing of views within the army" and that Mao teaches "us to overcome the habit of acting blindly." Attacking Teng in May 1966, at about the time of his removal, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* retorted:

You people called us a stick; that is correct. We, the people's armed forces, are a stick. Furthermore it is not an ordinary stick, but a heavy club of proletarian dictatorship, and it is used for the sole purpose of beating those harmful anti-party and anti-socialist people like you. . . . Long ago Chairman Mao said to those who call us dictators: Dear Sirs, what you have said is right. We are just like that.[26]

Chou Yang, as deputy chief of the party propaganda apparatus, was apparently even more of a thorn in the army's side. Chou was charged, among other things, with approving all motion pictures produced in China, and part of the case made against him when he was purged was that he had used his authority over a period of years to oppose films which the PLA leadership and General Political Department "considered good in popularizing Mao Tse-tung's thought" and to favor others which they viewed as "bad and containing serious mistakes."[27] According to the PLA, the central bone of contention in its running battle with Chou was the cultivation of the Mao cult, with Chou consistently taking an obstructionist stand and belittling Mao with "malicious slanders." At one meeting Chou was quoted as having said, "In praising Chairman Mao, one must see if it is the right place and the right time," and "It would be vulgar to talk about him 365 days a year."[28]

[26] May 13, 1966.
[27] PLA statement reported by *New China News Agency* (NCNA), July 16, 1966.
[28] *Ibid.*

The triumph of the PLA was thus a simultaneous triumph for Mao's cult, which has since been pushed to still greater and more fantastic extremes. It was also, of course, a personal victory for Lin Piao, who after the May purges received his initial reward in the form of unprecedented tributes to him in the press as an interpreter and spokesman for Mao's views. Finally, it set the stage for the public disclosure of an earlier behind-the-scenes victory for Lin Piao—and Mao—over PLA Chief of Staff and Central Committee secretary Lo Jui-ch'ing, who apparently had been purged sometime during the winter but whose replacements in his two chief posts were not announced until the summer of 1966.[29] The regime has displayed sensitivity and reticence about the reasons for Lo's purge, but it has intimated that he was guilty of (a) supporting the "professional military" viewpoint (*i.e.*, a return to P'eng Te-huai's heresy) and (b) resisting a purge of supporters of Chou Yang in the PLA's cultural appa-

[29] Lo's last reported appearance in public was in November 1965, and he did not attend a PLA political work conference held early in 1966. His replacement as PLA Chief of Staff was publicly disclosed on August 1 in connection with the formal celebration of the 39th anniversary of the Chinese Red Army.

Stalinist Paranoia—Maoist Version

The anti-people, anti-Communist, and counter-revolutionary revisionist elements of the "Three-Family Village," . . . and the notorious right opportunists who have been dismissed from office, are all dregs of the nation working for foreign countries. To overthrow the proletarian dictatorship and carry out the restoration of capitalism, they have not hesitated to sell out the motherland, betray the nation, give up their souls, treat a thief as their father, open the door to invite in robbers, let a wolf in the door, and abet all crimes. . . . They . . . indicated that if they succeeded in their plot, they would exterminate all the revolutionary people holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, thus turning China into a colony of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

—From an article in Chieh-fang Jih-pao (Shanghai), June 22, 1966.

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ratus and General Political Department. Such a purge had evidently been carried out in February 1966 and was amplified and made public in June after Chou Yang and P'eng Chen had fallen.

Those who have fallen victim to the purges, in both the party and the army, have been defamed and vilified in typical Stalinist fashion. Just as the Old Bolsheviks whom Stalin had defeated were later condemned as "wreckers," spies, traitors, and "enemies of the people," so Mao's latest victims—his old party comrades of long standing—have been denounced as "representatives of the bourgeoisie," as "revisionists," and even as members of "a counterrevolutionary clique" conspiring "to usurp the leadership of the party, army and government so as to restore capitalism." [30] All these fanciful accusations against veteran Communist cadres are obviously designed to camouflage the fact that their real offense lay simply in daring to oppose Mao's will and question his policies.

The Intellectual Terror

As the purge spread through the party's central and provincial cultural apparatus in June and July of 1966, every sector of cultural activity supervised by the apparatus was terrorized in turn—particularly the universities and the teaching profession, but also the press and television, the novelists, musicians, and movie-makers. The degradation heaped upon teachers was staggering. News reports from Western correspondents in Peking spoke of professors being forced to sit on stools and wear dunce caps while students taunted and accused them; [31] escapees to Hong Kong from nearby Canton gave eyewitness accounts of students "painting their professors' faces with chalk and ink, taunting them and spitting at them, all in the name of Chairman Mao." [32] Still other eyewitnesses described teachers in a South China school being beaten while kneeling at a mass rally.[33]

These activities were initially supervised throughout China by "work teams" sent out to the various educational institutions by the next higher party committee. In June and July, however, *Jen-min Jih-pao* issued sporadic warnings of dissatisfaction at the highest level with the improper manner in which the purge was being carried out in many places by the teams and local party officials. Then, in July, according to reports from Western correspondents on the spot, the work team sent to Peking University by the new municipal party committee to supervise the purge there was itself purged after having been criticized by student activists. Such criticism of party organs from below is only possible in China if inspired from the top, and the Western press in fact reported a previous stormy visit to the University by high party officials, among them Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, who appears by then to have been assigned a key organizational role in the cultural revolution. Similar action seems to have been taken against the party work teams at other universities and secondary schools.

The reasons for the dissatisfaction of the top leadership with the performance of the work teams were partially clarified by Premier Chou En-lai speaking at Tsinghua University in August. Chou, whose talk was reported only in a university wall poster, said that the "activist squads" sent out on orders of the party authorities in June "did not fully know their mission and committed a universal mistake." [34] As to the nature of this "mistake," the Central Committee's "Decision on the Cultural Revolution," adopted by the Eleventh Plenum at its session during the first two weeks of August and made public on August 8,[35] supplied a revealing clue:

> **Responsible men of certain schools, units, and work teams have been launching *counter-attacks against the masses*, writing big-character posters criticizing them [the masses], or raising the slogan that opposition to them [the party work teams, etc.] means opposition to the CCP Central Committee, the party, socialism, and the revolution. (Italics added).**

From this it would appear that many work teams and local party officials had used their authority not only to suppress "revisionists" and "rightists" but also to "counterattack" young Maoist fanatics who criticized them for not being severe and thorough enough in prosecuting the cultural revolution.

Blueprint for Anarchy

The Central Committee's resolution provided for the setting up of special cultural revolution "teams, committees, and congresses" which would supplant

[30] *E.g.*, see *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, July 1, 1966. In the case of Chou Yang, the vilification has even been carried to the point of picturing him as a ruthless "landlord" and exploiter of peasants. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1966.
[31] *The New York Times*, July 14, 1966.
[32] *The Washington Post*, Sept. 25, 1966.
[33] *The Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 14, 1966.
[34] *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1966.
[35] NCNA, Aug. 8, 1966.

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the former work teams and serve as "organs of power." However, an editorial in *Hung Ch'i* (August 10) made it clear that these bodies would provide guidance and control, and that everything else would be left to "the unknown soldiers and daring young generals"—that is, to the young student fanatics soon to be organized and unleashed under the banner of the "Red Guards."

Party officials at all levels were warned that they might come under criticism in wall posters, and that they should accept such criticism calmly. Presumably the decision as to whether the criticized officials would also be attacked in the press and eventually purged would be reserved to the central party authorities. Those who accepted criticism and were lucky enough not to be earmarked for replacement by the leaders in Peking would not be purged. In short, the whole party apparatus, except for Mao and a small number of selected leaders at the top, was to be exposed to semi-public criticism (*i.e.*, in wall posters), and suppression of such criticism would itself be grounds—or an excuse—for replacement.

There is good reason to believe that CPR Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i and party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing resisted this proposal when it was put forward by Mao at the August Plenum, and that they were supported by a good many other Central Committee members who, quite naturally, were not eager to see this "Marxist-Leninist innovation" put into effect. Both Liu and Teng, as products of the party machine who were instrumental in shaping its organization and staffing, could hardly have accepted without protest the anarchy into which Mao's plan promised to plunge the whole party.[36]

It became apparent that Liu and Teng had been demoted in party ranking at the Plenum, with Lin Piao shortly being proclaimed Mao's "closest comrade in arms" and presumably his chosen heir in place of Liu. Chou En-lai appears to have remained faithful to Mao at the Plenum and has since been confirmed as third man in the hierarchy. Some hitherto secondary figures who likewise proved themselves loyal to Mao—T'ao Chu, Ch'en Po-ta, and K'ang Sheng—suddenly rose in party stature, becoming members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Ch'en Po-ta heads the all-important "Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee," which presumably directs the activities of the Red Guards, with Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing as his first deputy. That Mao has given such an important role to his wife is indicative not so much of nepotism as of his desperate search for cadres he can fully trust to fill key positions.

In this writer's view, the conjecture of some journalists that Lin Piao engineered all this himself, using Mao as a puppet, is fallacious. In the face of the opposition of the two leading officials of the party machine (underlined since the Plenum by the hostile reaction of a large segment of party officialdom to the activities of the Red Guards), only one man could have had the strength to force through the party Central Committee a decision fraught with such threatening consequences for its members—and this certainly was not Lin Piao. Whether Lin will eventually build up such strength in the Central Committee as the result of the current purges is another question.

The Red Guards

What Liu and Teng undoubtedly tried to prevent at the August Plenum materialized during the ensuing weeks. On August 13, the Central Committee of the Young Communist League was reorganized without public announcement, and the YCL's propaganda organs subsequently ceased publication.

In the place of the old youth order came the new disorder—the Red Guards. Much has been written in the Western press about the activities of these bands of fanatical secondary-school and university students—the attacks on persons regarded as bourgeois, the beating of aged persons in the streets, the seizure and destruction of works of art, the attacks on both Christian churches and Buddhist temples, the forced extortion of ancestral tablets from terrorized peasants, the desecration of graveyards, and so on.

After these initial rampages, Red Guard activities in Peking were quieted down somewhat and regularized, and the focus of attack shifted to the provincial party organizations. Red Guards from other areas were brought to Peking for giant rallies attended by Mao and the new party leaders, listened to speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and then were sent back home to "storm the provincial party committee." This unprecedented method of conducting a purge—by humiliating and discrediting an entire provincial party organization rather than by simply replacing individual officials—went beyond anything conceived by Stalin and must have been regarded by innumerable second-level party

[36] There is substantial evidence suggesting that both men tried before the August Plenum to dissuade Mao from this step, and that they were dragging their feet in July while Mao's resolve hardened.

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leaders as an invitation to anarchy. In fact, there were widespread reports of provincial party leaders defending their prerogatives, asserting their immunity from criticism, and organizing resistance to their teen-age tormentors from Peking, with the result that violent clashes occurred in some places.

Finally, in September, there were some cautionary notes. The Red Guards were told not to attack factories or communes, and many of them were sent into the countryside to help the communes with the harvesting. At the same time, their organization was greatly tightened, and the formation of committees in the provinces to supervise their activities was accelerated, with party and PLA representatives both playing key roles. Classes in schools and universities remained suspended, however, and foreign students were sent home for a year, suggesting that Red Guard activities will dominate school life for many months to come.

Whatever course future events in Communist China may take, the developments to date have amply demonstrated that Mao's judgment regarding his lieutenants is as fallible as his judgment in other matters. Mao now appears to have placed his confidence in Lin Piao, who for many years strove to win that confidence by zealously supporting the policies closest to Mao's heart. But no one, including Mao, can know what is really in Lin's mind, and what he will do after Mao is gone—if indeed he should then be able to make good his claim to the succession, itself highly uncertain. The history of the Chinese Communist regime, like that of Stalin's, suggests that the public performance of Communist leaders under the eye of the dictator is not necessarily a reliable guide to their future performance when he has departed. But at least while Mao still lives, Lin Piao's chosen course seems clear: to follow Mao's lead to the end.

A Nation in Agony

By Theodore Hsi-en Chen

The most startling news from Communist China in recent months has been the frenzied rampage of young people calling themselves the "Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution." Obviously the Red Guards have mounted their campaign with official instigation and approval. The big question is: what are the Chinese Communists up to? Why are they indulging in destructive acts that risk nullifying the gains they have made in the past seventeen years of Communist rule?

No one can deny that the Communists have accomplished much since the birth of their regime. Politically, they have forged an intricate system of government and party administration that exercises effective authority in all parts of mainland China. Economically, they have made a good start towards industrialization, and the more rational policies pursued since the collapse of the "Great Leap" have brought a revival of agriculture and a better economic balance. The growth of state revenues and domestic stability have enabled the government to

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project its influence abroad and to extend aid to Asian and African countries. In the area of social reform, the Communists have substantially reduced social and economic inequality and established greatly expanded public welfare services; they have established an extensive system of full-time and part-time schools, for adults as well as school-age students, so that there are more educational institutions and more students enrolled in them than at any previous time in China's history. In view of all this, it is not surprising that many visitors to the Chinese mainland have come away highly impressed by the achievements of what appears to be a dynamic society under the leadership of an efficient and energetic, if rigidly totalitarian, government.

Significant as these achievements are, however, they represent only a part of the Chinese Communist program of revolution. The Communists are not satisfied with building a strong and prosperous China; they must push ahead to establish a new society and a new way of life. For them, it is not enough to have a government exercising effective control, not enough to have a stable and growing economy, not enough to have the piecemeal social reforms that are customarily sought by bourgeois-liberal reformers. Such developments are desirable only insofar as they constitute an advance toward the ultimate goal of establishing socialism and communism. Communism calls for the establishment of a new society, not only with new institutions but also with new social and economic relationships reflecting a new ideology, and with new loyalties and new attitudes to reinforce the ideology. It demands no less than a new type of man for a new social order. It requires fundamental changes in the minds and hearts of the people.

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" that has been gradually gathering momentum in mainland China since 1965 and has produced the Red Guards of 1966 is in essence a redoubled effort to change the minds and hearts of China's millions. This is not the first time that such an effort has been made. It is precisely because the previous attempts were not altogether successful that a massive new campaign has been deemed necessary by the Communist regime.

The Communists were reaching a peak of achievement and confidence in 1957. Reporting to the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress on June 26, 1957, Premier Chou En-lai noted with satisfaction the success of the new regime in consolidating its power.[1] Five major campaigns, he said, had helped to achieve this consolidation. They were: (1) the agrarian land reform campaign to destroy feudalism and the landlord class; (2) the "Resist-America, Aid-Korea" campaign to combat American "imperialism" and root out its evil influences in Chinese society; (3) the drive against "counterrevolutionaries" to eliminate opposition; (4) the "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns directed at the urban bourgeoisie; and (5) the ideological remolding movement designed to change the outlook, thought patterns, and basic loyalties of the whole people, especially the intellectuals.

These campaigns all took place in the early years of the regime. It should also be noted that although ideological remolding is listed as a separate campaign, it was actually involved in every one of the other four. One of the essential purposes of the agrarian reform was to instill "class consciousness" in the peasants and teach them to wage bitter class struggle against the landlords. The "Resist-America" drive, though linked directly with the Korean War, had the broader aim of eliminating ideas and attitudes traceable to American influence. The targets of the campaign against "counterrevolutionaries" were not strictly limited to those who committed outright acts of opposition against the new regime; they included those whose thinking was not in line with the new ideology. And the campaign directed at the urban bourgeoisie sought to combat "bourgeois ideology" and the "bourgeois way of life" as well as to suppress capitalism in economic life.

From the beginning of their regime, therefore, the Communists have stressed the supreme importance of changing the minds and hearts of the people. But this has proven to be an extremely difficult task. It was relatively easy to divest the landlords of their property and influence, even to liquidate a good many of them. It was a simple task to take over the educational institutions supported by American funds and cleanse the school curriculum of American-influenced subjects of study. The "counterrevolutionaries" were quickly silenced and the bourgeoisie compelled to submit to the new regulations for industry and commerce. But "unproletarian" ideas still persisted. After a decade and a half punctuated by successive campaigns of "ideological remolding" and "thought reform," the Communists came to the disconcerting realization that their battle for the minds and hearts of China's mil-

[1] The English translation of Chou's report appears in a supplement to *People's China* (Peking), July 16, 1957.

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lions had not made much headway. The intellectuals still harbored bourgeois ideas, and the people were still moved by desires and ambitions unworthy of a collective socialist society.

Mao's regime came to power in 1949. During the first few months, the Communists pursued a policy of relative moderation in order to allay the fears of the population. They talked about "New Democracy" instead of socialism and communism, implying that no drastic changes were impending.

After the Korean war, their major concern was the consolidation of power. The agrarian reform put the rural population under their control. The suppression of "counterrevolutionaries" eliminated

Memo To *Pravda*: Lest You Forget

Pravda on Chinese "Red Guards"

Here and there on the streets of Peking are people working and wearing signs reading "capitalist" and "private property owner" on chest and back. The "Red Guards" shower them with abuse and jeer at them as they walk along the city's streets. People with such signs can see motion pictures only standing (there are no seats for them in movie theaters). After the showing they must clean up the theater. They must also stand in buses. There are also no seats for them in restaurants.

—September 13, 1966.

The "Red Guards" detained Li Chung-huan, member of the Tientsin City Party Committee and mayor of the city, after demanding that he answer several questions. Li Chung-huan refused, on the grounds that he had to be at a meeting of the city committee. The "Red Guards" gave him one minute to telephone the city committee and to prepare to go; then they took him out and tried to secure a confession from him to the effect that the Tientsin City Party Committee is a "black gang." He was forced to "stand at attention" from 6 PM until midnight, then he was beaten up. Bloody and unconscious. Li Chung-huan was sent to the hospital.

The "Red Guards" beat up one worker because he was in a room where a portrait of Mao Tse-tung was found with a crack in its frame.

During the day of August 26 alone, the "Red Guards" beat up more than 40 persons, of whom six were sent to the hospital in serious condition.

Chen Chang-hua, one of the leaders of a Tientsin "Red Guard" group, went to Peking for instructions. The "wall newspaper" reported that, upon his return, he declared that he had met with responsible comrades who were leading the "cultural revolution," and they had told him that the thesis of the necessity to "conduct the fight by word and not by force" should not be obeyed to the letter. . . .

Questions arise: Why are non-party youths and school children called upon to criticize Communists and to judge the work of party bodies? . . . . For what cause was it necessary to replace the lawful agencies of people's rule in China and violate the Constitution and elementary principles of legality?

—September 15, 1966.

Komsomolskaia Pravda on Soviet "People's Guards"

[When cameramen attempted to set up mobile television units at a soccer match in Nikolaiev,] . . . some brave fellows with the red armbands of "people's guards" came up and ordered the sets to be removed immediately . . . The spectators were kind enough to point out that the cameras were not bothering anyone. But Mednik, the chief of the city headquarters of the people's guards, was so incensed that he would not listen to anyone. He ordered that the cameras be tossed over the fence. Naturally, Chief Engineer Zasukhin, a secretary of the primary Komsomol organization of the television center began to protest.

"Grab him," shouted Mednik.

They held the young engineer's arms and the chief of the people's guards hit him in the face. The engineer, who knew a little jujitsu, tried in vain to defend himself. At Mednik's command they fell upon the engineer and beat him. Some of them kicked him and some hit him from behind. . . .

Almost the most important work of the people's guards is to spy into other people's bedrooms and to relish the details of private lives. It is nothing for the "guards" to knock at someone's door at night and wake up the old folks and children to check on the behavior of Tamara, Zinaida, or Larisa. In Nikolaiev, if a girl wants to go to a restaurant with her boyfriend, the doorman will rudely halt them at the door and demand Mednik's special permission . . . Things went so far that on Mednik's order the "people's guards" detained 15 young women without any cause and also on his order demanded that they undergo a humiliating medical examination in the dispensary. For these acts alone Mednik should have been ousted from the people's guards and brought to court. But he gets away with everything, just as he did with the incident at the stadium.

—October 6, 1960.

It is remarkable that Comrade Dragomirov [deputy city prosecutor] . . . defends Mednik and heaps dirt on those who dare to complain. What can be said of the principles of this guardian of the law?

—May 5, 1961.

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political opposition. The class struggles against landlords and the urban bourgeoisie strengthened the position of "proletarian leadership." Anti-American agitation and ideological remolding attacked potential sources of resistance to the Communist ideology.

The consolidation of power, in essence a political revolution, paved the way for the economic revolution—the first Five-Year Plan (1953-57) and the transition to socialism. The "New Democracy" was terminated, and the era of socialism began in 1954. "A new upsurge in the socialist mass movement" was declared to be in progress, agriculture was collectivized, and private industry and commerce were "transformed" into socialist enterprises. These were the years in which the Communist regime's positive achievements in economic rehabilitation and material construction won widespread recognition abroad. But for the Chinese Communists, who could not be satisfied with anything less than a total revolution embracing every phase of individual and group life, there was still something lacking. Beneath the outward submission and the conformity, the people still clung to ideas, thoughts, and attitudes which were basically inimical to the political, economic and social collectivism which the Communists considered essential to their new society. There was the danger that these old ideas, thoughts, habits, attitudes—the "old" way of life, in short—might reassert themselves and jeopardize the visible, surface gains that had been made. It was this danger that the Communists had in mind when they issued frequent warnings against a possible "rebirth of capitalism" and a revival of bourgeois ideology.

While the Communists were hitherto concerned with concrete tasks of political and economic transformation, with the tangible process of replacing old institutions with new ones, the "cultural revolution" has less specific targets. It is aimed at the minds and hearts of the people and what goes on in them under the cover of apparent conformity—at sentiments and habits of thought which, the Communists fear, could reassert themselves and become the wellspring of resistance and opposition, even open rebellion. The fact that the Chinese Communist leaders still today speak out against those who hope for a "Hungarian uprising" in China shows that they do not discount even this extreme possibility.

The need for getting at the mainspring of the revolution—the minds and hearts of the people—has become more pressing in recent years. While due credit for the substantial achievements of the middle 1950's must be given to the Communists' organizational ability and the stimulus imparted by an energetic government, a major factor contributing to those successes was the initial enthusiastic response of the public to the new regime's appeal for hard work and concerted action to build a strong nation. Having yearned so long for a return to peace that would give them the opportunity to make long-range plans and exercise their frustrated capabilities, the Chinese people eagerly responded to the Communists' catchy slogans and patriotic appeals. They put forth their best efforts and made possible the production records that distinguished the first Five-Year Plan. The second Five-Year Plan (1957-62) was inaugurated with fanfare and extravagant promises, but these promises were not fulfilled. Instead, thanks to the ill-conceived and impetuous policies of the "Great Leap Forward" and the communes, serious economic dislocations became evident before the end of 1959, and the country was plunged into an economic crisis in 1960-62 that caused widespread suffering and disillusionment and drove large numbers of refugees across the border into Hong Kong. Natural disasters and the withdrawal of Soviet aid helped to aggravate the crisis, to be sure, but a major factor in the collapse was the fact that the people lost the enthusiasm and motivation of the earlier years. The acceleration of collectivism, the establishment of the communes with their public mess halls and public nurseries, the encroachments on personal and family life, threatened to deprive the people of things that they held particularly dear and precious. Having worked hard and given up much, they began to wonder whether they would ever enjoy the fruits of their labor. They slackened their effort, and production declined. The morale of the nation dropped to a low level.

The economic collapse of 1960-62 forced the Communists to take a few grudging steps backward. Bowing to practical necessity, they permitted the peasants to cultivate small private plots, raise livestock, and market their own produce, and they sought to revive industrial activity by providing material incentives for the workers. These concessions succeeded in effecting a substantial measure of economic recovery, but the Communists found it difficult to rekindle the enthusiasm and optimism of the earlier years. The major problem confronting them has not been one of devising additional governmental machinery or designing new economic institutions, but rather one of dealing with the people's state of mind, of reviving the élan and patriotic zeal that characterized the early 1950's. The chal-

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lenge to the Communists today, therefore, is not primarily economic or political in the narrow sense, but psychological and cultural. The term "cultural revolution" accurately reflects the nature of the problem.

Besides internal factors, the Sino-Soviet dispute has had considerable impact on the public state of mind. For years after coming to power, the new regime carried on a massive nationwide campaign to promote a feeling of brotherhood toward the USSR. The whole nation was instructed to "learn from the Soviet Union," and friendship with the USSR was written into the Chinese Communist constitution as a cardinal principle. In 1960, however, the official line was abruptly reversed. The nation was now told that the Soviet leaders were betraying the proletarian cause. The very people who had been affectionately called "Big Brothers" were now reviled as "enemies" of the revolution. This complete about-face must have confused the people. They could hardly help but wonder if the "truths" taught by Communist propaganda and indoctrination were reliable, and whether other "truths" besides "undying friendship" with the USSR might not prove equally false. Once the people begin to question the veracity of Communist propaganda, a major pillar of the Communist edifice becomes weakened. Here, again, the problem is one of dealing with mental attitudes, with motivations and morale. These are matters of the mind and heart.

It is not merely coincidental that the cultural revolution has taken its heaviest toll among those whose activities most directly influence people's minds. A significantly large proportion of those singled out for virulent attack have been novelists, playwrights, poets, film-makers, historians, newspaper editors, and university professors—*i.e.*, people who work in the realm of ideas and who communicate their ideas to others. Communist officials responsible for propaganda, indoctrination, and implementation of the party's cultural policies have also been attacked.

One of the chief targets of the cultural revolution has been "revisionism." By this is meant not only the Khrushchev brand of communism but any ideas at variance with the orthodox Chinese Communist party line. The reason why the current campaign has swelled to such vast proportions is that the Communist leadership now recognizes that revisionism exists not just in a few isolated pockets of the population, but virtually everywhere in China. Its roots are in the minds and hearts of citizens who do not and will not easily relinquish the values, ideas, habits, sentiments, ambitions, and loyalties they have inherited from the past. Some of the major sources of revisionism may be briefly identified.

First, there are many patriotic Chinese who are moved by nationalism, but not by communism. They want to do all they can to help rid China of all traces of foreign domination and build a strong and independent nation, but they have no enthusiasm for any ideology or political party as such. They do not make good partisans.

Second, there are liberals who from an early date warmly supported the Communists' proposals for reform because they themselves were deeply dissatisfied with the old social order. They are, however, not committed to the ideology the Communists consider essential to their program. Furthermore, the Communists attack "reformism" and "reformers" as incompatible with their stress on "revolution" and "revolutionaries." To advocate gradual reform or partial change is, in the Communist view, to be guilty of revisionism.

Third, the masses want better living conditions and a better livelihood, and they want these things right now, or at least in the foreseeable future. These aspirations, however, run counter to Communist preachments of disciplined living, acceptance of hardships, toughness of character, and sacrifice of personal comfort and welfare.

Fourth, many people in China do not subscribe to the Marxist theory of "class" and "class struggle." Indeed, the latter concept is totally alien to traditional Confucian philosophy with its emphasis on social harmony. To the doctrinaire Communist, however, class consciousness is the very essence and prerequisite of a "revolutionary outlook."

Fifth, the intellectuals do not readily fall into line. Even though they may outwardly submit to the party's demands for ideological conformity and thought reform, they have tended, at times of relaxed official controls, to reassert their independence and even to give veiled expression to "bourgeois" or "anti-proletarian" ideas.

Sixth, traditional social and cultural values persist despite strong official condemnation. Among them are attachment to home and family; aversion to collective life and to soldiery; reverence for Confucianism and its way of life; long-established social customs reinforced by deep sentiments, etc. These attitudes and values resist change and stand in the way of the total political and social transformation that the Communists seek to carry through. The "cultural revolution" of 1965-66 is, in large part, a

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frenzied all-out effort to stamp out these entrenched traditions of the "old society."

Seventh, technologists and professional people resent political interference with their activities. They do not accept the Communist principle of letting "politics take command." They place technology and professional competence above political and ideological orthodoxy. They include educators who want to put more emphasis on academic learning, technical personnel who feel that Marxism-Leninism and the "thought of Mao Tsetung" cannot take the place of technical expertise, and even military leaders who are more concerned with building a strong modern army than with political indoctrination or using soldiers for "productive labor."

Eighth, even among the Communists themselves, there is now a younger generation which has not experienced the "bitter struggle" that characterized

Profiles of the "Cultural Revolution"

On Politics and the Military

Chairman Mao's thinking on army-building is diametrically opposed to the purely military viewpoint which gives consideration solely to military matters in complete disregard of politics. . . . Representatives of the bourgeoisie who got hold of important posts in the army . . . opposed the party's Central Committee and Mao Tse-tung's thought, . . . talked about putting politics in command, but in practice gave first consideration to military affairs, technique, and specialized work. They waved "red flags" to oppose the red flag and vigorously spread eclecticism . . . in a vain attempt to substitute a bourgeois military line for Chairman Mao Tse-tung's proletarian military line.

—From Chieh-fang Chün Pao *(Liberation Army Daily) editorial, Aug. 1, 1966.*

On the Heritage of the Past

In building socialism and communism, we must not only completely eliminate all old systems by which man exploits man and man oppresses man, but also thoroughly eradicate the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits formed in the past several thousand years by the exploiting class. [This is] the most fundamental task in the proletarian cultural revolution. . . .

—From Peking Radio Domestic Service broadcast, June 18, 1966.

On "Bourgeois Individualism"

Bourgeois individualism is the root cause of all crimes. . . . There always exists the struggle between proletarian and individualist ideas among our comrades in general. . . . If we relax in such a struggle and slacken our ideological revolutionization, individualism will develop. . . . and in the end we will be taken in by the enemy and thrown into the stinking quagmire of capitalism.

—From Peking Radio Domestic Service broadcast, June 18, 1966.

On Education

The representatives of the bourgeoisie who have insinuated themselves in the educational world . . . hate the socialist revolution bitterly and are deeply antagonistic to the cultural emancipation of the worker, peasant, and soldier masses. Using the positions they have occupied in the various fields of education, they have persistently carried out a bourgeois and revisionist educational line and done everything within their power to impede and sabotage the educational line of the party's Central Committee and Chairman Mao.

—From Jen-Min Jih-pao *(People's Daily) editorial, June 18, 1966.*

On the Humanities

In philosophy, Yang Hsien-chen proposed the "two combined into one" theory as a basis for the relaxation of revolutionary struggles and the "freedoms" of private plots, free markets, profit-making enterprises. . . . In economics, the revisionists placed profit, instead of politics, in command. . . . Bourgeois historians opposed the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. . . . In literary and art circles, revisionists proposed the theory of "portraying realities," the theory of "middle characters," etc.

—From editorial in Hung Ch'i *(Red Flag), No. 8, 1966.*

On the Permanent Revolution

There still exist in socialist society classes and class struggle. We have confiscated the wealth and property of the exploiting class, but we could not confiscate their reactionary way of thinking. . . . Some unsteady elements in the revolutionary ranks are corrupted by ideas of the exploiting class . . . and new bourgeois elements develop continuously. . . . the settlement of the struggle to determine who will win, socialism or capitalism, requires a long period of time. It is impossible to settle the struggle within several decades. It requires a hundred or several hundred years. . . .

—From Peking Radio Domestic Service broadcast, June 15, 1966.

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the early years of the Communist movement in China, and which consequently does not share the fiery and single-minded dedication of the veterans.

Ninth, there are also Communists who would like to see the leadership adopt more moderate and realistic policies. They are afraid that the present hard, dogmatic approach will alienate public support and undermine the Communist regime. They urge, among other things, less haste in collectivization and more attention to the practical tasks of building a strong nation and a healthy economy.

Tenth, there is always the danger that the socialist changes effected by the regime may be gradually weakened and ultimately nullified by a "rebirth of capitalism." Private plots for the peasants, material incentives for labor, concessions to the remaining Chinese ex-capitalists—all of these pose a continuing threat to socialism and collectivism.

More might be added to the list. What the doctrinaire Communists call revisionism is likely to rear its head from many sections of the population and from varied areas of national life. The anti-revisionist campaign, therefore, must necessarily be long in duration and pervasive in scope.

The task of changing the minds and hearts of the people is fundamentally one of education, indoctrination, and propaganda, which are practically synonymous terms in the Communist lexicon. A cardinal principle of Chinese Communist education is that it must "serve proletarian politics." In other words, its first duty is to propagate and implant Communist ideology and ideas; it must produce a new type of man with a new mind and new loyalties. This task is undertaken on at least three basic levels.

First, the thoughts and motivations of the masses at large must be remolded. Academic instruction is only a secondary aspect of mass education in Communist China. The more important objective of Communist indoctrination is to teach the people to love collective life, to work for the common good as defined by the party-state, and to be willing to sacrifice material benefits and present comfort for the long-range success of the revolution.

A second level of the educational effort is directed specifically at the youth of the nation. It is from the younger generation that the regime has drawn the activists and cadres who are now the backbone of the Chinese Communist movement. From their ranks must come the "successors" who will take over the leadership from the now aging veterans of the Communist revolution. They must be taught "Communist morality." In them must be instilled a fiery and unflagging devotion to the revolution.

Thirdly, there is the crucial and most vexing problem of the intellectuals. Despite successive campaigns of "thought reform," many of them remain unconverted to communism. They have made the required public confessions and pledges of "heart surrender," but, whenever the regime's controls are slightly relaxed, their "unproletarian" ideas find expression in one form or another. They may conform in action, or even pay apparent homage to the regime, but their minds and hearts seem to be basically unchanged. They must be won over, however, if the revolution is to succeed. Their services are badly needed, and their traditional position in society enables them to exert great influence.

The events of 1960-62 seem to have convinced the Chinese Communist leaders that the program of education and indoctrination needed to be greatly intensified. Accordingly, a campaign of "socialist education" was launched with the broad purpose of rekindling "revolutionary fervor" and impressing upon the people the necessity of waging a bitter and unremitting class struggle against all "unproletarian" persons and ideas. Reporting to the National People's Congress in December 1964, Premier Chou En-lai already applied to this mounting campaign the name of "cultural revolution." "It is necessary," he declared, "to bring about a radical transformation of all bourgeois, feudal, and other forms of ideology and culture which are not suited to the socialist economic base and political system, and to carry forward the socialist revolution on the ideological and cultural fronts to the end."[2]

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" of 1966, therefore, is not a sudden development, but simply a new and more violent phase of the continuing battle the Communists are waging for the minds and hearts of China's millions. It is a desperate and frenzied effort to achieve what more than a decade and a half of "ideological remolding" has —by admission of the Chinese Communists themselves—failed to accomplish.

In focussing attention on this fundamental aspect of the "cultural revolution" in China, the writer does not mean to ignore the fact that the cataclysmic events of 1966 also reflect an intensifying struggle for power within the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party. These political ramifications, however, are not within the purview of this article.

[2] Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," *Peking Review*, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 13.

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The Great Splash Forward

By Michael Freeberne

A little over 50 years ago, in 1915, an article entitled "A Study of Athletics" appeared in *New Youth*, a leftwing Chinese nationalist periodical; the article was signed "Man of 28 strokes"—the number of strokes required to write Mao Tse-tung in Chinese. In the article, an unknown 21-year-old Chinese advocated physical culture for Chinese youth as a way to restore China's strength, following the humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign imperialist nations.

Now, at the age of 72, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic is apparently capable of an infinitely greater number of strokes, judging by accounts of his marathon swim in the Yangtse River on July 16, 1966. The intriguing question of whether or not the famous swim actually took place as described merits examination; of no less interest, however, is the enormous publicity Mao's feat has been given by the Chinese, typifying the extreme arguments currently employed to promote the success of the "cultural revolution" raging in China.

Mao Tse-tung has shown a life-long love of swimming. In May 1956, when he was 63 years old, he swam across the Yangtse from Wuchang to Hankow; the same summer he made two crossings between Hanyang and Wuchang. In 1957 he again made a crossing. Following the first of these plunges Mao wrote a poem called "Swimming," to the tune of "Shui Tiao Ko T'ou":

Just then a drink of water in the south,
Now a taste of fish in the north.
A swim cuts across the Long River;
A glance gauges the sky's width.
Let the wind blow and waves strike,
This surpasses an aimless stroll in the court.
Today's leisure is well spent.
Standing at a ford, the Master once said:
"Thus life flows into the past!"

Breeze shakes the masts
While Tortoise and Snake Hills are motionless,
A grand project is being conceived—
A bridge will fly across
And turn a barrier into a path.
To the west, new cliffs will arise;
Mount Wu's clouds and rains will be kept from the countryside.
Calm lakes will spring up in the gorges.
Were the goddess still alive
She would be amazed by the changes on this earth.[1]

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[1] See Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 346. Ch'en provides the following explanatory note: "The opening lines are a paraphrase of a folk song of the Three Kingdoms period (220-264): 'We would rather drink the waters of Chienyeh than eat the fish of Wuchang.' The people of the State of Wu were against the transfer of the capital from Chienyeh (present-day Nanking) to Wuchang, which was a part of the ancient state of Chu. The last line of the first stanza is a quotation from *The Analects*. The Tortoise and the Snake Hills are in Hanyang and Wuchang respectively, facing each other across the Yangtse."

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Both Mao's swim and his poem have since been treated as epic achievements. Annually since 1956, commemorative mass-swimming campaigns have been conducted, with main attention centered on crossings of the Yangtse. All these campaigns have received widespread coverage in the press, but none has come close to matching the commotion caused by Mao's mighty swim in July of this year.

Without doubt, an important reason for giving the swim such massive publicity was to dispel rumors that Mao Tse-tung was in other than the best of health. During the past few years there have been frequent reports in the Western press that Mao was seriously ill. These reports—necessarily speculative in the absence of official information—were based on his looking fatigued and on occasion quite ill during public appearances, and on his frequent and prolonged withdrawals from the public scene. One of Mao's recent retreats lasted from November 1965 to May 1966, culminating in his notable absence from the 1966 May Day celebrations, which prompted a new spate of stories that he was ailing. On May 3, a government spokesman attacked these reports as "entirely malicious, vicious slanders" and insisted that Mao was "in very good health." [2] Indeed, only a few days later, on May 10, Mao reappeared in order to hold talks with the visiting and much-feted Albanian delegation led by Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu. During the next two months Mao's whereabouts were again unknown, but on July 13, three days before his swim down the Yangtse, Peking newspapers carried front page photographs of the Chairman receiving Crown Prince Birenda of Nepal and his delegation.

Braving the Waves

Curiously, Mao's splendid swimming performance of July 16 was not announced until nine days after the event, when it was suddenly given the greatest prominence. No reason was offered for the delay in releasing news regarded as of such momentous significance to the Chinese people, and—as we shall see—some rather striking anomalies result. First, here are some excerpts from the initial announcement of the swim, carried in a New China News Agency dispatch datelined Wuhan, July 25:

. . . Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, was relaxed and easy as he again swam in the Yangtse River here on July 16, 1966, braving winds and waves. He stayed in the water a full 65 minutes, covering a total distance of almost 15 kilometers. . . . The happy news about Chairman Mao's latest swim in the Yangtse soon spread through Wuhan. The whole of this triple city was overjoyed as the news passed from one person to another. Everybody was saying: "Our respected and beloved leader Chairman Mao is in such wonderful health. This is the greatest happiness for the entire Chinese people, for the revolutionary people throughout the world!"

The account disclosed that the day began with a review by Mao of 5,000 swimmers, who, following his instructions "that they should swim and train in rivers and seas, participated enthusiastically in the 11th cross-Yangtse contest along the course first charted by their great leader." Mao stood, "with glowing ruddy cheeks and in buoyant spirits," on the deck of a motorboat. The swimmers must have presented a striking spectacle, for they "formed a great wall on the surface of the river," bearing aloft red flags and huge placards inscribed with quotations from Mao's own writings: "Unity, alertness, earnestness and activity"; "The imperialists are pushing China around in such a way that China must deal with them seriously"; "Resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they [presumably the Chinese] will surmount every difficulty to win victory!" A group of 200 primary-school children "held placards bearing the quotation from Chairman Mao: 'Study diligently and improve rapidly' and sang in chorus the song, 'We are successors to the Communist cause,' as they swam across the mighty river. . . . With a warm smile, [Mao] waved to them and said kindly, 'Hello, children.' Encouraged by Chairman Mao's words, the children swam with redoubled energy."

Then, as Mao's boat "drew toward the mouth of the Wuchang Dikes,"

Chairman Mao trod firmly down the gangway, and, after dipping his body into the water, he stretched out his arms and swam with steady strokes. It was then 11:00 a.m. The Yangtse was in spate; its currents were swift. On the broad expanse of water, Chairman Mao at times swam side-stroke, advancing as he cleaved through the waves, and at other times he floated and had a view of the azure sky above. In the water with Chairman Mao was Wang Jen-chung, Second Secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CCP's Central Committee and First Secretary of the Hupeh Provincial Party Committee, and a group of husky young men and women who swam closely behind. . . .

When it was nearly noon, a 10-meter-per-second wind swept over the broad expanse of the river, throwing up big waves. . . . Several times Comrade Wang Jen-chung asked Chairman Mao to go on board to take a rest. Chairman Mao asked how long they had been swimming. Comrades around said it was 45 minutes. In the best of spirits Chairman Mao said: "It's not even an

[2] Reported in *The Times* (London), May 4, 1966. Reuters dispatch.

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hour yet!" He continued swimming to the east. After one hour and five minutes, Comrade Wang Jen-chung again asked Chairman Mao to go on board the boat to take a rest. Chairman Mao said gaily: "You are the First Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee here, so I obey your order!" . . . When he boarded the boat [Mao] was vigorous and showed no sign of fatigue.

In closing, the account sounded the message that would reverberate throughout China, epitomizing the resurgence of the great-leap forward mentality in the so-called cultural revolution now going on:

Many friends remarked that the natural barrier of the Yangtse could be overcome and no difficulties were insuperable. In all this they also saw the splendor of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The great event, in which Chairman Mao once again swam with ease some 15 kilometers in the deep chasm of the Yangtse, stirred the hearts of all people. The cheering of "Long Live Chairman Mao" on both banks lasted well over four hours. This moving scene was expressive of the infinite love and respect of the Chinese people for their great leader, Chairman Mao. Under the guidance of the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung, the 700 million Chinese people train their eyes on the future, riding the wind and breaking the waves on their forward advance! [3]

A massive press fanfare accompanied the belated announcement of Mao's swim. Three large photographs were circulated which showed: first, Mao standing on the deck of a motorboat supposedly reviewing the mass crossing; second, Mao swimming, together with four others; and third, swimmers carrying placards. *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) printed an editorial headlined "Follow Chairman Mao and advance in the teeth of the great storms and waves." Its message ran:

To learn to swim without plunging into the water just doesn't work. No one has ever learned to swim just by standing on the shore and reading about one or another aspect of the art of swimming. And the same is true of making revolution. You must take part in actual class struggle, master the laws governing revolution in the storm of class struggle, and learn the art of swimming in class struggle.[4]

Raised Eyebrows

The splash made by accounts of Mao's swim in the Western press was considerable, although none antedates the NCNA release of July 25—an indication that if the event was witnessed by any foreign observers, they were slow to appreciate its news value.

To cite a few examples, the *Daily Express* (London) carried the huge NCNA photograph of Mao swimming with four comrades and facetiously challenged the world's leaders to outswim Mao. However, the paper said it was unable to find anything in the records of Wilson, Erhard, de Gaulle, Johnson or Franco to suggest that they might provide suitable competition for Mao's sterling performance, equivalent to nearly 7½ miles' distance an hour, compared with the 2½ miles an hour that a young, highly-trained swimmer could hope to average over such a distance.[5]

Some sources went so far as to challenge the authenticity of the photograph showing Mao swimming:

Have you ever seen a picture of five men swimming and *none* of their arms showing? Have you ever seen a picture like this where not a man-made ripple breaks the surface? Have you ever seen a picture of five men swimming and not one of them with his mouth open? [6]

The President of the World Professional Marathon Swimming Federation, Senor Carlos Larriera, chose to treat the reports and photos at face value. He invited Mao Tse-tung to enter two 10-mile races to be held in Canada this summer, remarking:

We are told you swam nine miles on July 16 in the excellent time of 1 hour, 5 minutes. This should put you in line for championships in both events, since the record for the 10-mile Quebec swim, set last year by one of the fastest swimmers in the world, Herman Willemse of Holland, was 4 hours, 30 minutes.[7]

The gist of Western comments was well summed up in the *Sunday Times* (London):

Hearing the news, embassies in Peking and, it would seem, experts in all countries started wondering how a 73-year-old man—although admittedly he swam with the current—beat the world record. Of course, this only shows how vulgar and suspicious a foreigner can be. In Chinese eyes, time and distance, as well as age, were more or less irrelevant details. What counted was that Mao did go in the water. . . . It would be un-Chinese to ask whether the Chairman stayed in the water 60 or 70 minutes and covered eight or 10 miles, so nobody does it, especially since the point was not to beat a world record but to show China and the rest of the world that the "beloved and respected leader is in excellent health" and therefore that the wild stories about a struggle for power do not make sense.[8]

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[3] NCNA, Wuhan, July 25, 1966.
[4] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), July 26.

[5] *Daily Express* (London), July 26. (Even this estimate of Mao's performance seems on the conservative side, since in 65 minutes he reportedly swam 15 kilometers, or about 9.3 miles—Ed.)
[6] *Daily Mirror* (London), July 27.
[7] *The Times* (London), July 29.
[8] *Sunday Times* (London), July 31.

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In admittedly un-Chinese fashion, then, doubts were cast upon the water, and somewhat irreverently *The Economist* even asked, "But has he tried walking on it?" [9]

A Chinese Puzzle

Certain strange aspects of the whole affair have not received the attention they deserve, however. Included in the NCNA release dated July 25, announcing Mao's swim "on the morning of July 16," was the following passage:

On that day, foreign friends on a trip to Wuhan after attending the Afro-Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting, were riding in boats to watch the spectacular mass cross-Yangtse swim. There they met the great leader of the Chinese people, Chairman Mao, whom they had long wished to see.

The above account does not tally with previously published reports of the whereabouts of the Afro-Asian writers. An NCNA release from Peking dated July 14 described a visit by the writers to the Great Wall, located to the north of the city. On both July 15 and 16, identical NCNA reports issued from Peking stated that "delegates and observers to the Afro-Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting recently held in Peking continued their sightseeing today," giving the impression that the sightseeing took place in or near the capital city. If some of the conferees were in fact fortunate enough to have met Mao Tse-tung in Wuhan—more than 500 miles to the south of Peking—on July 16, why wasn't it reported at the time? Most intriguing, an NCNA dispatch from Peking dated July 17 announced that Mao had received the conference delegates *that same day;* there was nothing in the story to indicate a previous encounter at Wuhan some 24 hours earlier.

Not until July 18 did NCNA reports from Wuhan indicate the presence of some of the touring delegates. One report described their arrival by plane and their reception by city officials. A second dispatch of the 18th gave the first account of a mass-swim across the Yangtse, and included a statement that "delegates who had attended the Afro-Asian Writers' Emergency Meeting in Peking were visiting Wuhan and watched the mass competition, the 11th of the series." This report described the crossing of 5,000 local swimmers in appropriately enthusiastic detail but gave absolutely no indication of the presence of Chairman Mao. It stated simply that the swimmers "followed a course charted by Chairman Mao Tse-tung ten years ago, when he swam across the river three times during May and June 1956." The report also referred to a launching ceremony held at Wuchang, the starting point of the cross-river swim—no mention of which appeared in the later NCNA account of July 25. In a speech during the ceremony Vice-Mayor Hsieh Tzu-chun described the conquering of the Yangtse as "another eloquent proof that people armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung are the greatest fighting force," and went on to associate the river-crossing with the great cultural revolution and the sweeping away of "all monsters and demons" by the people of Wuhan.

The differences between this report and the later account of July 25 are so striking that one wonders: Could there have been two almost identical mass swims, each with 5,000 participants, one on July 16 (with Mao participating) and one on July 18, and yet both said to be the 11th commemorative river-crossing? Were the Afro-Asian writers touring in at least two separate groups, each treated to one of these spectacles? Again, if Mao had made his great swim in the Yangtse only 48 hours earlier, could Hsieh have suppressed his excitement, and would the July 18th report have referred only to Mao's less spectacular 1956 crossings—which were also praised by the poet Kuo Mo-jo, according to an NCNA dispatch of July 19? All this suggests a string of anomalies. But then these doubts involve mere technicalities as to whether or not the swim took place, and if so when, for how long, and how far. After all, what really matters is the domestic and, in some degree, international propaganda value of the event, coupled with the post-swim repercussions.

Tidal Aftermath

The impact of Mao's reported swim in the Yangtse was immediate. Like a tidal wave, the news spread from Wuhan and the main urban centers to areas farther and farther away, until the whole country had received the glad tidings. According to NCNA, many people, seeing Mao's photograph in the press looking so fresh and well, burst into song with a rousing chorus of "The East is Red," or alternatively recited his poem "Swimming"; the streets and countryside resounded with cries of "Long Live Chairman Mao!"

Spontaneous gatherings [were held], big character posters were written and pasted up, letters were written

[9] *The Economist* (London), July 30-August 5, p. 439.

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collectively and sent off to the papers. In these and other ways the people expressed their boundless love for the great leader.

In the capital city:

Pledges were made to raise the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought still higher, and not only to swim in the rivers and seas . . . but to follow Chairman Mao and forge ahead amid the storm of class struggle and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution to completion.[10]

From the provinces came similar reports:

In the cities and the countryside people got together to discuss the happy event. Many speakers pledged to study well Chairman Mao's great revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. . . . People of all nationalities in Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan, which border on Vietnam, said they would adhere to Chairman Mao's teachings to give resolute support to the Vietnamese people's struggle against US imperialism, despite any hardship or sacrifice.[11]

Across the country the general cry was taken up:

We will always follow the guidance of Chairman Mao, the great helmsman, and fight the imperialists, revisionists and representatives of the bourgeoisie in a dauntless revolutionary spirit. We will trample all monsters and demons under foot, carry the socialist revolution through to the end, and build China into a still more splendid socialist country.[12]

Promises of renewed economic effort filled the press. Workers in Harbin's locomotive and rolling-stock plant launched an emulation campaign.[13] Speaking for inspired employees at the Taching oilfield, a young worker announced: "We are drilling China's first super-depth oil well. Chairman Mao's swim has greatly encouraged us; we must complete the task."[14] Laborers at the port of Tsingtao hailed Mao's good health and promised greater efforts to "steer our ship of revolution to communism."[15] As one magazine put it, the swim "has enhanced the enthusiasm and ardor of the people of the whole nation in socialist construction."[16]

China's national minorities were also said to be overjoyed:

Students of ten nationalities at the Kwangsi Institute for Nationalities wrote to Chairman Mao, comparing him to a towering pine on a high mountain, and the sun shining in the sky. "Your great undertaking of swimming the Yangtse has been a tremendous encouragement to us. We are determined to follow your teachings by becoming tempered in the revolutionary wind and storm!"[17]

Emancipated serfs in Tibet declared that "the news brings the people of China's various nationalities joy without measure" and expressed their determination "to wrest from nature their eighth bumper harvest in a row." In Sinkiang a Uighur forge-worker hailed "Chairman Mao's strong will" as "a lesson . . . in revolutionary struggle," while an electric welder of Sibo nationality stated, "I will always follow Chairman Mao and stand at the forefront of the class struggle." Olunchun hunters in the Khingan Mountains wished Mao longevity as

[10] NCNA, Peking, July 26.
[11] NCNA, Peking, July 27.
[12] NCNA, Peking, July 28.
[13] NCNA, Peking, July 27.
[14] NCNA, Peking, July 29.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Peking Review*, August 12.
[17] NCNA, Peking, July 27.

Long Live Chairman Mao (Gulp) !

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leading role in the Chinese revolution and world revolution is the outcome of historical developments. . . . Anyone who is well versed in Chairman Mao's work or the history of the CCP will clearly understand that Comrade Mao Tse-tung has . . . all along opposed excessive and impractical individual praise. . . .

—Hunan Daily *editorial, May 30, 1966.*

[During Mao's Yangtse swim] a militiaman named Nieh Chang-hsin . . . was so excited at the sight of Chairman Mao that he forgot that he himself was swimming. Raising high both arms, he shouted "Long Live Chairman Mao!" . . . He stood upright and sank, drinking a few mouthfuls of water which, however, he found to be of a particularly sweet taste.

—*NCNA, July 24, 1966.*

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they spread the news from one to another.[18] There was elation among the Huis in Ninghsia, where "revolutionaries would not lose their bearings, whatever storms and waves they encountered," provided they mastered Mao's thought.[19]

Naturally enough, China's sportsmen received a fillip from Mao's feat—"a source of infinite revolutionary courage and strength." Over 600 sportsmen met in Kwangsi to wish Mao a long life, declaring that his cross-Yangtse swim was "a great encouragement to the Chinese people and revolutionaries throughout the world, and a heavy blow to imperialism, modern revisionism, and the monsters and freaks internally who are opposed to socialism and Mao Tse-tung's thought."[20] Swimmers Feng Feng and Chang Shu-ching avowed that Mao's call for aquatic prowess was of major strategic importance:

At present U.S. imperialism is frenziedly expanding its war of aggression in Vietnam. We must follow Chairman Mao's teachings and go to steel ourselves in large rivers, in wind and storm, to become revolutionary fighters who can scale mountains and cross waters. In this way we shall at all times be ready to answer the call of the motherland to join the heroic Vietnamese people in completely routing the US aggressors.[21]

An outstanding parachutist attributed her five world records to Mao's teaching and was fired with enthusiasm at the news of the swim. A woman speed-skater said "the news strengthened her determination and confidence in the struggle against all the monsters and demons both at home and abroad."[22] Even table-tennis players drew new power from Mao's exploit.[23]

The People's Liberation Army and China's other fighting forces were also "overcome with joy" upon hearing of Mao's swim:

There were shouts of "Long live Chairman Mao" at the frontiers, along the coastal defense line, from the decks of naval vessels, at airfields and in the barracks. . . .[24]

A Mass Campaign

In the midst of all this spontaneous enthusiasm, the government's Physical Culture and Sports Commission on July 28 called for an intensified nationwide mass-swimming campaign, adding that—under the guidance of Mao's ideas on people's war and his teachings on sports and swimming—the season's swimming activities had already reached a larger scale than ever before in all parts of China.[25]

For example, more than 500 workers from a rubber plant in Hunan swam across the Siang River after reading about the Chairman's swim.[26] On the afternoon of July 25, 3,000 workers, peasants, students and militiamen from Huainan in Anhwei went to swim in the Huai River.[27] In the capital of Chinghai, Sining, "where few people went swimming in the past because of the low temperature and the great height of the plateau, the banks of the river running through the city swarmed with swimmers in the last few days [of July]. They dived into the turbulent waters that came down from the perennial snow on the Kilien Mountains."[28]

On July 31, to celebrate Army Day (August 1), 8,000 people took the plunge in Peking's Kunming Lake, watched by tens of thousands of onlookers. Among the swimmers were members of an aquatic team from North Vietnam. A guard of honor carried red banners and a huge portrait of Mao, followed by 800 members of the People's Liberation Army, fully equipped with rifles and machine guns, shouting: "Vietnam is sure to win, US imperialism is bound to be defeated." The captain of the Vietnamese team told eager reporters: "Our beloved Leader President Ho Chi Minh is also fond of swimming. We sportsmen must learn from Chairman Mao and President Ho."[29]

Steadily the numbers grew, until "millions of Chinese people" were reported to be "flocking to the sea coasts, rivers and lakes to swim in rough waters":

The idea of developing a courageous spirit and a strong physique through swimming has caught on. The purpose is to be better prepared for socialist revolution and construction, and to maintain high combat-readiness against possible US imperialist aggression.[30]

In Changsha, Hunan, where Mao used to swim in the Siangkiang River in his younger days, a cross-river swim attracted 5,000 participants. In Harbin 15,000 swimmers in the Sungari River were watched by 300,000 spectators, while 12,000 militiamen

[18] NCNA, Peking, July 29.
[19] NCNA, Peking, July 30.
[20] NCNA, Peking, July 26.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] NCNA, Peking, July 27.
[23] NCNA, Peking, July 26.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] NCNA, Peking, July 28.
[26] NCNA, Peking, July 27.
[27] NCNA, Peking, July 28.
[28] NCNA, Peking, July 30.
[29] NCNA, Peking, July 31.
[30] NCNA, Peking, August 4.

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crossed the Chientang River in Hangchow. Children from seven years of age upward took part in cross-river and sea swimming in Swatow, Foochow and Hofei, and a race in Tientsin "combined holiday swimming with training for combat readiness," including "first-aid and bandaging demonstrations in the water." [31]

One of the most spectacular mass swims involved no fewer than 10,000 fully armed militiamen, who on August 8 crossed the Yangtse while staging a mock battle:

When the starting signal was given the militia units first bombarded the opposite bank with concentrated gunfire. Then they jumped into the water, with units composed of workers and students forming the leading wave. The drill reached its climax when the militiamen, on reaching the opposite shore, charged into the "enemy's" positions with hand grenades and rifle and machine-gun fire. A big roar of approval went up from the crowds when the victorious militiamen planted their colors on the dominating height of the "enemy" positions. The shock force was followed by a main force comprising five regiments, including infantry, artillery, signal, medical, transportation and fire-fighting units. The posters the swimmers carried and the slogans they shouted were mainly quotations from Chairman Mao, such as "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive." [32]

Thus, from a small and innocuous enough beginning, the sport of swimming has grown into an important element in both domestic and international revolution. Use of the theme is typified by the recent prominence given to Mao's purported remarks after his fourth swim across the Yangtse in 1957:

People say that the Yangtse is a very big river, but actually there is nothing to be afraid of about its size. Isn't US imperialism very big? It turned out to be nothing when we rebuffed it once. . . .[33]

While Western reaction to the news of Mao's swimming feat was by and large one of skepticism and not a little amusement, pro-Peking elements in a number of countries beyond China's frontiers have shown no hesitation in treating the swim as an event of deep significance. In Katmandu, for instance, the Chairman of the Nepal-China Friendship Association avowed that "the news of Chairman Mao's swim in the Yangtse is a blow to the imperialists and all reactionaries; it is a source of strength for the people who are struggling against imperialism and colonialism." From Africa came reports that Mao's plunge had "greatly inspired African freedom-fighters in Cairo. . . ."; that a nationalist leader from "the fighting Congo" (Leopoldville) had enthusiastically commented, "the news is indeed encouraging to our fighting people"; that "freedom-fighters" from Azania (South Africa) had declared, "Chairman Mao's good swim in the Yangtse is thrilling and happy news which shows the revolutionary spirit of Chairman Mao and the Chinese people." [34] In Latin America, a certain Mexican gentleman was quite carried away in his excitement, describing Mao's swim as "a fine symbol of humanity's real life," which "shows that man's beautiful aspirations can become reality." With more spirit than logic, he added: "The Chinese people and the people of all other countries will definitely emerge victorious." [35]—All of which demonstrates that, at least in the eyes of the Chinese and their supporters, world events are developing swimmingly.

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[31] *Ibid.*
[32] NCNA, Wuhan, August 10.
[33] *Peking Review*, August 12.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] NCNA, Peking, August 16.

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Economics and Politics: VI

EDITORS' NOTE: The three articles below bring to a close our current survey of economic reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The pioneer in this area, and the country that provides the most provocative illustration of the relationship between economic and political liberalization, has been, of course, Yugoslavia. Hungary's blueprint for economic reform has only recently been unveiled, but in some respects it seems to be more radical than those of the other "people's democracies." Whether or not it is meaningful and realistic, however, is a question to which Mr. Held addresses himself. In the concluding article, Mr. Grossman examines the progress of economic reforms in all the countries with which this survey has been concerned, analyzing their successes, failures, and future prospects, both economic and political.

Yugoslavia: Towards a Market Socialism

By Fred Warner Neal and Winston M. Fisk

Today, some 18 years after the Yugoslav Communists took the big plunge and declared their independence from the Kremlin, they are still searching for the "correct" way to develop a system of free-market socialism. Over the years they have had to struggle against the strictures of ideology—revisionist though it may be—historically imposed backwardness and inefficiency, a national propensity

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toward extremism, ethnic particularism, an entrenched bureaucracy, and considerable criticism at home and abroad.

The road they have traversed over the past decade or so has been arduous and uneven. On more than one occasion promises have been made, grandiose plans announced—only to be shelved or aborted. At times it seemed as if the party, apprehensive about the possible consequences of economic and political liberalization, pulled back at the last moment, unwilling to put the new theories to test. Yet despite all these setbacks considerable progress has been made, and more progress is in the offing. Indeed, it now seems as if the vision of a "socialist market economy", proudly championed by Yugoslavs as their own, unique contribution to (or revision of) contemporary Marxism, is finally to be realized.

The most recent promise was the Economic Reform of 1965.[1] The reform had two principle aims: to make Yugoslav goods competitive in international markets and to modernize the economy by eliminating uneconomic investment and production and by compelling enterprises to respond to the forces of supply and demand. This meant making worker-managed enterprises really independent, ending government intervention in the economy, abandoning oppressively centralized planning and the concomitant subsidization of uneconomic enterprises in underdeveloped republics of the south and east at the expense of the more developed areas, making prices reflect costs, freeing foreign trade and achieving genuine convertibility for the dinar.

Specifically, the reform called for the following:

1). Devaluing the dinar to the realistic rate of 1250 to the dollar. (This was followed by creating new dinars with the decimal moved over two places, *à la* de Gaulle. The official rate is now quoted as 12.50 of these new dinars to the dollar. Partial convertibility was extended with full convertibility set for 1970.)

2). Cutting by more than 50 percent the average rate of customs duties, overhauling the system of tariff differentials and gradually eliminating most of the import and export restrictions.[2]

3). Curtailing governmental controls of investment and giving the investment banks greater authority.

4). Changing tax laws to allow enterprises to expand their own investment and production as their market situation permits, abolishing taxes on enterprise earnings and reducing obligatory contributions, known as "capital rent," from six to four percent; (the turnover tax on manufacturing was replaced by a sales tax on consumption).

5). Suspending subsidies in the form of controlled prices for all but a few commodities, allowing rents to be raised to cover building and maintenance costs.

The first of these measures moved the Yugoslav currency decisively toward incorporation into the international monetary system, toward competing as a hard currency in the world financial market. The second did the same for the entire Yugoslav economy, now officially rid of the principles of economic autarky traditionally practiced by Communist states. (Yugoslavia's entry into GATT—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—clearly reflects this decision.) The third allowed the productive processes of the Yugoslav economy, already freed from the grip of direct government management and of a mandatory detailed plan, to control their own destinies more fully, without complete government direction of the economy. The fourth reduced the use of the tax device as a governmental influence in the economy. The fifth established at least the principle of a sharp cutback in direct government intervention in the market.

These drastic changes have been accompanied by an array of others,[3] some nearly as important

[1] See Rudolf Bićanić, "Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, pp. 633-50. Bićanić is a Yugoslav economist.

[2] The November 1964 Resolution of the Federal Assembly For the Drawing Up of the Social Plan of Yugoslavia for the 1964-1970 Period. *Službeni List SFRJ*, No. 49, 1964; official English translation in *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 19, October-December 1964.

[3] The development, formal legislative enactment, and administrative effectuation of the Economic Reform, plus the official comment and discussion associated with them, form a large body of documentation, displaying the substantial and increasing importance of public statements and debate, legislative work and other overt activity in Yugoslav policy-making.

The legislative history of the reform measures can be traced in the Resolution on Basic Guidelines for the Further Development of the Economic System, adopted by the Federal Assembly in April 1964 (the official English text is given in *Yugoslav Survey*, V, No. 17, April-June 1964, pp. 2505-12; the Assembly's November 1964 Resolution for Drawing Up of the Social Plan of Yugoslavia for the 1964-70 Period (note 2, *supra*). For the continuing overhaul of the banking and credit system, see *Službeni List* SFRJ No. 23, 1964, and No. 12, 1965, (*Yugoslav Survey*, VI, No. 22 July-September 1965, pp. 3215-36 and VII, No. 24 January-March 1966, pp. 3461-74.) For the evolution of the Social Plan for 1965 and of the plan-implementing laws, see *Yugoslav Survey*, VII, No. 20 January-March 1965, pp. 2855-66.

Useful Yugoslav accounts of the movements of prices from 1962 well on into 1966, conveniently accessible in English, are to be found in *Yugoslav Survey*, VII, No. 24 January-March 1966, pp. 3475-84, and VII No. 25 April-June 1966, pp. 3601-10.

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and some subsidiary but all pointing the same way. They began tentatively in 1964, spread over all of 1965 and are continuing to this day.

Before attempting to evaluate the reform in terms of what it has thus far achieved, one should see it in its proper perspective. First of all, the reform's goals are not new: they were the substance of similar measures introduced in 1952, in 1956 and again in 1962. Yet each time these liberal ideas were promoted, a complex combination of economic and political factors intervened to sabotage their fulfillment. For example, some workers' councils often raised wages and prices without increasing production, and local autonomy frequently resulted in wasteful and uneconomic investment. Nor were the proposals to increase foreign trade producing the desired results. Worried about inflation and the shortages of foreign exchange, the government often established cumbersome and uneven administrative controls on prices and wages, curbed imports and resorted to a haphazard system of subsidizing export industries.

The biggest obstacle to these reform measures, however, came from the Yugoslav conservatives led by Aleksandar Rancović, until July 1966 Vice President of the Republic of Yugoslavia, and considered by many as Tito's principal heir, who put up stubborn, even bitter opposition. An influential group, they never really accepted the implications of the decentralized system on theoretical grounds, and objected particularly to those measures which threatened to abolish the subsidization of industrial installations in Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia which were financed by overtaxing the more profitable enterprises of Slovenia and Croatia. Ranković, in his role as party secretary in charge of cadres and *de facto* boss of the security police, was often able to dissuade important people from working for the reform and to prevent legislation necessary to implement the reforms from reaching parliament.

The result of all this was continuing government and party intervention—legal and extra-legal—in the economy despite pronouncements to the contrary, and continuing inefficiency and waste protected by political influence. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming was the failure to expand foreign markets and to correct a growing balance-of-payments deficit.

Despite the skepticism warranted by the past, it would be unfair to characterize the 1965 economic reform as *déjà vue* or to dismiss it as impractical. First of all, there is considerable evidence that this time the Yugoslavs really are determined to make it work. Second, the earlier attempts at liberalization, while they did not really succeed, never failed altogether; each took Yugoslav socialism further along the road toward a market economy. As this process has continued, it has produced, and been accompanied by, profound changes in the whole social and political system. Most important, the removal of Ranković and his group last summer has tipped the scales decidedly in favor of the liberals, who can now consolidate their gains and move forward into new areas of political reform.

These gains have been, after all, considerable. Despite some restrictive laws, some interventions by the government and some pressure from the party, the workers' councils and their elected management boards are in fact responsible for the control of their own enterprises.[4] Planning has been decentralized and functions through a series of indirect controls rather than by government fiat.[5] There is competition and competitive pricing.[6] The role of the party has been restricted and police powers curbed. Decentralization has extended autonomy to the communes, and there has been a notable expansion of industry and increase in the standard of living as well as substantially more personal freedom than in the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

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[4] Worker management was originally launched by a law enacted on July 2, 1950. See *Službeni List*, No. 43, July 5, 1950. Although this statute has been amended from time to time, the basic provisions have not been substantially altered. For a discussion of the early period of worker management see F. W. Neal, *Titoism in Action: The Reforms in Yugoslavia after 1948*, University of California Press, 1958, esp. pp. 120-127. For a discussion of more recent experiences, see George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, Ch. 14; P. Kovač and D. Miljević, *Samoupravljanje Proizvodjaća u Privredi*, Savremena Administracja, Belgrade, 1958; Avdo Horvat and Vlado Rascovic, "Worker Management in Yugoslavia. A Comment," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. LXVII (April, 1959), pp. 194-198; and Jiri Kolaja, *Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience*, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965.

[5] The first decentralized planning went into effect in 1951. *Cf. Službeni List*, December 30, 1951. Additional laws on planning were adopted in 1954 (*Službeni List*, July 23, 1954) and 1956 (*Službeni List*, April 26, 1956). Although each annual plan differs, the basic characteristics of the system have remained. See Branko Kubović, Jakov Sirotković and Berislav Sefer, *Economic Planning in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1959; and Svetozar Pejovich, *The Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia*, University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

[6] Cf. "Economic Planning and Management in Yugoslavia," *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. X, No. 3, 1958; S. Novaković, *Ekonomska Politika*, Belgrade, 1959, pp. 117-144; and Milos Vukovich, "The Recent Development of the Money and Banking System in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Political Economy*, August, 1963.

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While it is still too early to judge the effectiveness of all the measures introduced in 1965,[7] a few preliminary observations on the first stage can be made.

Economic Consequences

The most important result to date, according to the Yugoslavs, is that the country had a favorable balance of payments for the year 1965, the first one in over 20 years.[8] This was due in part to postponements of some international debts, and in part to a good harvest, but it also reflected to some extent the measures of the reform. Although the figures available thus far for 1966 are promising, the economy is not yet clearly over the hurdle of the most delicate part of the reform, *i.e.* the full liberalization of export and import restrictions and the real and permanent entry into the world market of Yugoslav products on a competitive basis. In 1962, stand-by credits put up by several Western powers were run through quickly in a wave of buying abroad, while exports failed to expand. This year, stand-by credits were made available by the International Monetary Fund, and the Yugoslavs are confident that these, together with their own reserves, will be adequate.

Figures for the first half of 1966 indicate an increase in total exports of 17 percent over the first half of 1965.[9] Some of the structural aspects of these export figures provide even greater reasons for optimism: for example, substantial increases (about 35 percent) in trade with Western Europe suggest that more Yugoslav goods and services may already be competing effectively in those difficult markets.

Internally the picture is one of moderate improvements which are also encouraging. Inflation was largely checked in 1965 after an initial upward adjustment of prices, which edged up only slowly, if at all, after that.[10] While wages have not kept pace with prices, in one sense real wages are higher than they were before the reform. Today the consumer enjoys a more favorable position because the general wage increase in 1965 was greater than the accompanying rise in retail prices of diet staples. Although "moonlighting" is still widespread (in the past it had a severely limiting effect on productivity in the "socialist sector"), Yugoslav planners now insist optimistically that the necessity for workers to take a second job in order to make ends meet is being reduced by the increased ability of the socialist enterprises to pay adequate wages.

[7] Adequate statistics, even for 1965, are not yet available from official sources. All of our statistics are drawn from informal conversations with Yugoslav officials.

[8] The interpretation of the accounting system is a complicated matter. The figure usually given for the favorable balance is $8 million.

[9] Imports had also risen substantially, but being less related to productive efficiency, their increase is somewhat less significant since they are more easily controlled.

[10] Prices were generally frozen, but administrative controls can be only partially effective. The significant point is that there seems to be comparatively little steam behind the push against the freeze. An interesting discussion of the problem can be found in: "One Year Since the Economic Reform," by Kiro Gligorov, the federal secretary for finance, in the August 5-20, 1966 issue of the Yugoslav periodical, *Review of International Affairs*. For a different and severely critical view of the background of the Economic Reform see Ljubo Sirc, "Inflation in Yugoslavia," in the No. 5, 1965 issue of *Review*, published in London by the Study Center for Yugoslav Affairs. For a recent general account of the evolution of the economy, see Svetozar Pejovich, *The Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

– Kako? Bunite se da u mom poduzeću nema samoupravljanja. Pa svima vam je poznato da sam upravljam!...

SELF-MANAGEMENT

—"What? You protest that there is no self-management in my enterprise, and you all know that I myself manage it."

—*From* Vjesnik *(Zagreb), Oct. 13, 1966.*

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One of the causes of the inflation was the tendency, spurred by political factors, to over-invest. This has undoubtedly been relieved by the shift of the locus of investment decisions to enterprises and banks and away from political spheres. Investment expenditures for the first half of 1966 were reported down about 15 percent compared with the first six months of 1965.

Direct government intervention in the economy has been substantially reduced. Government subsidies have been drastically curbed, and the overall amount of subsidy payments more than halved, with the promise of further reductions in the coming year. At the same time, the share of enterprises in the national product is up from about 50 percent to approximately 70 percent, reflecting both the greater freedom to expand production in more profitable areas and the shift in taxation.

The increased independence of the banking system is another important factor.[11] Not only have the banks been freed from much administrative control, but their area of competence has been widened. This is especially true in regard to capital development financing. Prior to 1953 this had been handled by direct grants from government budgets and later from separately established funds, supported mainly by enterprise contributions. In 1963, the funds were gradually abolished and their resources transferred to the banks. As a result of the 1965 reform, it now appears that more and more of the concentration and allocation of resources for capital development financing will be done through banks without direct government intervention. While the banks are subject to more governmental influence in regard to planning industrial investment, their independence is substantial and growing. In the fields of both short-term industrial credit and consumer credit, banking institutions operate virtually as autonomous units, albeit under government regulation and policy standards.

The result of all this—curtailment of government intervention, enterprise independence, shift of taxation and banking autonomy in lending money—has been to make funds more available to those enterprises which are most efficient, thus forcing the inefficient operators to reform their enterprises along economically sound lines. This is already producing some important structural changes in the economy.[12] Heretofore, the manufacturing and processing sectors had been favored. As a result of the reform there has been an improvement in the relative position of the generally profitable extractive and raw materials sectors. The case of the Trepca mine, one of the best foreign exchange earners in Yugoslavia, is illustrative. This enterprise had for some time been planning an investment of several billion dinars, which the investment bank promised to match. At the last moment, however, the federal government barred the deal. Last summer, after the political upheavals gave new impetus to liberalization, the arrangements with the investment bank were finally consummated.

One anticipated consequence of the reform not mentioned in official pronouncements but widely discussed by economists both in and out of the government has been the greater availability of credits to small private businesses which continue to multiply all over Yugoslavia. (These sometimes operate jointly with socialist enterprises.) Another consequence is the availability of funds for such non-socialist activities as joint enterprises with foreign capital. One of the first of these is likely to be an often-discussed new tourist hotel on the Adriatic Coast, owned jointly by a Yugoslav enterprise and Pan-American Airways.[13]

During the initial stages of the economic reform some stabilization of demand was achieved without serious checks on production; overall industrial output was up five percent in the first half of 1966 as compared with the first half of 1965. This rate of increase was smaller than the inflated rates of previous years, but it had the encouraging characteristic of being based on higher man-hour productivity, since industrial employment was down two percent.

The possibility of increased unemployment as a result of dislocations following the reform has been a source of worry to Yugoslav officials. It had been anticipated that a number of firms would not be able to make it on their own and would be forced to go out of business. As of mid-1966, however, only two such forced shut-downs were reported, although the secretariat for economic affairs an-

[11] Changes in the system are described in "Reform of the Credit and Banking System," *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 22, July-September, 1965, pp. 3215-36. More detail is supplied in "Credit and Money," *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 24, January-March, 1966, pp. 3461-74.

[12] The Yugoslavs think these highly important, especially those which change relations between the raw materials-extractive sectors and the processing-manufacture sectors.

[13] In the past, efforts to promote joint companies with foreign participation always failed.

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nounced that more than a dozen have been "warned." Some enterprises have been trying to cope with the new hazards by lay-offs and discharges. Whether future dislocations will increase unemployment enough to cause even larger numbers of Yugoslav citizens to seek work outside the country remains to be seen.[14] Economic officials confidently predict, however, that the ultimate impact of the reform will be to increase employment to above pre-1965 levels.

Political Evolution

As we have already noted, the liberalization in economic affairs has been accompanied by a gradual evolution of the Titoist political system. On this issue the liberals and conservatives have taken even stronger sides than over economic issues. Fundamentally the argument is over the question of how far the regime should rely on parliamentary institutions and the extent to which the non-party masses should be called upon to participate in the parliamentary process.

The parliament that existed under the 1953 constitution fell far short of the claim that it was a democratic body. Although candidates did not run for office formally as members of the League of Communists, there was no real opposition. The nomination process was relatively free, but "approved" candidates, while sometimes opposed, were rarely defeated. It was not the method of election so much as the method of operation that kept the Yugoslav *Skupština* from being a true parliamentary body in the Western sense. If not exactly a rubber stamp—occasionally voices of opposition to official policy were raised—it was still something less than a real legislature. Its chief function was to take up and approve legislation formulated in the Federal Executive Council. The liberals, chief among them Edvard Kardelj—once considered by many as another possible heir to Tito—were acutely conscious of the *Skupština's* shortcomings and launched a movement to build up its importance. Prominent citizens not easily intimidated by the Federal Executive Council bureaucrats were put in key parliamentary posts, but this, in effect, changed nothing.

Actually the impetus for parliamentary reform grew out of the changes introduced by the new economic reforms of 1956, measures which aimed at basing the whole economy on workers' management. But just as the conservatives fought the economic reforms, they tried to obstruct the political changes that the liberals, with Tito's apparent blessing, were trying to promote. In the chaos that ensued—liberals pushing one way, the conservatives another—it became clear that both the economic and political systems had become obsolete. In 1958, a wave of strikes—unheard of in a Communist country and theoretically impossible in one with workers' management—dramatically focused attention on these problems. Tito, acting as he already had on several earlier occasions, personally intervened and denounced the malpractices, but this time sided with the reformers. In the liberalization that ensued, there was a scurrying of party bureaucrats out of expensive houses and flats. Government and party intervention in the economy was curbed, and by 1960 restrictions on wages and prices were virtually eliminated.

The new reform was accompanied by a plan to rotate officials to ensure that no one (except Tito) could continue in any office for more than one term. To prove that they were serious, the Yugoslav leaders also drafted a new constitution which embodied all of the liberal economic and political principles promulgated earlier, created a new and independent role for the Federal Assembly and even provided for a Constitutional Court to keep both elected and appointed officials in line.[15] The new parliament, under the 1963 constitution, was supposed to legislate and not rubber-stamp. It is composed of five chambers, each charged with separate and distinct responsibilities. To symbolize its importance, Kardelj himself became its president.

The importance of the new Federal Assembly goes beyond its growing role as a formulator of legislation. Over the past few years its legislative committees have taken the initiative in developing policy, have worked out compromises between federal and local interests, between government planners and segments of industry and even individual enterprises, and have assumed the responsibility of supervising the administration. Elections to that body have been contested more frequently, debate in the various chambers has been sharper, and in-

[14] There is also the possibility that rural labor influx into the cities will be reversed.

[15] The Constitutional Court has remarkably broad powers. See *1963 Constitution SFRJ*, Articles 241-51. According to *Ustavni Sud Jugoslaviji Saopstenja*, Belgrade, 1966, the Court seems to be exercising these powers quite vigorously. See also Winston M. Fisk and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court," *East Europe*, July, 1966, 24-28.

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dependent legislative proposals have begun to emerge from the legislature itself.

To a considerable extent, therefore, the liberals seem to have won more victories than the conservatives in determining the course of events in Yugoslavia. They have done so, however, in the face of bitter, tenacious, and frequently overpowering opposition.

The Case of Ranković

As was noted earlier in this discussion, until July 1966 [16] Aleksandar Ranković constituted the chief obstacle to the revisionist policies of the reformers. As the man in charge of party cadres as well as the SDB—the security police—he never had any enthusiasm for *liberalizatsia,* and used all of his powers and influence to sabotage both the political and economic reforms of the past ten years. Using police nets to gather information, Ranković not only controlled the party apparatus but influenced the personnel and investment policies of major enterprises; even the transfer of investment funds between republics was subject to his approval.

In party echelons, he played his politics of delay more subtly. Relying on old friendships and employing the police "public opinion" reports which were certainly biased, he conjured up images of the grave dangers that would beset the country if the Executive Committee weakened its control. Above all he profited from his close association with Tito, both to influence "Stari" (the "Old Man") himself and to convince others that the Marshal was in agreement with him. Sometimes he was successful. The much heralded plan for denying government posts to those holding party positions, for example, never did come up for decision nor did another proposal to permit foreign companies to form joint companies with Yugoslav enterprises.

It was the security police and their networks in the party and state apparatuses that prevented the implementation of the economic reforms adopted in July 1965 and that opposed the efforts of the revisionists to advance the cause of "direct democracy." Further, it should be noted that the security police had become a stronghold of those Serbs—Serbia was the heartland of Ranković's personal influence as well—who objected to the liberalization of the economic system because it threatened an end to heavy subsidization of industrial development in several underdeveloped republics.

Despite all this "underground opposition," however, Ranković and his group were clearly losing ground. In the balance hung the coming elections of 1967, the law on rotation which meant that Ranković would have to surrender the vice presidency, to say nothing of his ultimate succession to Tito. The Federal Assembly also began about this time to act more and more independently,[17] and there was renewed talk about the separation of party and government jobs. Seriously worried now, the Ranković group overplayed its hand. Intent on knowing which way the wind was blowing, they "bugged" several of Tito's residences as well as the home of the leading liberal of the party, Valdimir Bakarić, the Crotian party leader. This chain of events led to the dramatic showdown of July 1966, which was followed by the dismissal of Ranković and his aides and a purge, albeit bloodless, of the Serbian and Montenegrin Communist parties.

The Role of Tito

The position of Tito in this long quarrel is highly significant, but at the same time problematical. With regard to economic questions there is no doubt that Tito in the final analysis sides with the liberals, although hesitantly and with great caution. His personal interventions over the past five years bear this out. Following the liberalization of 1960, there was something of an economic boom, but it left the country worse off than before. An overexpansion of consumer goods resulted in severe price inflation, a decrease in industrial production and a worsening of the foreign exchange position. In short, Communist Yugoslavia was suffering from the capitalist sickness, economic depression. After futile and continuous wrangles between the "conservatives" and "liberals" Tito decided to step in. At the March 1962 Plenum of the Central Committee he demanded not only tighter control of the economy but also a greater and more active role for the party and more stringent party discipline.

His *volte face* was short-lived, however. The liberal economists argued that the new restrictions could cause economic stagnation and pointed to a falling off of over-all production and continued

[16] The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, at Brioni.

[17] The 1963 constitution placed "legislative supremacy" and "unity of power" in the hands of the legislature under articles 163 and 164, powers which that body began to take more seriously after 1965.

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trade and balance of payments deficits. The Slovenes and the Croats especially chafed under the curbs on investment, protesting that this meant favoring the more underdeveloped republics at the expense of the country as a whole. Faced with mounting liberal pressure within the party, the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Assembly, Tito finally gave in. The Eighth Congress of the League of Communists in December 1964 opted clearly for more liberalization. It meant, said *Borba*, ". . . full realization of all the potentialities of our system, and this time there must be no hesitation. . . ." [18]

Characteristic, too, has been Tito's attitude towards his old comrade and heir apparent, Ranković. For some time it had been an open secret that Ranković was bitterly opposed to both economic and political reforms, and that he was consolidating his own position through his control over the security apparatus. There were, for example, reports of police brutality and torture—especially in the underprivileged Autonomous Kosvo-Metohija (Kosmet) Region, inhabited chiefly by Moslem Albanians. Yet no action could be undertaken against Ranković and his men as long as Tito was unwilling to move against them. It was not until Ranković overplayed his hand that Tito finally stepped in, thus, in effect, allying himself with the liberal wing of the party.

All this illustrates the ambivalence of Tito's role. He is, of course, the prime exponent of the curious system that bears his name. Many feel, however, that he drags his feet on the evolution of "Titoism" in both the political and economic fields, while others feel that he is endangering the whole system of order by his apparent concessions to liberalism. The Yugoslav leader is certainly no liberal in the Western sense. He has made no secret of his dislike for men like Milovan Djilas, now serving another prison term, or Mihajlo Mihajlov, now under arrest. Nor does he particularly welcome the intrusion of Western ideas in either political or artistic fields, as he has stated on a number of occasions. As long as he remains undisputed master of a totalitarian system, there will continue to be serious questions about the problem of his successor, and considerably less than full opportunity for the young and able liberals in the Yugoslav party to assert themselves.

Perhaps one can best describe Tito's policy as the politics of balance. He has surely exhibited juggling talents in the past, and in the months following the purge of the Ranković group, he has demonstrated his old virtuosity, preserving the delicate balance of nationalities, appealing to the Serbs to play the leading role in the reform, and placating the fears of many who felt themselves compromised by the decisions of the Fourth Plenum at Brioni in July 1966. Ranković's removal, for example, has not apparently enhanced the position of Edvard Kardelj as far as succession is concerned. Nor is Koca Popović, the former foreign minister who stepped into Ranković's government post, considered to have increased his political power. Among those whose political fortunes may have improved are Veljko Vlahović and Mihalko Todorović, both

[18] "Kongres i Nasa Stuarnost," *Borba* (Belgrade), December 28, 1964.

GRAPHIC PROBLEMS

Caption over graph: "Production." *Below:* "Let's transfer the loss to the state's account—that way it will wither away."



—From Borba (Belgrade), Sept. 14, 1966, reprinted from Front slobode (Tuzla).

— Да пребацимо губитке на терет државе она ће лепо одумрети.
(Х. Фазлић, „Фронт слободе", Тузла)

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liberal members of the Executive Committee. However, the official Yugoslav policy to rotate party and government posts, with the obvious exception of Tito, makes it improbable that these men can consolidate any significant personal power.

In terms of the country's ethnic conflicts, Ranković's elimination cannot even be considered a victory for the Croats and the Slovenes. While these areas might now be able to develop more freely without helping to support industrialization programs in the more backward republics, there has been no "defeat" for the Serbs. Both Popović and Todorović, who took over Ranković's government and party jobs, are Serbs, and even the latter's deputy for the security police has been replaced by another Serb, Rista Antunović.

Tito is by no means ready to permit the liberals total freedom in the political sphere, which only a few apparently really want. Independent initiatives on serious issues still have to be made within the party. In the Federal Assembly itself, most of the leading members of the legislative committees still seem to be strongly oriented toward official points of view, their influence constituting one method of indirect control. Yet over the past several months, these committees have not hesitated to rebuff the government, for example, over the budget account for 1965.[19] Other government financial amendments have been defeated in the Assembly by substantial majorities. Many observers feel that the time is not far distant when the committees and ultimately the parliament itself will criticize official policy not only on technical matters but on important substantive issues as well. It has even been suggested that the regime, having introduced competitive enterprise and a market economy, might pioneer in the political realm by establishing a socialist opposition party.

Less Power for the Party?

For the time being, however, the entire Yugoslav leadership is seriously engaged in the reform of the party itself. Considered by many observers to be one of the most significant developments in Yugoslavia since 1948, the "democratization" of the League of Yugoslav Communists, under discussion all over the country, promises to change the whole character of Yugoslav communism, even though it is difficult at this point to make out just what its new features will resemble. The formula, created by Tito and adopted at the Fifth Plenum in Belgrade on October 4, appears to be yet another compromise.

Under its terms the top echelon party structure has been radically altered. The former Executive Committee (politburo) has been disbanded and its members incorporated into a larger, 35-man Presidium, charged with policy planning. A new 11-man Executive Committee has been formed with Mihalko Todorović as its Secretary, charged with the execution of the decisions of the Central Committee. None of these men may hold government positions. Five of them are secretaries of the executive committees of republican central committees. The Central Committee, which has now been strengthened at the expense of the old Executive Committee, is now served by five separate advisory commissions made up of Central Committee members but including non-members as well.

The reform, described by Tito and Todorović as strictly a provisional measure until its results can be discussed at the 1968 congress, does diffuse power at the apex of the party. The "old guard" of the former Executive Committee (all but five are over 50) no longer can dominate the Central Committee as they once did. Their strength has been even further diluted in the newly created Presidiuim. Yet they have not been removed from positions of influence, and presumably will remain in office until 1968. The new Executive Committee, ostensibly a more liberal group (the average age is 44), will continue to take its orders from the Central Committee, which has not been enlarged.

It is very difficult at this stage to make any clear predictions about the future of Yugoslav communism, for it is obvious that even the Yugoslav leaders are uncertain about what will finally be the role of the party. Risking a tautology, one can only say that the October decisions are peculiarly Titoist for they make concessions to both the liberals and conservatives without completely satisfying either.

How successful the economic reform will be, if the Yugoslavs really mean it to be this time, is still to be determined. Despite bright chances, there could arise economic difficulties so serious that no government could allow them to continue without intervention. In one sense there is a race between cultural and economic developments. Worker management and market socialism can never function as they are supposed to until those responsible for

[19] The Budget Committee refused to approve the budget closing account for 1965. See *Borba*, Sept. 28, 1966.

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the economy—in the enterprises and in the government—acquire more management know-how and can sublimate both short-run personal interest and narrow ethnic-national particularism. Great strides must be achieved in education and social responsibility in order to prevent a repetition of past errors and excesses requiring a reversion to a controlled economy. Success may also depend on factors outside Yugoslavia. While the country has now become a full-fledged member of GATT, Belgrade still fears that tighter economic integration in both Western and Eastern Europe could nullify the drive for greater markets.

The future of agriculture will also be significant. The Yugoslav system of cooperation between private farmers, who own most of the land, and government-oriented cooperatives seems to be working well. But Yugoslav agriculture is handicapped by the fact that two-thirds of the productive land is confined to the Voivodina in the northeast part of the country. In the past, crushing droughts in this area have frequently forced the Yugoslavs to buy vast quantities of grain abroad, aggravating their balance of payments difficulties. In 1950 when the drought hit Yugoslavia and did not seem to enter either Rumania and Hungary, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade remarked: "God is on the side of the Cominform." Time proved him wrong. On the other hand there is no certainty that Providence is on the side of the Tito regime either.

Hungary: Iron out of Wood

By Joseph Held

The new economic reform program adopted in Hungary is characterized by greater zeal, higher ambitions, wilder expectations—and more double-talk—than any of its counterparts in Eastern Europe. At a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on May 25-27, 1966, the long-awaited system of reforms was finally accepted. According to the official announcement, the most important changes gradually to be introduced between now and 1968 are: 1) a new type of planning that will give greater independence to directors of enterprises; 2) greater freedom of the market through deference to the "spontaneous" workings of the laws of supply and demand; 3) a new system of prices and wages, based on the coordination of national interests with those of individual enterprises; and 4) greater emphasis on the development of agriculture.[1]

A great deal of cautious planning and debate preceded the adoption of the reforms. The significance attached to the program was exemplified in the comment of one participant in the discussions, József Bognár, who stated that "the proposals represent the most important changes in the history of socialist economy since the introduction of socialist relations of ownership." [2] By no means was there universal enthusiasm, however; during the protracted

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[1] *Népszabadság* (Budapest), May 29, 1966.
[2] J. Bognár, "Overall Direction and Operation of the Economy," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), Spring 1966, p. 31.

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discussions, the proposals encountered resistance from diverse elements in the party. The old guard saw the reforms as a repudiation of the cherished ideal of a centrally-controlled economy, the basis of the party's monopoly of political power. On the other hand, some of the reform-minded party members were fearful that the admission of total failure of the old methods would produce such a sharp reaction that the new mechanism would represent a step backward to "capitalism." [3]

Yet there was hardly any choice. As early as 1963, it had become painfully clear even to the hard-core Stalinists that the system was bankrupt. In 1964 the *coup de grâce* to Stalinist methods was administered by Iván T. Berend, a historian of economics, in a short book with a long title that created immediate controversy.[4]

The appearance of this book in itself reflected the greater freedom of expression that the Kádár regime had cautiously extended to Hungary's intellectuals. Disregarding ideological myths and fallacies, the study succeeded in indicting the economic policy of the party during the Rákosi era. The author demonstrated—supporting his arguments with documents from the party archives(!)—that the nation's economy had been systematically ruined by dilettantes after the Communist conquest of power in 1948. He maintained that during the entire Rákosi era, waste, deception, incompetence and terror had characterized the process of economic policy-making as well as the direction of the political life of the country. He showed, in fact, that the entire mechanism of the planned economy had broken down by the time the Rákosi-Gerö clique fell from power.[5] Although he did not do so, he might have added the same about the political mechanism, as the events of 1956 strikingly demonstrated.

It is hardly likely that this book could have appeared without the permission of the party authorities, the more so since Berend had been expounding his ideas for some time before the study was published. Probably the intention was to show that the present leadership was thoroughly fed up with continuous obstruction by hard-core Stalinists. The study also served as a starting point for the actual introduction of reform plans. At the same time, in order to show how much times had changed, the regime invited economic experts and "other leading citizens" to participate in preliminary discussion of the reform.

The need for reform was manifest in virtually every sector of the economic system. Hungary's chronic problems were in many respects even more critical than those of the other East European countries. In the wake of the 1956 revolution, the Kádár regime had pursued a relentlessly Stalinist course, relying for its economic survival on credits extended by its "socialist" partners. Collectivization of agriculture had been pressed to completion in 1960-61, but agricultural production continued to lag. Rural living conditions were so miserable that there was a steady exodus of farm labor to the cities, siphoning off the youngest and most vigorous members of the collectives. Even so, there were not enough workers to meet the demand for skilled labor in the factories, reflecting in part a long and steady decline in Hungary's birth rate. The consequence of these and other factors was virtual stagnation in the overall growth rate of the economy. Though there were some improvements in the living conditions of the population during the early 1960's, they were so slow in coming that there was perceptible unrest in both the urban and rural areas. Finally, serious problems arose out of the fact that Hungary's exports had been subsidized throughout most of its "socialist" history; the deficit in foreign trade had steadily increased in the decade up to 1964, leading to the weakening of the *forint*.[6] It was clear that—even without prodding from neighbor regimes—the Hungarian party had to do something to change the situation.

From the start, however, the leaders faced a fundamental dilemma. The problem was not unique; it was—and still is—shared by all Communist-controlled governments of Eastern Europe. If the rigidly-controlled, inflexible economic system was to be replaced by a more efficient one, by a system able to respond to the growing complexities of society, then the parties had to consider delegating greater authority in the economic decision-making process to non-party experts and managers. Yet

[3] See, *e.g.*, József Garam, "A Gazdasági Reformrol" (About the Economic Reform), *Latóhatár* (Budapest), July-August 1966, p. 720.

[4] T. Berend, *Gazdaságpolitika az elsö ötéves terv megindításakor* (Economic Policy at the Beginning of the First Five-Year Plan), Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1964.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

[6] In *Statisztikai Évkönyv* (Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, 1964, pp. 223-26, it was admitted that Hungary's trade deficit amounted to 6.3 billion "*deviza forints*" (based on the *forint's* value in Western markets, which is well below the official exchange-rate). The 1964 deficit was higher than in any previous year, totalling 1.7 billion "*deviza forints*."

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economic life is hard, if not impossible, to separate from political life; the next logical step would be decentralization of the monopoly of political power. Communists, who take pride in their correct understanding of history, could hardly overlook the many examples from its pages of groups who first gained economic independence and then began to demand a greater voice in the political life of their countries.

This dilemma made itself felt throughout the discussion and formulation of the reform program. Fear of losing its monopoly of power prevented the Kádár regime from accepting the logical conclusions of its own reasoning.

Planning: Old and New

During the Rákosi era the economic plans provided gross output targets for every single enterprise and collective farm, large and small alike. The main task of the managers and chairmen of these units was to follow central directives. Since the managers received bonuses and recognition only if they reached their targets irrespective of any other consideration, they had no interest in improving the quality of production. The orders of the central organs were often unreasonable, failing to take into account special conditions at the enterprise level and forcing managers to indulge in fraud, deception and misrepresentation. Many managers juggled with statistics to show a high level of accomplishment when their factories actually produced substandard goods; in fact, a high volume of production usually meant a large number of unsalable items. Thus the interests of the firms often ran contrary to the interests of the economy as a whole.[7] Relations between managers and the government deteriorated to such an extent that it was not unusual for directors to be threatened with jail if their production fell behind targets.

The error of the regime was one common to all dictatorships. By insisting upon close conformity with central directives, the party eliminated individual initiative of the "right" kind—though there was plenty of initiative for deception—both within and outside its ranks. Such an economic system was suited only to the rigid conditions that prevailed in Hungary, as well as in the rest of Eastern Europe, during the Stalin era. Accordingly, the realization that the methods no longer sufficed prompted the Kádár regime to end centralized, detailed planning.

According to initial explanations of the reform, the central plan would henceforth contain only a few guidelines indicating the long-range objectives of the economy. Instead of being assigned compulsory targets, enterprises would simply be informed of the amount of money they would be expected to contribute to the national budget; any profits remaining to them would be used at their own discretion. Managers would have the task of making short-range plans for their firms, coordinating them with the broad guidelines set forth by the central planners. The most important concern of the managers would be to increase the *profitability* of their production. They would be expected to pay close attention to the market, and they would have to be flexible in their plans.

These stipulations seemed to hold the promise of a significant move toward a more rational system. Yet the degree of independence they appeared to grant to enterprise managers became one of the major issues generating alarm within the party (as it turned out, without justification). A number of party economists argued that if managers were left free to set their own plans, they would be sorely tempted to ignore national interest, just as they had proved soft in resisting erroneous directives during the era of the "personality cult." They would, it was held, promote "anarchy of the market" by following the path of least resistance to the pockets of their customers.[8] In the face of these objections, the architects of the reform found it necessary to clarify just how much—*i.e.*, little—freedom *was* being granted to enterprises, as well as how much reliance was actually being placed on the market.

It fell to Ottó Gadó, a member of the Central Planning Bureau, to explain that

. . . the independence of enterprises is not one of our goals. . . Enterprise independence means, instead, that firms have their own fields of responsibility. Central directives—and there will be cases when direct orders must be given to firms—will be stricter than before.[9]

Another spokesman asserted:

The firms will not be independent, but they will have to pay close attention to "spontaneous" economic forces as

[7] See György Varga, "A gazdasági mechanizmus reformja" (Reform of the Economic Mechanism), *Közgazdasági szemle* (Budapest), July-August 1966, p. 793.

[8] Garam, *op. cit.*, p. 723.

[9] O. Gadó's comment on József Bognár's lecture, *Közgazdasági szemle*, January 1966, p. 119.

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well as to central directives; in this way central directives will be more efficient.[10]

Considering the fact that the distribution of industrial supplies is to remain centralized, and that priority projects will undoubtedly be favored by the central planners, it seems patently clear that the authority of managers will not be greatly increased. Apparently the main objective of the reform is not to make enterprise-government relationships more rational but to make central direction of the economy more effective. It is true that managers will have greater leeway in implementing central directives, and that central planners will probably be more restricted in issuing direct orders to firms. Yet while this may be an improvement over the old system, it does not amount to decentralization of the economic process. And since the "remainder" of an enterprise's profits depends ultimately on the planners, the latter will remain in control as before.

The role to be assigned to the "market" was another issue that needed clarification. In a statement reporting on the proceedings of the plenary session of May 25-27, the party economist György Varga noted:

The socialist market is an organized one. This means that all the tools by which the state can exert its influence over both the market and enterprises will be retained by the state.[11]

Varga then reported that new commercial companies would be established by the party to act as middlemen between the firms and the "market."

Added to other restrictions, this plan underscores the fact that enterprises will have very little independence, since the "market" will not represent a regulating mechanism in the true sense of the term. The market will be a new intermediary in the chain of command, its regulation remaining in the hands of the *apparat*. In certain cases it will be used to transmit the orders of the party to the firms. Therefore, it is clearly not a new form in the economic mechanism.

[10] Péter Nagy's comment on József Bognár's lecture, *ibid.*, p. 118.

Sign on gate: "Steel Spring and Bolt Factory." *Sign left:* "Bakery." *Caption:* "Since we opened a pie bakery, there's no deficit."

—*From* Ludas Matyi *(Budapest), Sept. 8, 1966.*

Price Reforms

In a lecture to the 1966 session of the Hungarian Economic Society, József Bognár announced:

We are introducing an economic system that will make comparison between activities in different sectors of the economy possible, one that will promote rational economic activity.[12]

The real basis of such a rational comparison would be a price system corresponding to prices on the world market. But prices have long been arbitrarily determined in Hungary, and the habit of control does not die quickly. Settling on a course of reform must have been a difficult task; but in the end the party came up with the answer. The basic element involved in pricing was not to be changed: prices were to include, as before, the cost of "social investment."[13] The fact that the system

[11] G. Varga, *op. cit.*, p. 794.

[12] J. Bognár, "Uj gazdaságirányítási rendszerünk körvonalai" (Outlines of Our New System of Economic Direction), *Közgazdasági szemle*, January 1966, p. 114.

[13] See Béla Csikós-Nagy, "A magyarországi árvita két szakasza" (Two Phases of the Hungarian Discussions over Prices), *Közgazdasági szemle*, April 1966, p. 401.

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which resulted is no less arbitrary than the old one did not disturb the reformers.

As a first step, radical price increases were ordered in some of the most important categories of foodstuffs. Together with wage increases for certain categories of workers, higher taxes were declared on higher-than-average-income pensioners.[14]

It seems likely that the leaders had several goals in mind when deciding on these rather unpopular steps. It was evident that the party hoped to stimulate production of the most important foodstuffs by increasing wholesale prices paid for them. It is also probable that an important idea behind the increases was to limit consumption of meat and dairy products, since these are increasingly becoming the mainstay of Hungary's exports to the West.[15]

Price increases were only one part of the reform program. In order to establish a balance between the rather conflicting goals of stability and flexibility, three categories of consumer prices were introduced. In the first category prices were to remain fixed; in the second, maximum-minimum limits were to be established; while in the third, prices were to remain free to follow market fluctuations. In its anxiety to maintain the stability of the price system, however, the regime decided to include the great majority of consumer products in the first two categories. Thus the prices of most foodstuffs, clothing, and building material for private use, to mention only the most important items in the average Hungarian's budget, continue under the control of the central government, and there will be relatively little opportunity to determine the real value of goods on the basis of the market mechanism.

Another important segment of the price structure comprises industrial prices. Formerly industrial prices, like consumer prices, were determined arbitrarily. In some of the most important categories of producers' goods, enormous subsidies were given to firms that were unable to operate profitably, especially in the sector of basic industrial raw materials. Increasing these prices therefore became imperative in order to set the producers on their own feet. But the dilemma was that if prices of basic industrial raw materials were raised, this might start an inflationary chain reaction which the regime could not afford. Therefore, the central planners resorted to a partial increase of raw material prices, while at the same time they continued—and intended to keep on—subsidizing the producers of these materials.

A "New" Investment Policy

The most important aspect of the reform of investment policy is that, while managers will decide on short-term investment expenditures or on replacement of depreciated machinery, control over long-term investments and priority projects will be left to the central planners. It is hoped that by gaining control over at least part of their profits, directors will be forced to organize production in their factories along more rational lines.

It is also expected that banks will take on a larger role in financing short-term investments for enterprises by acquiring the right to formulate their own credit policies. Their major consideration in weighing credit requests will be the profitability rate expected from the proposed investments.[16]

In order to propose rational investments, however, the directors will have to know their expected profit rate; in other words, they must know the *actual* value of goods produced in their factories, on the one hand, and market conditions on the other. According to the reform, they will be empowered to spend part of their depreciation fund for market research; they will also be expected to establish close connections with their customers.[17] But the market will not be a freely operating mechanism, and through the fixed-price category the government will again be in a position to assign "real values" to goods. The proposed profitability rates will thus depend on what the party deems acceptable and desirable for its own goals.

Interest rates, which according to the reforms should serve as a stimulant for greater profitability, will reflect instead priority assignments.

In short, the reforms have not yet succeeded in providing sufficiently new motives for rational activity at the enterprise level. Since the reforms will be combined with severe restrictions on the

[14] *Népszabadság*, Dec. 19, 1965.

[15] See Antal Máriás, "Népgazdaságunk strukturája és gazdaságfejlesztési céljaink" (Structure of Our People's Economy and Our Goals for Economic Development), *Közgazdasági szemle*, April 1966, pp. 497-99. The author describes the losses accruing from Hungary's imbalance of payments, remarking that only by increasing imports of foodstuffs to the West can the situation be corrected.

[16] Kálmán Szabó's comment on József Bognár's lecture, *Közgazdasági szemle*, January 1966, p. 118.

[17] However, the amount reserved for the depreciation funds is so small that they will serve only very minor investments. See Egon Kemenes, "The Firm as a Functional Model in a Planned Economy," *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, Autumn 1965, pp. 61-62.

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buying power of the general population in order to avoid sudden scarcities of consumer goods,[18] little incentive will be left for greater profitability. It seems rather strange that the regime should try to disprove the old Hungarian proverb that "one cannot make an iron ring out of wood." Yet granting that its intentions are sincere, the regime has chosen an odd way of going about the rationalization of the economic mechanism. Certainly, it is rather difficult to discover the "free play" of economic forces in this system.

Agriculture

One of the brighter aspects of the reform program may be discovered in the party's new approach to agriculture. Through the aforementioned price increases of last December, the first halting steps were taken to channel needed funds to the collectivized farms. Compulsory production targets were also abolished, and the government began encouraging greater initiative on the part of managers of agricultural units.

But the measures go only halfway; here again commitments to ideology have prevented the party from following up its own lead. Despite all the talk about individual initiative, the party has retained its monopoly over purchasing and distributing agricultural products.[19] There will be little added motivation for collectives and individual peasants to produce more if they have to sell their output at prices that depend on the planners.

On the other hand, further hopeful changes are being contemplated—some of them revolutionary when compared with the party's past approach. For instance, the economist Imre Tar has recommended that a new system of plot-distribution be introduced. He suggested that able and willing peasant families should be given more than the customary single private plot, and that they should be supplied with small agricultural machinery, seeds and chemicals.[20] It is true that these proposals have not yet been accepted, but the fact that they could even be voiced gives hope for a further relaxation of the tight control that the party has exercised over agriculture in the past eighteen years.

There is a further problem, however, that cannot be easily solved. Since last December, there has been seething antagonism between the urban and rural populations. City-dwellers have resented the increase of food prices, regarding it as an effort to placate the peasantry at their expense. The trouble is that the party cannot really divert significant funds from the national budget in the interest of any segment of society without injuring the rest. Thus the situation harbors a potential source of trouble for the future.

In plain fact, the years of neglect of agriculture during the Rákosi era cannot be canceled out in a short time. The lack of agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizers throughout the period only begins to tell the story of that neglect. Rural roads, communications, railways, electrical-power needs and public health were also assigned lowest priority in national planning. Consequently, when the Kádár regime talks of increasing incentives for the collectives, it deals only with the most visible and immediate part of the problem.

The party knows that if it really wanted to improve Hungarian agriculture, it would have to embark on a program that would demand most of the funds available for the entire economy at its present level. It would have to begin building roads, modernizing railroad transportation, supplying refrigerated boxcars for perishable foodstuffs, improving storage facilities, and creating a whole new packing industry. It would also have to end insecurity in the countryside by proving its willingness to leave the private plots alone and to permit the peasantry to sell their produce on the open market.

At the present time, however, the party has neither the funds to embark on such a complete reorganization of agriculture, nor the willingness to discard old ideological clichés. The reforms represent an attempt to bridge the gap of the next few years, in the hope that meantime something might happen to solve an insoluble problem. Price increases of foodstuffs, while they may facilitate higher production in certain categories, cannot be substitutes for "changing the thinking-cap"—the fundamental step that is so badly needed in the Hungarian economy.

* * *

There is little doubt that the Hungarian Communists are moving in a vicious circle, inherited in large part from the unfortunate period of the

[18] See Peter Havas, "A piac megszervezése" (Organization of the Market), *Közgazdasági szemle*, July-August 1966, p. 803.

[19] See Pál Korom, "Az árukapcsolatok uj vonásai a termelöszövetkezetekben" (New Elements of Commodity Relations in the Collectives), *Közgazdasági szemle*, March 1966, p .369.

[20] I. Tar, "A mezögazdaság reformja" (Reform of Agriculture), *Társadalmi szemle* (Budapest), February 1966, p. 201; see also László Csapó, "Hosszutávu novekedéstervezés nyitott gazdaságban" (Long-Range Growth-Planning in an Open Economy), *Közgasdasági szemle*, November 1965, pp. 1368-81.

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"personality cult." Common sense and the logic of events compel them to seek a way out of the mess of a bankrupt economic system; on the other hand, they are unwilling to consider the necessary concomitant of genuine economic health—*i.e.*, decentralization of their monopoly of political power. They are not alone in this dilemma, as is evident from the doubts that other Eastern European governments have shown in introducing reform programs.

Manifestly, rationalization of the economic system is closely connected with the problem of democratization of the political life of the region. In Hungary, as in most of Eastern Europe, there is little in the current atmosphere to indicate that the party is willing to cross this historic barrier. Memories of Imre Nagy's innovations and their results are still too strong among most of the party membership to permit a smooth transition towards democracy.

The question whether the Hungarian economy will work better as a result of the reform program cannot be answered with any assurance. The most that can be hoped for, under present circumstances, is that *attitudes*, if not conditions, may change as a result of the reforms. As it is, the economy faces a long uphill fight before there will be any meaningful improvement in the living conditions of the Hungarian people.

Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet

By Gregory Grossman

The year 1965—like 1953 and 1956—was a memorable landmark in the postwar history of Communist Europe: it was The Year of Economic Reform. Anticipated quietly by East Germany in 1963—and, of course, by Yugoslavia a decade earlier—nearly all the countries of Eastern Europe succumbed within a span of twelve months, one after the other, like so many dominoes, to the winds of economic change: Czechoslovakia in January 1965, Poland in July, the Soviet Union in September, Hungary in November, and Bulgaria in early December.[1] Just a fortnight before the year ran out, East Germany tinkered further with its "New Economic System." And as though to ensure its reformist lead on its neighbors to the east and north, Yugoslavia took another long forward step in July 1965. Only internally rigid Rumania, still too successful with Stalinist economic methods to fully realize their defects, and tiny Albania, defiant in Balkan manner behind its Chinese wall, have so far escaped the epidemic of economic reform.

The East German "New Economic System" is the sole reform system functioning at this time. In all the other cases the reforms have proceeded no

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[1] The cited months refer to the meetings of the Central Committees of the respective parties at which the initial decisions to proceed with the reforms were taken.

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farther than stated intentions on the part of the ruling regimes, or at best some preliminary steps in the promised direction. The next two to three years will test each regime's capacity and resolution to do the job. How far and how fast the reforms will eventually go is still largely a matter of conjecture—fascinating conjecture, given the welter of economic, political, ideological, and international factors impinging on their progress. We shall take a brief look at some of these factors in the present essay. But from the outset we must recognize that if each country's announcement of an economic reform represents the end of one era of political struggles and doctrinal debates, it also marks the beginning of a new era that will produce clashes no less intense. In what follows we are concerned with the USSR and other Soviet-type economies, and only incidentally with Yugoslavia.

Problems and Causes

The readers of this journal—and especially of the series of articles on "Economics and Politics" in its recent issues—need hardly be reminded of the main problems associated with the traditional Soviet-type "command" economy, and hence of the considerations that have prompted some sort of reform in all the countries in question. Very poor articulation of demand and supply; accumulation of unwanted goods; highly wasteful use of resources in production; a relatively low share of the national product going to the consumer and, within the limits of this share, poor attention to his interests; generally low quality of products, which among other things affects the competitiveness of exports on the world market; undistinguished performance of the agricultural sector: these are some of the well-known "static" defects of the Soviet-type economy. On the "dynamic" side, we note considerable declines in the traditionally high rates of growth in all the countries in question after the turn of the decade; corresponding declines in annual rates of increase of labor productivity and consumption levels; disappointing—though in themselves often quite respectable—rates of technological progress, in part owing to opposition to innovation from below; falling increments in product per unit of investment, and so forth.

Underlying these negative phenomena are such institutional causes as overcentralization of decisions and correspondingly overextended lines of communication; exceedingly complicated administrative structures; primitive methods of planning; reliance on crude physical indicators; information that is at once excessive in volume and poorly adapted to sophisticated decision-making; faulty signals, chiefly owing to irrational pricing practices; a rigid system of materials allocation; suppression of initiative and impairment or misplacement of incentives; political interference at all levels of the economy; dogmatically rooted impediments, such as evidenced in pricing principles and in the opposition to virtually any private enterprise, even where it would be clearly beneficial to economic performance. These causes, no less than their effects, are well known both to outside students of the Soviet economic system and to domestic critics.[2]

Yet the picture must not be painted in unduly dark tones. With some notable exceptions—such as the total halt in Czechoslovakia's growth-rate in 1962-1964, and the chronic ills of agriculture in most of the countries—the European Communist economies are continuing to grow at respectable rates, albeit less rapidly than before. Consumption levels are continuing to rise, and technological standards are advancing. The point is that these increases are inadequate from the standpoint of both the regimes and their populations. At the same time, it would be shortsighted to see the case for reforms as resting on economic grounds alone. There is little doubt that at this juncture in history the pressure for reform in Communist countries is rooted not only in economic expectations but also in political and moral aspirations. The *decentralization* of the economic structure is undoubtedly favored by some of its partisans as a step toward the eventual *democratization* of political and social life, as well as for its economic benefits.

External Influences

A number of forces from the outside world have also given a push to the reform movement.

The importance of the Yugoslav example— "socialist" and Marxist, but with a fundamentally different institutional system—can hardly be exaggerated. However wanting Yugoslav reality may be in relation to its own ideal or to the more ad-

[2] For an extensive analysis of the problems faced by the Soviet economy, see *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Parts I-V, report of the US Congress' Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966. For an excellent shorter treatment of the subject, see Robert W. Campbell, "Economics: Roads and Inroads," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1965, pp. 28-33.

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vanced and sophisticated economies of the industrial West, its strengths often lie precisely where the major weaknesses of the Soviet-type economies and societies are to be found. Its market mechanism permits the suppleness and the dispersed initiative that the command economy lacks. There is greater acceptance of small-scale private enterprise. Its system of workers' self-government strives at that measure of industrial democracy which is conspicuously lacking in other countries proclaiming themselves to be socialist. Nor has Yugoslavia had to pay a price for these advantages in terms of economic growth, for its growth rate compares favorably with those of its more orthodox neighbors. Last but not least, Yugoslavia's economic reforms have been accompanied by some (if so far quite limited) liberalization and democratization in the cultural and political spheres. The party's role in society has become more circumscribed. In sum, by its mere existence Yugoslavia serves as an example of a workable, and in many respects attractive, form of socialist economy and society.

If the capitalist economies of the West do not represent an alternative for the Soviet-type countries in the same sense in which Yugoslavia does, they nonetheless provide forceful examples of technological modernity and consumer well-being that are not lost on either the regimes or the populations of Eastern Europe. At the same time, Western economics—especially that part of it which concerns itself with the maximization of social objectives through rational resource utilization—has made a profound impact on at least a part of the economics profession in the Communist countries. Being largely apolitical, this body of Western economics is in principle easily transferable into a socialist context, where it has a high potential impact because of its profound implications for rationalizing, planning and management. Moreover, its arrival in the East tends to de-ideologize and de-dogmatize the Communist political economy, thus smoothing the way for pragmatically-motivated institutional changes.

Lastly, the importance of foreign trade in preparing the ground for the reforms must not be underrated. All the European Communist countries have continuously faced serious shortages of foreign exchange, and for all of them, except the Soviet Union, rapid industrialization without relatively large importations of goods—whether raw materials of highly fabricated goods (especially machinery), or both, depending on the particular country—is impossible. Extensive credits are difficult for them to obtain. Thus, they must export on a large scale, both to the East and to the West. In doing so they submit their goods to a severe competitive test in terms of quality and technological modernity; and their economic institutions undergo a similar test in terms of adaptability to changing external conditions and overall effectiveness. Frequently they have found both their goods and their institutions to be seriously wanting on these scores. In all the countries, with the exception of the USSR, a major argument for thoroughgoing economic reform has been the need to render their economies more effective in both the "capitalist" and the "socialist" world markets.

But the influence of foreign trade on reformist thinking does not stop here. The "socialist world market," in which the European Communist countries transact about two-thirds of their external trade, is after all a *market*. As such, it has served as a school, and a very compelling one at that, in which the logic of market relations among *socialist* entities was inevitably learned by the regimes in question. Among other things, they learned in this school that rational economic decisions cannot be based on irrational price structures, and that every resource use has its opportunity cost—elementary verities of economics that all too often have been overlooked by Communist leaders and planners when not subjected to the discipline of the external market and the relentless need to earn foreign exchange.

Furthermore, a country which desperately needs to earn foreign exchange soon begins to think of it as a main objective of economic policy. Because foreign exchange is a relatively simple, quantifiable, and even almost unidimensional criterion [3] of national-economic success (compared, say, to such domestic objectives as industrialization or the improvement in living standards), it can be easily incorporated into formal theories or mathematical expressions that purport to specify the conditions of efficient resource allocation. One thousand more dollars (or marks, or pounds, or even foreign-trade rubles) is always better than one thousand less when foreign exchange is desperately scarce, and therefore a pattern of resource use that earns the extra thousand is clearly better than one that does not. From this point on the rational economic calculus can take over. Hence, the chronic shortage

[3] What prevents it from being a uni-dimensional criterion is the earning of non-convertible currencies, an important qualification in the case of the Communist countries since most of their trade is with each other—*i.e.*, in non-convertible currencies.

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of foreign exchange was a kind of blessing in the guise of a crisis—at least in the sense of opening the door to the intrusion of rational methods into Communist political economy and to the slow exit of scholasticism and dogma. This is just what has been happening in Eastern Europe since the mid-1950's, when formal theories of "foreign trade efficiency" began to make their appearance.[4] There is thus a direct intellectual link between the primitive formulas for foreign-exchange maximization that appeared in Hungary in 1954 and the elaborate theoretical and philosophical underpinning of that country's far-reaching economic reform a decade later.

The Reform Proposals

Since the syndrome of economic malfunctioning is largely the same in all Soviety-type countries, it is not surprising that the remedial measures proposed by the current reforms consist of essentially the same ingredients, though often mixed in different proportions. To indicate the main ingredients we can do no better than to reproduce a list that was prepared by the research staff of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe:

(i) Broad directives seeking to improve central planning techniques, requiring, in particular, greater reliance on the medium and long-term plans which are regarded as devices for achieving greater stability in the conditions under which enterprises operate;

(ii) Changes and reductions in the centrally planned targets that are mandatory for the enterprise, together with greater emphasis on gross income (*i.e.*, net value added), profit, and rate of profitability as criteria for judging the enterprise's success;

(iii) The expansion of decentralized investment funds available to enterprises and the larger economic units, and a greater use of bank credits;

(iv) The introduction of a capital charge on the fixed assets of enterprises, which will play an increasingly important role in transferring a proportion of profits to the budget;

(v) A strengthening of economic incentives (amounting in some cases to changes in the wage system) by establishing closer ties between the remuneration of employees and the enterprise's performance;

(vi) The promotion of direct contracts between economic units which, in contrast with the old system, are no longer conceived simply as instruments for the implementation of national plans, but rather as a means of guiding the plan itself;

(vii) Price reforms, which include changes in the determination of prices and in the price structure;

(viii) The concentration of industrial enterprises into larger units (sometimes accounting for a whole branch of industry), . . . [having] administrative responsibilities but being called upon to operate to a greater extent as economically accountable organizations;

(ix) The streamlining of the administrative apparatus responsible for the management of industry, and/or various administrative changes having more specific objectives.[5]

The basic thrust of all the reforms is in the direction of decentralization, which is natural considering that the ills of the traditional system have been largely ills of overcentralization. But the various reforms differ greatly in the extent and comprehensiveness of the decentralizing measures. On this more presently. One feature should be noted here, however. In all the reforms except the most conservative, the Soviet, and the most daring, the Hungarian, the decentralization is in large measure not to the level of the individual enterprise but to that of the newly-created (or strengthened) "associations" into which the enterprises of whole industries have been or are being combined (see item viii above).[6] This is important.

One reason given for creating powerful "branch associations" is that they can take over much of the burden of *centralized* planning, coordination, and management from the national planning agencies, and thus allow the latter to concentrate on broader and more basic problems. The associations are closer to the enterprises and can plan and manage them more effectively than can the top planners. The second reason for emphasizing the associations is that they have some distinct advantages over enterprises in terms of economies of scale: ensuring large production runs where possible, centralizing research for the industry, standardizing technology and design, dealing with foreign buyers. We may add a third reason: it is easier for central authorities to maintain economic and political vigilance over 100-odd associations than over thousands of enterprises, especially if some devolution of decision-making power is to take place.

But what remains unclear in all reforms that place heavy emphasis on the branch associations—includ-

[4] *Cf.* Frederic L. Pryor, *The Communist Foreign Trade System*, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1963, pp. 106 ff.

[5] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1965*, Part 1, p. 57.

[6] In East Germany there are some 90 such branch associations (designated as VVB—*Vereiningungen volkseigener Betriebe*), while in Czechoslovakia there are about 100 "concerns" (vertically integrated large enterprises) and "trusts" (horizontally grouped enterprises in a given branch). In his speech announcing the Soviet reform (Sept. 27, 1965), Mr. Kosygin spoke of the creation of a "net" of branch associations on a level between the ministry and the enterprise, but it is not clear what is being done on this score. (The proposed "branch" associations are not to be confused with the *firmy*—horizontal groupings of relatively smaller enterprises—that have been created by the hundreds in recent years in the USSR.)

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ing the East German case where the new system has been in effect for several years—is how the coordination between branches is to be achieved without depriving the associations of their autonomy. If the reforms stop short of creating a workable market mechanism, there is always the danger of either permitting the associations to develop into autarkic empires, with consequent loss of efficiency and progressivity, or, to avoid these defects, backsliding into the old-style command economy by recentralizing to the top level. On the other hand, should a market mechanism be introduced, the socialist country would enter the new era with a structure of supermonopolies, with all that again implies for efficiency and progressivity. Of course, insofar as the associations will be marketing abroad, they will be in salutary competition with foreign producers. But their domestic markets are likely to remain well protected, if only because foreign exchange shortages—which are sure to persist for a long time yet—will forestall active competition on the side of imports.

It is also necessary to take note of what the announced reforms are *not* to change—even on paper, let alone in the process of their realization:

1). They assuredly are not intended to overturn the political monopoly of the party, the exclusive power of the regime, the basic commitment to a socialist system, or the proclaimed advance towards full communism and further rapid industrialization.

2). The reforms do not challenge the principle of central planning of all the important "proportions" of the economy and of its speed and direction of development. Even should some of the reforms go so far as to establish socialist market systems, they will continue to be subject to comprehensive national planning and central control and regulation.

3). Moreover, there is little indication that the resources of each country will cease to be under great pressure. While the national plans in the future may be less ambitious—not to say fanciful—than in the past, they will most likely continue to call for the highest degree of resource utilization. A corollary is that sellers' markets are likely to persist.

4). Because of this, and because of fear of inflation and uncontrolled redistribution of income, prices on all or nearly all important producer goods are likely to remain under control for some time. (We shall return to the question of prices at a later point in this essay).

5). The physical allocation (rationing) of producer goods (materials and equipment) continues in all the countries, and—in part because of points 3 and 4 above—is likely to continue for some time. There is talk, even in the USSR, of eventually abolishing materials allocation and going over to "wholesale trade" in producer goods, and the talk itself represents a significant change. But for some time it is likely to remain talk.

6). The functionaries of both the government and the party on levels above the enterprise remain largely the same, although they may change offices and "hats." And their mental habits remain the same. This is surely one of the more important reasons to expect a conservative bias in the implementation of the reforms.

7). The principle of "one-man" management in the enterprise is not being significantly diluted, and the manager is still accountable only upward, not downward. In other words, the Yugoslav institution of "workers' self-management" is not being adopted. This is not an oversight; rather, it is a deliberate decision, common to all the regimes in question, to retain political as well as economic power where it now resides.[7] More on this below.

8). Lastly, so far the institutional reforms have touched agriculture only marginally if at all, although in some of the countries (especially the USSR and Hungary) additional resources in the form of higher prices and larger capital allocations have been channeled into the agricultural sector with the aim of improving its performance.[8]

The Line-up of Forces

The question of economic reform has been one of the most intense political issues to arise in Eastern Europe in the last several years. It has been as widely debated in professional journals, in the

[7] True, there has been considerable discussion of the augmented role of the official trade unions and of the intra-enterprise "production conferences" (or similar worker-management councils). But these appear to be token moves; no serious step in the direction of Yugoslav-type worker self-management is to be inferred. In fact, in Hungary, the "factory councils" (which succeeded the autonomous "workers' councils" of 1956 vintage) are now being dissolved. (For a summary survey see "Economic Reform and the Changing Trade Union Role," Research Department of Radio Free Europe, Aug. 3, 1966, mimeographed.)

[8] On recent policy regarding agriculture in the USSR see the contributions by J. F. Karz and Keith Bush in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, *supra*, Part II-b, Section 3.

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daily and specialized press, in academic forums, and in high councils, as any economic measure in any part of the world in recent history. It has profoundly divided the economic profession (though not in equal measure in different countries), and it could not help but cause deep division within the leaderships as well. Yet we know relatively little of the *political* side of the coin.

We do know that some of the most ardent advocates of reform—that is, of *some* reform of a decentralizing and rationalizing nature—have been academic economists (including those affiliated with research institutes) rather than the economic experts involved in actual planning or administration. But we also know that there have been, and continue to be, great differences in approach and opinion within the profession, ranging from preference for relatively mild tinkering with prices and organizational structures to advocacy of a socialist market economy that is highly decentralized, at least for current production decisions and a portion of investment. Academic economists—some of them young and quite mathematically (or at least "Western") oriented in their economics—seem to have played an especially significant role in working out the blueprints of the two most far-reaching reforms, those of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In the Soviet Union, where the generational pattern was more severely imposed by the preceding decades of Stalinism, the division among economists has been in good measure along age lines. But even there, some of the abler and more vocal pre-reform leaders belonged to a venerable generation: the late V. Nemchinov, V. Novozhilov, A. Vainshtein, and (the somewhat younger) Ye. Liberman.

Much of the discussion among economists has been characterized by polemical intensity, which is not unusual for economic debates conducted in the shadow of political and ideological authority. The would-be reformers show a missionary zeal that is compounded of deep dissatisfaction with the *status quo* and faith in newly-discovered (or resuscitated) economic truths. Their opponents have reacted to the challenge of their traditional axioms and habitual modes of thinking with predictable immoderation. Such, however, is the sweep of economic reformism in Eastern Europe (except in Rumania and Albania) that the Stalinist model seems to be no longer *openly* defended.

We know from their writings and from other evidence that some of the managers have been pro-reform, or at least in favor of lightening the weight of the superordinate bureaucracy and doing away with some of the irrationalities and inefficiencies of the existing system. But it would be overly hasty to assume that the vast majority of managers were in favor of the reforms, let alone of thoroughgoing decentralization. After all, the managers of today are the ones who succeeded under the old system by virtue of appropriate abilities or right connections. They are part of the Communist "establishment." Must we assume that they would overwhelmingly favor a change in the rules of the game?

What the man in the street or at the workbench has thought of the reforms while they were being debated in the press, after their announcement, and during the initial phases of their implementation, we simply do not know. Some may welcome the reforms for their promise of higher living standards. But many may fear for their jobs. In countries—notably Czechoslovakia—where, for incentive purposes, greater wage differentials have been advocated by the proponents of reform, the average (or below average) man may well feel apprehension. But we might also guess that having seen many a reform under the Communist regime in the past, the average citizen is prone to take an agnostic if not a cynical view.

Information on this score is fragmentary, but it seems that the chief opponents of the reform, and the chief obstructionists to their successful implementation at this stage, are to be found in the intermediate and upper layers of the party and governmental bureaucracy. The reasons, no doubt, are complex: fear of losing position or status, fear of opening a Pandora's box, ideological rigidity, and so forth.[9]

Comparisons and Contrasts

Since the reforms in the individual countries have already been discussed in separate articles of the present series, we shall restrict ourselves here to pointing out the considerable range in the degree of "reformism" that the various measures—or, at this point more correctly, their language—represent. The most conservative, those of Poland and the USSR, bear a resemblance which seems to derive as much from shared caution or indecision as from anything else. Since the Polish reform was only recently discussed at some length in this journal by Professor Smolinski, we shall concentrate here

[9] *Cf.* J. M. Montias, "Economic Reform in Perspective," *Survey*, April 1966, pp. 58-60.

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on the Soviet reform as an example of a conservative measure.[10]

The Soviet reform consists of two distinct, if interrelated, parts: (1) the abolition of Khrushchev's *sovnarkhozy* (regional economic councils) and the reestablishment of "branch" ministries on the pre-1957 model; and (2) the reform "proper," which amounts to some vertical decentralization, together with related measures in the realms of prices, incentives, and management.

The reversion to a ministerial organization—a move of some significance but not of central importance for our present discussion—was carried out immediately upon its enactment in early October 1965, even without waiting for the end of the plan year. This haste is rather difficult to understand; it must have caused considerable confusion for a while.

The Soviet reform "proper" is being put into effect much more slowly, and by stages. It is to be fully implemented only after the revision of the price structure is completed—supposedly by 1967-68. The main features of the reform are:

a) replacement of the "gross value of output" target by the "value of sales" target as the chief success indicator for enterprises;

b) an enhanced role for profit as a criterion of successful operation, although at this point it is unclear to what extent it will challenge the primacy of the sales target in this regard;

c) a reduction, but apparently not a drastic one, in the number of physical production targets;

d) somewhat more freedom for management in the selection of inputs (labor, materials, equipment) and in inventory holdings;

e) the shift of production planning toward more reliance on mutual orders among enterprises (so-called "direct links");

f) greater freedom for industrial enterprises to decide their own investment and to finance it from internal funds or bank credit, rather than from budgetary allocations;

g) financing of some *new* projects by bank credit rather than budgetary allocations;

h) charging of interest (though not under this name) for all the capital invested in an enterprise;

i) use of a part of the profit earned by an enterprise for bonuses to its management and staff, linking the bonuses to the amount of profit earned.

Many of these measures—particularly those giving management somewhat greater leeway as well

[10] The Soviet economic reform was discussed by Michel Tatu in the January-February 1966 issue of this journal, but is reviewed here for comparative purposes. Leon Smolinski's article "Reform in Poland" appeared in July-August 1966. For analyses of the East German and Bulgarian reforms—which appear to be intermediate in their degree of "reformism"—see Dorothy Miller and Harry G. Trend, "Economic Reforms in East Germany," March-April 1966, and J. F. Brown, "Reforms in Bulgaria," May-June 1966.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: SOME PERENNIAL PROBLEMS

ДИРЕКТОР МАГАЗИНА: — Нам повезло! «Мосфильм» закупил одежду последних моделей для съемки исторического фильма.

Рисунок Б. САВКОВА

LEFT: Store Director—"We've been lucky! 'Mosfilm' bought up the clothes of the latest models for its new historical film."

—From **Krokodil** *(Moscow), No. 7, March 1966.*



— Наконец-то ликвидировали очередь за газетами!

Рисунок Б. САВКОВА

RIGHT: Booths are marked "Newspapers." Sign in back: "Money Exchange." Caption: "Finally they got rid of the line for newspapers!"

—From Krokodil, No. 1, January 1966.

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as a financial inducement to economize—are so commonsensical that one wonders why it took 35 years to introduce them. The substitution of the sales target for the gross output target will presumably eliminate or reduce the ridiculous but not infrequent situation of enterprises producing utterly unsalable goods. (On the other hand, it may in some cases only enhance the producers' efforts to pass on their low-quality wares). Perhaps the most reformist of the features is the granting of considerable autonomy to enterprises in the realm of investment, especially for modernization and rationalization. By 1967, a quarter of gross fixed investment in industry will supposedly have been "decentralized" in this fashion. The catch here, however, is whether the enterprises will be able to obtain the necessary materials and equipment, which continue to be tightly rationed, and whether they will have the requisite incentives to undertake the investment. Moreover, the economic rationale of decentralized investments, even if profit-motivated, remains under a cloud until the price structure is rationalized.

The Soviet reform is qualified here as a conservative one because it retains (1) most of the physical production targets, and (2) the rigid system of materials allocation. Both of these holdovers from the past will present serious handicaps to attempts by enterprises to adjust production to demand and to select economical input mixes, even if the role of the profits target under the new system is less equivocal than it seems to be. Lastly, the same functionaries staff the new ministries and bureaus, and complaints are already being voiced in the Soviet press that the bureaucracy refuses to give up its habitual modes of operation.

Some 700 industrial enterprises were converted to the "new system" by mid-1966. It was said in March that by the beginning of 1967 one-third of all industrial workers would be brought under the system, though it is not clear whether the conversion of enterprises implies adoption of all or only some of the above-enumerated changes. The crucial test will come, however, in regard to the revision of the price structure. It is here that much of the current discussion and struggle is centered. Should the price revision follow orthodox lines—eliminating most subsidies but paying little heed to the equilibration of demand and supply—as now seems likely,[11] then (as we shall presently argue) it will be very difficult, even with the best will in the world, to get rid of materials allocation and physical production targets, with the result that no major decentralization can take place.

At the other extreme of the spectrum are the Czechoslovak and Hungarian reforms.[12] The former entered its first phase of implementation at the beginning of 1966; the latter is about to be launched. In both cases, the accompanying rhetoric is more impressive than the institutional reforms themselves. In Czechoslovakia—where growth had ground to a halt and other economic difficulties were pressing—the dominant tone of published *economic* opinion swung from deep orthodoxy to extreme liberalism (in the Communist context) within a matter of months during 1963-64. In Hungary economic opinion shifted more slowly and over a longer period, but by now has arrived at a frontier of liberalism similar to the Czech.

The current rhetoric in these two countries consists of scorn for orthodox, Soviet-type economic institutions (though with a bow to their contribution to "extensive" growth in the early postwar period) and lavish praise for the market mechanism, profit-making, and competition. To be sure, the profit-making and competition are of the socialist variety, and the market is to be a handmaiden of the national plan. But nonetheless it is hard to believe that statements like "the market is the final touchstone of the social usefulness of expended labor," [13] or the "uniform and single criterion [for economic decision] is profit," [14] emanate from Communist economists writing in official publications. The infatuation with the market—now evident among economists all over Eastern Europe and in the USSR, as well as in the two countries mentioned—may be an understandable and even salutary reaction to its former dogmatic rejection; yet this optimism will doubtless be followed in time by a swing towards the center, when it is realized that the market raises its own difficult problems.

The actual reform measures adopted in Czechoslovakia and Hungary do not fully share the econo-

[11] See the contribution by Morris Bornstein in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy, supra*, Part I.

[12] The Czechoslovak reform is covered in detail by Harry G. Shaffer and Vaclav Holesovsky in *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1965; on the Hungarian reform, see Joseph Held's article in this issue.

[13] Zdyslav Shults, "Creative Development of Marxist Economic Thinking," *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, June 1965.

[14] József Bognár, "Overall Direction and Operation of the Economy," *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, Spring 1966, p. 13.

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mists' infatuation with the market. These reforms —though far-reaching in comparison to the system they aim to supersede—are much more cautious and compromise-ridden. The *leitmotif* is of course decentralization. We have already noted the agglomeration of Czechoslovak industry into 100-odd concerns and trusts, leaving little prospect for domestic competition. Physical production targets are not entirely eliminated; they remain (in Czechoslovakia) for several dozen commodities of key importance, such as items for which there are definite export commitments.[15] Insofar as this writer is able to discover, the rationing of some scarce producer goods is likely to continue into the near future. Lastly, most producer-goods prices are to be either fixed or subject to ceilings (which amounts to the same thing, since pressure on them is likely to be upward).[16]

The formal introduction of the Czech reform began almost a year ago, and some useful lessons are already discernible. One of the most significant lessons is that the reforms are destined to have rough sledding, just as they have had even in the far less radical Soviet case. Usually blame is attached to deliberate sabotage or resistance on the part of the hostile and entrenched bureaucracy. (Similar charges have been continually made in Yugoslavia, culminating in the purge of Ranković and his associates in mid-1966). Quite possibly, this is where most of the blame belongs. Yet, we should also realize that decentralized decision-making simply cannot do a proper job when the signals (prices) are still faulty and the economy is still ridden with scarcities. Under such conditions there may be very good social reasons to keep close rein on the enterprises and the trusts. And a way to discredit the reform would be to decentralize too fast, before prices were properly revised.

Pricing Problems

It is often said in relation to the East European reforms that their success is predicated on the establishment of *rational* price structures. This is not quite correct, if in this context "rational prices"[17] mean what they usually mean to economists: namely, a set of prices which—together with appropriate managerial rules and incentives, and in the light of society's resources and technological knowledge—will maximize some kind of index of social welfare. Of course, in an authoritarian society this index is largely defined, if only implicitly, in an authoritarian way.

Needless to say, prices in no actual economy are "rational" in this theoretical sense. An economy can function quite well, albeit at less than 100 percent theoretical efficiency, if the actual prices deviate moderately from the theoretical norm; and many do.[18] To be sure, the price structures of the Communist economies probably deviate more than "moderately" from the theoretical norm. If the efficiency of the economies is to be raised substantially, the price structures will have to be revised to conform more closely to a rational norm—even though complete coincidence is not to be expected.

What is meant by the reforms succeeding, however, is usually something else; namely, that the decentralizing and initiative-stimulating measures survive an initial test period, and that the economy performs in a reasonably satisfactory fashion thereafter. Insofar as prices are concerned, the crux here is that the price structure should not be such as to force major recentralization of economic decisions, and this is achieved by the use of equilibrium prices. By "equilibrium prices" we mean prices which serve to equate demand and supply for each individual commodity, service, or resource. In the abstract model of a perfectly efficient economy, rational prices are also equilibrium prices. But in practice they are not the same, as attested to by every market economy without price control.

To see why equilibrium prices come close to being a necessary condition for the success of the reforms—in the sense in which we have just interpreted "success"—we need only inquire what will happen if the Soviet-type economies are organizationally decentralized, but prices are fixed at levels substantially deviating from equilibrium

[15] The number of compulsory targets in the national economic plan is said to have been reduced from 1,200 to 67.

[16] In Czechoslovakia, free wholesale prices are to account for only 7 percent of the value of industrial output, and free retail prices, for only 11 percent of retail sales. See useful summaries in *Economic Survey of Europe in 1965, supra*, Pt. 1, p. 65, and *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 9, 1966, p. 41. In Hungary, free wholesale prices are to apply to 29 percent of (all?) goods (*Pravda*, June 20, 1966, p. 3).

[17] Also known to the economist as "efficiency prices." In the current terminology of Soviet economics they are often referred to as "prices of the optimal plan," and are a close kin to L. V. Kantorovich's "objectively determined valuations" or V. V. Novozhilov's "differential costs."

[18] It has been lately argued by a number of Western economists that the deleterious effects of price distortion through resource misallocation are very small, at least in some market economies. See for example, Harvey Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency,'" *American Economic Review*, June 1966, pp. 392-415.

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levels. Since these economies are likely to be experiencing high overall demand in relation to their productive capacity, *i.e.*, inflationary pressure, the fixed prices soon become too low to equate demand and supply. (As we shall presently see, a main reason for price fixing is precisely to resist inflationary pressure.) For the sake of simplicity, let us focus on producer-goods prices at wholesale.

Because prices are too low and demand exceeds supply, all important goods must be allocated (rationed) to reserve them for higher priority purposes, as indeed will continue to be the case under the reforms. As a result, enterprises are severely constrained in their efforts to maximize profits by using the best (*i.e.*, cheapest) combinations of inputs, and one of the chief aims of the reforms is thereby already frustrated.

Moreover, to allocate materials effectively the authorities must take care that the expected supplies are forthcoming. Yet the fixed prices may render the production of some goods unprofitable. Hence, there will be a strong temptation on the authorities' part to keep direct control of production, which means to assign physical production targets to enterprises. (If instead prices should be manipulated to elicit the requisite supplies, which is what the market mechanism would call for, then the objective of a stable price level would be endangered and the specter of inflation would loom larger). But physical production targets have a well-known tendency to proliferate—and before long most important decisions in the economy are recentralized.[19] Even if a reform had gone so far as to establish a market mechanism, the retention of tight materials allocation and other physical controls would tend to undermine the "market" progressively, until finally the command economy was reestablished.

Furthermore, the complex and arduous process of price-fixing in itself strengthens the hand of the bureaucracy, diverts the attention and efforts of enterprises away from production and selling, and retards the depoliticization of economic life (which is one of the desirable corollaries of the market). Even *with* more or less equilibrium prices, the authorities and the bureaucrats might not wish to relinquish materials allocation, either because they want to hold on to their power or because they fear (in part justifiably) that the market alone will not be able to ensure the satisfaction of national priorities. But *without* equilibrium prices, there is little chance that materials allocation will be dismantled.

Thus, equilibrium prices are a necessary—or almost necessary—condition of the success of the decentralizing reforms. Yet, it does not seem that in any of the countries in question the impending price revision will result in bringing wholesale prices of producer goods to equilibrium levels, or at least in leaving them there for a critically lengthy period of time. First, as we have noted, in all cases price revisions will hardly depart from the traditional principle of *fixed* prices. Second, while lip service is often given to the equilibration of demand and supply through prices—especially in the case of Czech, Hungarian and (more recently) East German materials—the more concrete and authoritative statements offer little hope on this score.[20] Rather, the usual formulation is that "prices must be fixed for all important commodities that are still in short supply," which is to say that prices are to be fixed at below-equilibrium levels. Third, in any case it is very hard to compute in advance what the equilibrium level of any price will be while all prices are changing at the same time (and the ground rules of economic behavior as well!). And those prices that are set too low are likely to be kept there as the authorities strain to hold the general price line. Which brings us to the fourth point. While much lip service is also paid to some minimal price flexibility, the arduousness of price calculation, the complexity of the procedure, the desire to hold the line against inflation, and the "politics" of the matter—all these considerations rather suggest that once prices are revised they will tend to remain fixed for lengthy periods. Which is to say that even if producer-goods prices start at or near equilibrium levels, they are not likely to stay there very long as supply-demand conditions change.

But why fix producer goods prices? Why not let them fluctuate freely? The reasons are many. The ideologically conservative are repelled by the idea of the "chaos" of freely fluctuating prices under socialism. The top leaders and planners are

[19] I have discussed elsewhere the penchant of the command economy for "creeping recentralization." See Gregory Grossman, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," *Soviet Studies*, October 1963, p. 114.

[20] *Cf.* Bornstein, *loc. cit.*, and *Economic Survey of Europe in 1965*, Pt. 1, pp. 56 ff. An example of the equivocating approach to price revision that apparently prevails in high places can be found in Béla Czikós-Nagy (head of the Hungarian Price Office), "Die Ungarische Preisreform," *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, No. 3, 1966, pp. 209-19.

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reluctant to forswear what will become in the process of the reforms a most important instrument of control over the economy. (We may recall here, for example, the danger of monopoly inherent in the newly formed or strengthened "associations.") Bureaucrats do not wish to deprive themselves of their functions, power, and jobs. Some managers may fear the uncertainty that would accompany freely moving prices. It must be noted that price uncertainty is now much more unsettling to enterprises than before, given the enhanced role of profit as a success indicator, as a source of personal income for management and staff, and as the chief determinant of internal investment funds.

Still another major reason for opting for fixed prices is the fear of inflation. Communist governments have always been sensitive on this issue, although—or because—their record on this score is none too strong. There is a good deal of validity to the fear of inflation at the present juncture. Reforms or no, the pressure of overall demand on resources is likely to continue to be strong. In the labor-short countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany), the tightness of the labor market will continue to put upward pressure on labor costs. In the labor-surplus countries, rural-urban migration will continue to be rapid, continuing to swell money incomes. Relative wages and other incomes may have to be readjusted—for this is one of the rationalizing aspects of the reforms—but the days when it was politically possible to readjust relative incomes by pushing some *money* incomes down are long gone in the countries in question. Thus, the danger of cost inflation by dint of an upward drift in wages and other incomes casts a long shadow on the reforms, even allowing for their expected boost to efficiency. Not surprisingly, wage and salary rates remain generally under central control in all the reforms. But control of wage rates and even of total wage payments is not enough because of the profit-sharing features of the reforms. Hence, there is also an argument for simultaneously fixing prices. The effects of an inflation of producer-goods prices (in the socialist sector) would be serious, even in the socialist economy, and especially after the reforms. It might lead, *via* a "cost push," to inflation of consumer-goods prices, with likely negative political effects. It might also bring about an undesired redistribution of income *via* the profit-sharing schemes. And it would likely distort the direction of investment to the extent that investment is now decentralized.

As we have just noted, wage and salary *rates* will, as a rule, continue to be centrally set under all the reforms in question. However, as a means of checking inflation this control is imperfect, since the central authorities cannot oversee the classification of each employee, a matter which remains dependent in part on individual bargaining between employee and employer. Thus there is reason to limit or restrain the total outpayment of wages and salaries by each enterprise. The reforms provide a range of techniques. In the more conservative reforms, such as the Soviet, the old practice of assigning a maximum wage fund to each enterprise is preserved, although the fund is no longer to be broken down into subdivisions for specific categories of workers and employees. At the other extreme, in Czechoslovakia, there is apparently no such limit on each enterprise, but wages are taxed (*via* a tax on so-called gross income) and a new "stabilization payment" is being introduced, which is a 30-percent tax on wage payments above a stipulated minimum.[21]

In sum, the need for rigid physical controls would be lessened, price flexibility would more likely be allowed, and hence the decentralizing reforms would be more likely to succeed, if the overall pressure on resources—which is to say, the ambitiousness of the national plans and goals of the countries in question—were to be restrained. To some extent the ambitiousness of the national goals is a delayed response to the long-repressed material aspirations of the population. But the pressure on resources also derives in large measure from more traditional Communist objectives—rapid industrialization, military power, *etc.* In this regard it is worth noting that an improvement in the international climate might well have a significant effect both directly and indirectly on the course of the reforms.[22]

The Question of Viability

How viable are these reforms on purely economic grounds? It has already been noted that the "blueprints" of the reforms vary considerably along the scale of liberalization in terms of the decentralization of production and investment decisions—but

[21] See *East Europe*, September 1966, p. 53. The "stabilization payment" is a two-edged sword. It may hold wage payments down. But it may also contribute in part to the "cost push" and thus to inflation.

[22] See this author's "Soviet Economy and the Waning of the Cold War," in Robert A. Goldwin, *Beyond the Cold War*, Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1966.

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that everywhere prices and wage rates are to remain under rather tight control, and that (most significantly) materials allocation is to be continued. Clearly the more conservative reforms, especially the Soviet and Polish, fall far short of envisioning anything like a functioning socialist market economy. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian blueprints, in both language and design, come much closer to instituting a market mechanism, at least for current production decisions.

We must bear in mind that the *implementation* of every reform, however liberal or conservative on paper, is likely to suffer from a conservative bias. This is so because, first, the detailed implementation is inevitably in the hands of the bureaucracy and party *apparat*—that is, largely in the hands of the reforms' opponents. But, secondly, there are also good "objective" reasons for the bias. In the course of implementation there will be innumerable specific, detailed problems to be resolved. They will mostly be problems of coordinating separate activities and ensuring harmony between the dispered decisions and the national goals. As a rule, such specific problems can be resolved only by centralizing certain particular decisions and actions, not by leaving them to be handled at the enterprise level.

Thus, the implementation of the reforms is likely to fall short of the decentralizing reach of their blueprints. Will the resultant half-way or quarter-way solutions be viable? One wonders. If the market mechanism is not strongly enough established—and most of the reforms do not even intend to establish it—then the burden of coordination among the millions of economic decisions and activities will largely remain with the central authorities. To do this job—and to protect its own positions—the bureaucracy is likely to resume the process of centralization. In this it will be strongly abetted by the persistence of materials allocation and by the fear of inflation, as has already been argued. Moreover, the partial decentralization of investment in the absence of a suitable price system may well channel resources into directions that the central authorities deplore and that they will therefore attempt to thwart by administrative means. In general, effective decentralization in a centrally-administered economy can take place only when carried out on a very broad front all at once, which requires intervention from higher quarters and calls for big political battles. Centralization, however, can and often does proceed in little steps, virtually unnoticed but important in aggregate impact.

Of course, many of the sensible features of the present reforms are likely to survive the recentralizing process. Such measures as the substitution of the sales target for the gross output target, the charging of interest and economic rent, a moderate amount of profit-sharing, need not fall victim to recentralization.

To sum up, the more conservative reforms involve relatively little liberalization to begin with, and to the extent that they do, they are soon likely to begin drifting back towards the *status quo ante* (at least in the absence of additional broad decentralizing measures). The countries with more liberal reforms are also likely to experience recentralizing tendencies soon after the new institutions make their appearance. But here—which is to say, primarily in Hungary and Czechoslovakia—the repudiation of the old system has gone so far that the result is more likely to be a lengthy epoch of drift rather than a substantial reversion to the former extremely centralized setup—unless, of course, more resolute liberalization is decreed from above to establish a viable, market-bound alternative to the command economy.

It should be noted that the chances of such resolute liberalization do not seem to be high for the foreseeable future. No doubt voices will continue to be raised in favor of a fuller role for the market mechanism. The struggles and debates will go on. But, by having gone as far as it has already, "by consenting to reform the old brankrupt planning system, the regime hopes to gain a new lease on life, not to abdicate." [23] Economic liberalization is pregnant with political risks—the more liberalization, the higher the risks—and the first imperative of each regime is to retain power, not to endanger it for the sake of better economic performance. In this it has the more-than-willing support of the bureaucracy and the *apparat*. On the other hand, it would be foolhardy to exclude altogether the prospect of "marketization" of the present command economies. Yugoslavia has accomplished a form of it, although under very specific conditions. The Soviet world is in flux and ferment; the chain of surprises has not yet come to an end. There may be a lesson in the fact that few competent observers would have predicted three or four years ago that the cautious Czechoslovak and Hungarian regimes were about to sanction their economic reforms, even if only on paper.

[23] Holesovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

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Political Implications

What, then, of the future? We noted at the start that economic decentralization should not be confused with socio-political democratization. True, in all East European countries the launching of the reforms was preceded by a remarkable broadening of the limits of economic discussion. Some extension of the bounds of permissible discussion also occurred in other social sciences (sociology and law) and in cultural affairs. Yet the launching of the reforms themselves need not at all imply further liberalization in the intellectual and cultural spheres. Indeed, the opposite may happen, should the regimes feel that the potentially centrifugal effect of the economic reforms ought to be contained by stricter ideological and social controls; or should bargains be struck between various factions in the leadership, in the sense that the "price" of economic liberalization becomes retrenchment on other fronts. Such seems to have been the case in the USSR, as evidenced by the divergent lines laid down at the 23rd Party Congress (March 1966), where the economic reforms of the preceding autumn were reaffirmed, together with a distinct hardening of ideological and cultural positions. A similar trend has also been evident in Hungary. Nor need we expect that the purely economic successes of the reforms—if they materialize—must perforce increase freedom and democratize political life in the Communist countries. Greater economic freedom for managers is not yet political freedom for everyone, and improvement in material conditions of life can come without the multi-party ballot.

It would be convenient to leave the argument at this point, but much too easy. For one thing, a successful decentralization of the economy—should it occur despite the various handicaps that have been outlined above—would tend to change the role of the party in society. Today, the lower and intermediate party levels owe their functions and powers in the economy precisely to the failure of economic institutions. So far, these levels of the *apparat* have had a job to do because of inadequate incentives, improper signals, imperfect coordination within the economy, conflicting goals and standards, shortages of all sorts, and other functional defects. In all such cases the party has had to step in to keep the wheels of the economy turning. But if the economic mechanism itself is so improved as to provide adequate and proper signals, incentives, and coordination, then most of the party's economic functions at the intermediate and lower levels disappear. The basic question of what role the party is playing in society, already looming on the horizon, will become even more apt and timely. Will the parties in the other Communist countries be prepared to restrict their day-to-day economic roles as the Yugoslav party has done?

Seen otherwise, the political implications of the reforms depend largely on the extent to which economic decentralization survives the initial test—about which we have already expressed considerable doubt—and proves capable of creating alternate nodes of power that in some measure escape the full control of the regime. The great autonomy of enterprises (or "associations") creates some measure of power that—almost by definition—is not under the close control of the party leaders. But whether this can contribute to the growth of meaningful political pluralism remains to be seen. On the other hand, enterprise autonomy may stimulate the appearance of labor organizations such as workers' councils (as distinct from the regime-controlled trade unions) with which to confront management "from below." Any such institutions would be potentially significant sources of power in that they would be relatively independent not only of management but of the existing political authority. Enterprise autonomy is conducive to labor autonomy, and it is the latter that poses by far the greater challenge to the existing order. Could the conservative opposition to economic reform be motivated in part by fear of this possibility? If so, the Yugoslav experience with workers' "self-management" offers nothing to allay the conservatives' apprehensions.

That the present European Communist regimes (except Yugoslavia) have little liking for autonomous workers' councils is clear. Where such councils arose spontaneously—in Poland and Hungary in 1956—they were quickly suppressed or subverted after the new regimes re-established internal control. They are most conspicuously absent from all the blueprints of economic reform, although some token gestures are made in the direction of worker participation in decisions at the enterprise level. Yet it is hard to believe that in time the issue of autonomous workers' councils and meaningful workers' "self-management" will not come to the forefront. When it arises, it will be inevitably linked with the issue of more meaningful enterprise autonomy, for without the latter, workers' councils or "self-management" lack substance. And at that juncture the political implications of economic reform will become much more profound than now.

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Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: The following articles offer some further views on the nature and future of the Soviet system, continuing a discussion launched just a year ago in our November-December issue of 1965. A list of contributions to the discussion during the past year is printed in the annual index at the back of this issue.

Totalitarian Rule and Social Change

By Boris Meissner

The evolutionary trends in Soviet Russia today can be understood only if the interaction between its political system and the social reality is viewed in proper perspective. This requires greater emphasis than in the past on the analysis of the internal structure of Soviet society. In the absence of any precise definition of the several social groups and their role in society, it is impossible to answer the question raised by Zbigniew Brzezinski: namely, whether the present process of change in the Soviet system represents transformation or degeneration.

Soviet society, as the product of two radical social revolutions,[1] has a Janus face. On the one hand it is a relatively primitive industrial society that is struggling with serious problems of development. On the other hand it is a class society constituted on a totalitarian basis, exhibiting a high degree of social stress. The complex character of Soviet society cannot therefore be understood through study of a single model: besides the totalitarian model, which reflects the political system, models of industrial societies and of the developing countries' societies must also be relied upon. In analyzing the interaction between power structure and social structure, it is most im-

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[1] What is meant here– in addition to the October Revolution, which was primarily the work of Lenin—is Stalin's "revolution from above," which performed the function of a "substitute capitalism" and "substitute Bonapartism."

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portant to project a model of totalitarian society that reflects both the static and the dynamic features of totalitarian rule.

Basic Features

All past discussions about totalitarianism have been vitiated by overemphasis on mass terror as a distinguishing feature, due to the impact of the Hitler regime and Stalinism.[2] At the same time, insufficient attention has been given to the really decisive characteristics of the autocratic-totalitarian regime. These are mainly three.[3] The first is the unrestricted autocracy of the party, which is the consequence of permanent one-party dictatorship. It is this absolute absence of any restriction on the party that constitutes the principal difference between a totalitarian and an authoritarian regime, even though today the latter is often also based on a one-party dictatorship.

The second characteristic feature is total control from above. The Soviet control apparatus extends not only to all social organizations and institutions, but also to all mass media and other sources of public information. When total control exists, the function of terror is merely to serve as a constant reminder of the efficiency of the control apparatus. Totalitarian regimes will never give up using fear as an instrument of social manipulation—but neither do they have to depend on mass terror. Not all-encompassing terror, but the control of all functions and thought in every area of the life of society, must be regarded as the distinctive characteristic of totalitarianism.

The third feature is total planning, extending not only to the economic but to the political and cultural sectors of society. This total planning is designed to accomplish the radical transformation of the social structure, in line with the ultimate goal set by Marxist-Leninist ideology; the "socialist society" is merely a phase of transition to a perfect "communist society." The transformation of the social structure is intended to be revolutionary in terms of its underlying ideological orientation, but it is to be realized preferably by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. Whatever the means used by the party at any given time, the operative concept is that of *control*. So long as the party possesses the will and the power to exercise control over the autonomous social processes and forms of social spontaneity that it is promoting, the society remains subjected to totalitarian rule—whatever the given relaxation.

This conclusion by no means implies that the mere exercise of control can resolve the basic conflict within Soviet society—that is, the clash between the party's demand for supremacy in matters of ideology and organization, and the requirements of industrial evolution. Fluctuations in the enforcement of social sanctions are therefore an important guide in evaluating phases of the continuing conflict.[4] The conflict is waged chiefly between the ruling power elite, on one side, and the managers of the economy, together with the prestige elite (made up mainly of writers, artists, and scientists) on the other. The power elite consists mostly of the portion of the "leadership cadres" that may be described as the top-level bureaucracy (Hochbürokratie). The remaining portion of the "leadership cadres" is made up of the top-level managers of the economy, who in the main represent the technical and economic intelligentsia. The prestige elite represents the scientific and cultural intelligentsia, which is also referred to as the "creative intelligentsia" (*tvorcheskaia intelligentsiia*) in the Soviet Union.

The Intelligentsia

Consequently, what we are dealing with is not, as is so often asserted, a single class of functionaries, making up a social bloc of white-collar workers of a cohesive, broadly-based intelligentsia. The top-level bureaucracy, by reason of the social functions which it performs as a result of the totalitarian power structure—that is, functions of command and control as well as of planning—is sharply distinguished from other groupings that might normally be described as white-collar."[5] Similarly, the intelligentsia—using the term in a narrow sense to denote those people with specialties based on university or

[2] This holds true particularly for authors like Hannah Arendt, Carl C. Friedrich, and occasionally also Brzezinski.

[3] For a detailed exposition of the three basic elements of totalitarianism of the Soviet-Communist type, *cf.* B. Meissner, "Wandlungen im Herrschafts-system und Verfassungsrecht der Sowjetunion" (Changes in the Government and the Constitutional Law of the Soviet Union) in Boettcher-Lieber-Meissner, *Bilanz der Ära Chruschtschow* (A Balance Sheet of the Khrushchev Era), Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 142 ff. See also Meissner, "Party and Government Reforms," in "Russia since Khrushchev," *Survey* (London), July 1965, pp. 31 ff.

[4] See P. Chr. Ludz, "Entwurf einer soziologischen Theorie totalitär verfasster Gesellschaft," (Sketch of a Sociological Theory of a Society Based on Totalitarianism), in *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR*, Cologne-Opalden, 1964, pp. 18 ff.

[5] *Cf.* B. Meissner, *Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel. Russlands Weg zur Industriegesellschaft* (The Transformation of Soviet Society. Russia's Way to Industrial Society), Stuttgart, 1966, p. 104.

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higher technical-school training—can be distinctly set off from the foremen and skilled workers with white-collar status, as well as from clerical employees. The only place where overlapping occurs is between the ruling power elite and the technical-economic intelligentsia, which virtually constitutes a supply or base group for the top-level bureaucracy. One of the decisive problems in this relationship is the fact that the top-level bureaucracy even to this day is largely made up of persons of proletarian or peasant origin, possessing an educational background inferior to that of the members of the intelligentsia. The bureaucracy also includes many so-called "specialists" who joined the party in the period before the war and in most cases have not had a thorough technical training.[6]

The distinction between these two controlling social groups lies primarily in the fact that the power of the top bureaucrats rests in the *positions* they hold, while that of the intelligentsia is rooted in the authority and prestige inherent in the *functions* it performs. The basis of authority as well as of prestige in modern industrial society is specialized knowledge. This is as true in the Soviet Union as in any other country—although Soviet industrial society has not yet entirely shaken off the eggshell of its developmental stage. Ability based on specialized knowledge is not, however, the only avenue to the top positions in society. Another essential requisite is the ability to get ahead; here personality, adaptation to the social norms prevailing within society, and personal connections are all important factors in the selection and promotion process, quite aside from the question of performance.[7] The ability to get ahead is much more decisive in the hyper-bureaucratized Soviet society, with its single-party system, than in democratic industrialized societies. Contributing to the individual's success in this connection are a knowledge of ideological doctrines and power techniques, recognized service in the organization and party patronage under the "nomenclature system." [8]

The subordination of specialized ability to the ability to get ahead, particularly in the filling of top positions, is responsible for the marked class character of Soviet society on the one hand, and the flexibility and heterogeneous nature of the ruling class on the other. From this standpoint, the democratic Western industrial societies—all their structural weaknesses notwithstanding—represent merit societies to a much higher degree than does the Soviet Union, for all its claims that the merit principle is a basic element in the organization of work.

In the Soviet Union, it is primarily those with university or higher technical-school training who possess the specialized knowledge that is needed by an industrial society in the nuclear age. Even if they do not occupy positions of power, their functions are so crucial that they can influence, at the side of those exercising actual power, the determination of the social norms and sanctions of society. Together with the leading party cadres, this merit elite is to be found mainly in the upper stratum and the upper middle stratum of society. Within this elite, special prestige attaches to scientists, writers, and artists, which permits them to exert an influence—beyond the scope of their own stratum and sometimes in opposition to the ruling group—on the practices of society as a whole.[9] The value concepts of Soviet society are in some instances more strongly shaped by the intellectual influences emanating from this prestige elite than they are by the accomplishments of the managers of the economy or the norms prescribed by the ruling power elite. This fact is clearly borne out by a sociological survey conducted by the Philosophical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1961-62, which dealt with the values and aspirations of an elite group of Soviet youth.[10]

The top-level bureaucracy and the intelligentsia thus constitute two social groups which, irrespective of their further subdivisions, are clearly distinct in terms of their origin, their social functions, and their relationship to power.

Some Pertinent Statistics

What proportion of the working population and of the CPSU do these two groups represent? [11] In 1959

[6] *Cf.* B. Lewytzkj, "Die Führungskräfte des sowjetischen Parteiapparates" (the Leadership Forces of the Soviet Party Apparatus), *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 15, 1965, pp. 739 ff.

[7] *Cf.* O. Dreitzel, *Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur* (Elite Concept and Social Structure), Stuttgart, 1962, pp. 100 ff.

[8] *Cf.* Meissner, *Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel, loc. cit.*, p. 103; B. Lewytzkj, "Die Nomenklatur. Ein wichtiges Instrument sowietischer Kaderpolitik (Nomenclature. An Important Instrument of Soviet Cadre Policy), *Osteuropa*, No. 11, 1961, pp. 409 ff.

[9] *Cf.* the revealing report by Mihajlo Mihajlov, *Moscow Summer*, New York, Farrar Strauss, 1965.

[10] *Cf.* G. Wagenlehner, "Die empirische Sozialforschung in Sowjetunion" (Empirical Social Research in the Soviet Union), *Moderne Welt* (Düsseldorf), No. 6, 1965, pp. 410 ff.

[11] The sources of the figures that follow are cited in *Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel, loc. cit.*; in *Osteuropa's* special issue devoted to the Twenty-third CPSU Congress; and in the author's forthcoming article, "Die soziale Struktur der KPdSU" (The Social Structure of the CPSU), *Osteuropa*, September 1966.

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the "leading cadres," irrespective of their levels of education, and the members of the intelligentsia in all areas of activity totalled 12.7 million—*i.e.*, 60 percent of all white-collar employees. Of this total, the top-level bureaucracy (excluding the military) numbered 0.4 million, the technical and economic intelligentsia (including the industrial managers) 7 million, and the scientific and cultural intelligentsia (including the prestige elite) 5.3 million. A "ruling class" with a core of 0.4 million was thus confronted with a 12.3-million member intelligentsia, using the term in the broad sense; of these, 8 million comprised the intelligentsia in the narrower sense—*i.e.* specialists with university or higher technical-school education.

CPSU membership figures for 1961 indicate that party members belonging to the "leadership cadres" and the intelligentsia (in the broad sense) constituted 77.7 percent of the 4.5 million gainfully-employed Communists in the employee category, exclusive of the military. In absolute figures, party members in the top-level bureaucracy numbered about 0.2 million (4.1 percent); in the technical and economic intelligentsia, 2.3 million (52.1 percent); and in the scientific and cultural intelligentsia, 1 million (21.5 percent). In terms of overall party membership (1961: 9.3 million), these three groups represented 2.1 percent, 24.7 percent, and 10.7 percent of the total. The variations in these percentages in the period up to 1966 have been minimal.

An entirely different picture emerges when these ratios are compared with the representation at the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU and the composition of the new Central Committee.[12] The top-level bureaucracy (exclusive of the military), comprising just 2.1 percent of the total party membership, accounted for nearly 40 percent of the party delegates, and emerged with 81.1 percent representation among the full members of the Central Committee. The industrial managers and the technical and economic intelligentsia, representing about 25 percent of the total party membership, accounted for 14.2 percent of the Congress delegates, and only 2.1 percent of the Central Committee members. The prestige elite and the scientific and cultural intelligentsia got a higher percentage of representation on the Central Committee than among Party Congress delegates, but this fact is not significant since—almost without exception—the authors, artists and scientists on the Central Committee function as aides to the official cultural functionaries of the party.

[12] *Cf.* this author's analysis of the 23rd CPSU Congress in *Osteuropa* and *Europa-Archiv.*

While party congresses have always been shows of strength on the part of the ruling power elite, what makes the 23rd Party Congress different is its reflection of the sociological effects of the Kosygin economic reform, by which the power position of the state and economic bureaucracy has been greatly strengthened in relation to the party bureaucracy. This has restored the situation that existed prior to 1957. The industrial managers appear as only secondary beneficiaries of this development, and so far—as the Central Committee figures indicate—the reform has not increased their influence on the policy-making process. As for the prestige elite, party opposition to the recent expansion of its social influence was reflected in the removal of several progressive Soviet writers, among them Tvardovski and Surkov, from the Central Committee.

Thus, nothing has been changed in the actual class structure of the party. The economic reform has resulted in a better balance within the top-level bureaucracy and has at the same time strengthened the position of the power elite as a whole. As the state and economic bureaucracy has gained influence, the "party organizers" within the party bureaucracy have been reduced to their control function. At the same time, the 23rd Party Congress revealed the effort of the "party ideologists," through stronger emphasis on ideological control, to preserve the primacy of the party bureaucracy and to give new confidence to the full-time party apparatus.

Whereas the party leadership is recruited without exception from the top-level bureaucracy, the intelligentsia is the key social group in the rank and file of the party. The conflict arising out of the party leadership's absolute monopoly of power is intensified by the conflict of generations resulting from the considerable age difference between the leadership and the rank and file. An age analysis of the party shows that 2.5 million members (20 percent) today are under 30 years of age, and 4.6 million (53 percent) are less than 40 years old. The middle generation (51 to 60 years of age) and the old generation together account for only 22.1 percent of the total party membership, yet most of the top functionaries come from these groups. The younger generation, comprising over one-half of the party rank and file, and 47.1 percent of the party as a whole, has no representation in the top leadership at all; this group in the main joined the CPSU in the "destalinization" period, after 1956.

In the intelligentsia, men and women are about equally represented. However, the influence women have in the leadership of the party is remarkably weak: though women, who make up 20.2 percent of

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the total party, constituted 23.3 percent of the Congress delegates, only 5 (2.6 percent) emerged as full members of the Central Committee, and none is now included in the supreme party leadership.

Conflicts and Tensions

All of these statistics demonstrate that the gap between the top-level bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, far from diminishing, has widened in recent years. The ruling power elite is increasingly regarded as parasitic, for two reasons. In the first place, it represents a foreign body in the fabric of the elite structure of an industrialized society, since it does not submit to the economic rationality that is characteristic of an industrial merit society. The goal of promoting the conditions for existence and growth is only of secondary relevance to it. Its primary objective is the consolidation and expansion of its power base.

Secondly, the ruling elite is immensely exploitative of the other social groups. Through its absolute monopoly of power and unrestricted control over the means of production and property of the state, it is in a position to divert a disproportionately large share of the social product to the achievement of its political objectives, and at the same time to secure a higher personal income for its members. These advantages would be reduced if a larger proportion of the social product were to be applied to economic investment and mass consumption. As a result there is a marked conflict of interest within the "leading cadres" between the power elite and the managers of the economy, who aspire to a greater recognition of economic factors in policy-makeup and to an expansion of industrial autonomy as well as "personal property." Even deeper is the conflict of interest between the ruling elite and the prestige elite, which seeks to enlarge the sphere of individual freedom through curtailment of the omnipotence of the state.

The managers of the economy and most members of the prestige elite, in exercising their leadership functions, hold state offices. Despite this, they are much closer to the other strata of Soviet society than is the ruling power elite, whose core is the full-time party apparatus. To be sure, social tensions exist not just between rulers and subjects but also between the intelligentsia and the popular masses; yet the latter range of tensions differs in that they are "non-antagonistic," in Marxist terms.

In evaluating the possibilities for social change under the conditions of totalitarian rule, it is irrelevant in the last analysis whether the intelligentsia (in the narrower sense) is viewed as a distinct class or whether its top group is looked upon as a counter-elite. In either event, the intelligentsia must be regarded as the force pushing the reform efforts associated with "destalinization," which are in part openly directed against the party bureaucracy as the nucleus of the "ruling class." The conflict of roles which marks the existence of the intelligentsia has, to be sure, prevented it up till now from developing that dynamic force that would have enabled Soviet society to embark upon a post-totalitarian phase of evolution.

Given the special position of all those whose role is primarily social leadership in a modern industrial society as opposed to political rulership, would it not be appropriate to conclude, as Rolf Dahrendorf, the German sociologist, has done, that the social conflict arising out of the very structure of rule constitutes the most productive source of social change, and that the social change can only come in the form of a revolutionary upheaval? [13] In the opinion of this author, this theory has much to recommend it, in that it correctly points to the constant danger posed to the rulers by a party which—as the only authorized political organization in the country—may itself become the breeding ground of revolutionary trends and movements. What it neglects to take sufficiently into account, however, are the pressures for more gradual change exerted by those who exercise functions of social leadership as opposed to political ruling functions. It is these pressures which, once set in motion, cause the gradual erosion of the autocratic-totalitarian system, thus in turn creating conditions for accelerated social change as well.

An important role in this connection is also played by conflict existing within the "ruling class," since this class includes elements which want to have rule interpreted in terms of social leadership. The power elite in the USSR is by no means the unified body it is so often believed to be. There are frictions not only between the party and state bureaucracy, but also between various sectors of the top-level bureaucracy and the mass organizations, especially labor unions, as well as between the bureaucracy and the military. The power elite includes forces, lodged for the most part in the area of the state, which oppose the power monopoly of the full-time party apparatus. The case of Col. Penkovsky shows that this attitude also exists among high-ranking military officers.

[13] R. Dahrendorf, "Zu einer Theorie des sozialen Konflikts" (Towards a Theory of Social Conflict), *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts und Gesellschaftspolitik*, vol. 3, Tübingen, 1958, p. 90.

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The same disunity exists within the party bureaucracy itself where distinctions must be drawn between national, regional and local levels of the apparatus. Stalinist opposition, in essence expressed inertia, is much more pronounced at the district and regional levels than in the central party office in Moscow or in the basic party organizations.

The conflicts which contribute to social change therefore operate horizontally as well as vertically in the power structure. Democratic societies are characterized by free competition among the groups of the elite. Such a situation does not exist in totalitarian societies; yet a limited pluralism of the elite can be noted even within the framework of autocratic-totalitarian systems.

Prospects for Change

Two consequences follow from the present situation. First, the progressive forces in Soviet society, particularly the creative intelligentsia, are making efforts to accomplish a speedy social change through reforms. "Progressive" applies to all social forces which, whether they lean more to the "liberal" or to the "conservative" side,[14] seek a decisive repudiation of totalitarianism. The principal confrontation in this connection takes place within the Soviet upper stratum, involving the top-level bureaucracy on one hand, and the university-trained group among the managers of the economy, together with progressive elements of the party elite, on the other. The upper middle stratum has not been touched by this confrontation to any great extent.

Kosygin's economic reform has brought the managers of the economy greater freedom of action. At the same time, progressive authors, artists, and scientists within the party elite have demanded a more liberal cultural policy and have courageously denounced all attempts at "restalinization." This situation has compelled the present leadership in the Kremlin, despite the ultraconservative forces still exerting pressure within its ranks, to introduce reforms which sometimes go farther than Khrushchev ever did.

On the other hand, the leadership's fear of more far-reaching experiments is unmistakable. Khrushchev's successors could soften the conflict between the ruling elite and the progressive forces among the intelligentsia only if they were prepared to curtail the permanent and absolute dictatorship of the party and emancipate large areas of social life from party control. This applies especially to the various branches of the humanities and social sciences and the area of literary and artistic creativeness. Such a development would not mean the end of Bolshevik one-party rule, but it would mean a transition from the totalitarian to an authoritarian system. The process would be comparable, for instance, to the transformation of absolutism (at a time in history when despotic features had already diminished greatly) into *enlightened* absolutism. The transformation of totalitarian rule into authoritarian rule, such as projected by the conceptions of reform communism, would be a gigantic step forward from the standpoint of Soviet society. Authoritarianism would mean a type of dictatorship that would be content with the centralization of political power, limited control over some sectors of society, and a skeletal form of planning that would mainly concentrate on the economy. Whether such a development would be a step in the direction of genuine liberalization or even democratization is difficult to foresee; given the strength of Russian nationalism, for example, a form of Russian national communism might in the end adopt fascist features.

The Communist Party, using ideology and the methods of totalitarian rule, has always been successful in enforcing unity in the face of class division and in integrating divergent social groups and forces into a single body. This task is becoming increasingly difficult with the growing complexity and, in the sociological sense, greater density of Soviet society. There is a steadily growing number of people who feel that the party, in its totalitarian form, is an obstacle to the continued development of Russia, and who are working toward abolition of the exploitative features of the Soviet class society.

[14] In this writer's opinion, the distinction drawn by Brzezinski between "leftists," "centrists," and "rightists" in the political spectrum of the USSR relies on an obsolete historical pattern. A distinction between "liberal," "conservative," and "restorative" forces would seem more apposite today. Among the "conservatives" a differentiation can again be made between "liberal conservatives," the conservative "center," and the "ultra-conservatives." The reform wing includes liberal "revisionists" and "liberal conservatives," while the orthodox wing contains both "ultraconservatives" and restorative "dogmatists." Finally, the radicals of both wings also include revolutionaries.

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Some Historical Parallels

By Robert Strausz-Hupé

An analysis of change in the Soviet Union should take into account two kinds of phenomena: those that recur in the history of all peoples, and those that are peculiar to the Soviet political and social system.

In the history of all peoples, the passage of time and the procession of generations have brought about radical change to one degree or another. There is no reason to except the Soviet Union from this generalization. The dynamism of contemporary industrial-scientific civilization has accelerated the forces of change that have always been at work in human society. In the United States, this acceleration has been more notable than in any other country. Indeed, some evidence can be adduced to show that the forces making for change in the human condition have operated less freely in the Soviet Union than in North America and Western Europe. The impositions of the Soviet political system have retarded urbanization and the shift of manpower from the agricultural to the industrial and service sector. Had the Russian people been permitted to abide by the workings of a market economy and to follow their own preferences, it is likely that more Russians would now inhabit cities and fewer would tend the soil. The relatively slow adoption of mechanized farming techniques and the compulsory deployment of the labor force in agricultural development and undercapitalized extractive industries probably have delayed by some twenty years a population shift which, under Western-type conditions of mobility, would have placed four-fifths—rather than three-fifths—of the Soviet population in urban-industrial employment.

Professional revolutionaries and zealous doctrinaires created the Soviet system. Because of circumstances which are peculiar to the phenomenon of violent revolution and to the Russian historical-cultural environment, these professional revolutionaries and doctrinaires have been hanging on to power longer than they might have under conditions of more gradual social and political change—such as obtained, during the last hundred years or so, in Western Europe and North America. Of course, this hypothesis is not testable—but it is not without meaning. In any case, the very violence of the Russian revolution destroyed all alternative elites and gave the revolutionary cadre as absolute a control over the populace as has ever been vested in a numerically minuscule ruling minority.

The power base of this ruling elite has remained, to this day, relatively narrow. The Stalinist and post-Stalinist purges, the heavy toll on all social classes of World War II, and the exclusiveness of the party bureaucracy have stunted the growth of those secondary elites which, throughout Western democratic countries, supply the catalyst and articulation of popular consensus.

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Ever since the advent of Stalin, the political climate of the Soviet Union has been inhospitable to the growth of an intelligentsia that might have mediated between official orthodoxy and popular mores. In fact "Tsarism-on-the-run" and civil war bolshevism allowed the intelligentsia more scope for self-expression than did Stalin and his successors. The result has been the petty-bourgeois, conformist, philistine and servile disposition of the Soviet middle class. The analogies drawn by some Western Sovietologists between this subservient middle class—*Untertanen*—and the managerial and technocratic elites which are gaining an ever larger influence in the West are, at best, impressionistically loose and, at worst, highly misleading. The attempt of some Western publicists to equate, on paper, the values of the Soviet bosses and their trusted uniformed or civilian henchmen with those of American corporation executives and the political "ins" they try to cultivate bespeaks a ludicrous misapprehension not only of Soviet social realities but also of social values in general. Ideologically, the new Soviet middle class is more hidebound than it has ever been since the inception of destalinization.

In the Soviet Union, the waning of revolutionary zest has been compensated for by a hardening of liturgical ideology. Communism has lost its spontaneity. The new Communist "status society" can do well without spontaneity; but it cannot do without a legitimization derived from the Marxist-Leninist verities. Soviet society is obsessed with hierarchical rank and ridden by cant. Never has Russia been more theocratic, more Byzantine than she is now. If an analogy seems to fit contemporary Russia, it is that of Imperial Germany—though no historical analogy is completely valid, and certainly not this one. Imperial Germany tolerated political dissent and individual idiosyncrasies to a far greater degree than Soviet Russia does today. Yet, the German middle class of the 1890's might have had no trouble adjusting to the present Soviet political and spiritual climate, for it rejoiced in building the scientific-technological-military might of the Reich, scrambled for bemedalled rank, and left politics to the officials. It managed both to cherish the higher things of *Kultur* and to indulge in the crudest xenophobia. More important, the Imperial regime, though it could not always rely on the support of the German middle classes in domestic politics, never had to fear their opposition to its chauvinist foreign and armament policies.

The middle strata of the Soviet state and party bureaucracy are now completely deproletarized and sensitively caste-conscious. Certainly, the regime has had to concede to this growing and demanding social class the requisite economic and symbolic attributes of status. I presume that this is the one hard social datum which underlies all theories about Soviet social change—the "mellowing" of communism in Russia. Yet, in return, the class thus rewarded forms a broad and stable base of Soviet state power, far broader and more stable than that which supported Stalin's rule. Like its German counterpart of a generation ago, it is "patriotic," *i.e.*, uncritically submissive to whatever directives the regime cares to issue on how the proper Soviet citizen should think and behave about foreign and security matters. It is this circumstance which warps the slender lines of communication between the Soviet intelligentsia—I use the term advisedly in its traditional Russian context—and, let us say, American academics, artists, managers and members of the professions.

Educated Russians will, upon closer acquaintance, meet their Western counterparts with that personal openness and intellectual receptivity which so charmingly flavor the Russian national character. But these traits are unalloyed by that sense of personal responsibility and direct involvement which, for example, American education inculcates and American politics hardens in the average citizen. Here again, we may discern the striking resemblance between the new Soviet society and the old German middle class—intelligent, intellectually "open," amiable, steeped in political philosophy yet profoundly apolitical, if not actually rejoicing in its withdrawal from all responsibility for the "High Policies" of the State. This disposition is unlikely to undergo any significant alterations just because doctrinal roadblocks to the circulation of modern concepts in the social sciences and esthetics are being removed gingerly by Stalin's successors. On the contrary, it is likely to be strengthened by the selective acquisition of the best techniques and methodologies that can be adapted to the needs of Soviet society.

The society of contemporary Byzantine Russia suffers from many rigidities, burdensome for its people and puzzling as well as disquieting to foreigners. It is a unique blend of modernity and anachronism, which effectively sustains the immense bureaucratic and military weight of the state. Indeed, ambiguity is intrinsic to the system's power. In this respect, the new Byzantine Empire reveals itself as the true kin of the older and notoriously durable model.

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1956—A Memoir

(*continued from page 1*)

happened; what to some of us was a flash of lightning was interpreted by others as a diplomatic gesture. Each man has his own Kronstadt, it has been said. The Soviet reversal of relations with Tito's Yugoslavia seemed in May and June 1955 to be a monumental move. It unraveled the monstrosities of the "Zhdanov era," calling into question everything that had happened since 1948-49. Following upon the enormously impressive performance of the Yugoslav resistance movement during the war, the charges that Tito and his associates had always been "agents of imperialism," and that outstanding Eastern European Communists (and many in the West) were traitors, spies and hirelings of "Titoism," had been a shattering experience. Now the Soviet leaders were, with a certain nonchalance, eating humble pie. In retrospect, the 20th Congress six months later was almost anticlimactic.

To American Communists, the spring of 1955 was traumatic on other counts, stemming from their own peculiar history which has had so little serious examination.[1] During the four previous years, the CPUSA had endured three contemporaneous leaderships. The top figures had gone to jail in July 1951 under the Smith Act; in spring of 1955 they were released on parole, which forbade their engaging in any political activity until the following January. Another group of leaders and cadres had gone "underground" in the belief that the world was moving to a cataclysmic war and the country to fascism; key cadres were scattered far and wide (a few of them abroad), attempting to lead a movement under intense stress by remote control. Finally, there was a formal leadership, headed by the late William Z. Foster, who had authored the conception of an early showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union. To Foster, the very idea of "a temporary stabilization" was anathema. It smacked of the ideas of coexistence and of an American path to socialism, which had been championed by his predecessor, Earl Browder, a decade earlier. Indeed, the most charitable characterization which Communists permitted themselves of Browder was that he had been a "premature Titoist."

Ten years had passed since Browder's ideas had been peremptorily assailed in a famous article by the French Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, whom everyone assumed to be speaking for the Soviet party.[2] The consequences of having faithfully followed the international movement, as interpreted by Foster, had led the American party to a crisis. Whether in jail, in hiding, or somewhere in Paris, Moscow or Peking, American Communists had begun to ask themselves where their own faith had taken them. Now, in making up with Tito, the Soviet leaders were announcing that different paths to socialism were possible after all. Indeed, with the Bandung Conference that year, the San Francisco Assembly of the United Nations, and the settlement of both the Korean and Indo-China wars, nothing of what William Z. Foster and his friends had anticipated was coming to pass. The relevance of Browder's ideas haunted us all. If the Soviets

[1] For one account, see *Survey* (London), January 1965.

[2] J. Duclos, in *Cahiers du Communisme* (Paris), April 1945.

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were now championing as orthodoxy much of what had been denounced as heresy a decade before, where had we been led?

That something was rotten in Moscow was not too astonishing an idea to someone who had visited there several times since 1950. In far-off Peking, where I finally landed for a year, a prominent French Communist, the late Pierre Courtade (then a member of the PCF Central Committee and foreign editor of *l'Humanité*) had once teased me an entire afternoon: It was September 1952, and Courtade, who had himself just passed through Moscow, exclaimed: "Who is Stalin, after all—a genial leader or a terrible old man?"

"*Dirigeant génial ou vieillard terrible?*"—the question had shaken me profoundly although it was of a piece with that cynical banter not uncommon among sophisticated Italian and French Communists of the time. In the summer of 1955, I had heard Russians make the same suggestion. This time no Gallic banter could leaven the harshness of the words. I remember a prominent correspondent of *Pravda* at some United Nations function who blurted out the thought: "Stalin was a dictator. Maybe this Khrushchev will do better. . . ." Later, a prominent Polish writer-diplomat, whom I had once seen celebrating the 1953 New Year in Moscow with his Soviet counterparts, was now plunged in fearsome despair. When I ventured the thought that the whole conception of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would have to be re-examined, he became visibly excited. A new kind of international solidarity seemed to be arising, based on the mutual recognition of revisionist thinking which now could be safely expressed.

The year 1955 seemed then like a vast intellectual black market in which many of us traded, half in a daze, unable to voice everything on our minds, often misunderstood by those who were closest to us because our experiences had been different. We were all governed and inhibited by a common determination to see things through one way or another. I refused to resume activity in the American party in the conviction that somehow a protest had to be made against the way Foster and his friends had run it into the ground, threatening to expel everyone who called their ideas into question. I remember telling those leaders returning from jail, but still on parole, what I thought had to be done, and urging them to do it *before* the 20th Congress, which the Soviets had just announced for the following February, lest the necessary reorientation of the American movement again come as an aftermath of international changes. I published a most Aesopian book that autumn, full of allusions, with ghostly ideas between the lines:[3] a poor book for its lack of courage, but immediately attacked in the Communist press. It was as much as a man could say to those whom he knew to be floating in the clouds of a lifelong honest commitment—and like himself troubled but immobilized by this very loyalty.

The year 1956 was, of course, a time of continual shock. But the greatest shock to the Communist believer was not so much the revelation of how Stalin had governed; it was the way his coworkers proceeded to admit some of the ugly truths, but dragged their feet in drawing fundamental conclusions from their own admissions.

It was, for example, a shock to learn that Lenin's "testament"—which voiced agonizing doubts about Stalin's suitability as party leader, even urging his removal in its famous postscript—was genuine. (Indeed, there were millions of rank-and-file party members who had never heard of it at all.) With how many young socialists and Trotskyists had we not argued, in far-off days, that Lenin could not possibly have held Stalin in such low esteem?

It was also a shock to read in Anastas Mikoyan's address to the 20th Congress that "we are lagging seriously in our study of the present phase of capitalism, do not engage in a profound study of facts and figures, and frequently, for agitational purposes, pick out isolated facts relating to the oncoming crisis, to the impoverishment of the working people, but fail to give an all-round and profound evaluation of the phenomena observed in the life of foreign countries."[4] Indeed, Mikoyan disclosed that the institutes for the study of both the West and the East had been closed, and he expressed envy that, by contrast, the Soviet Union was being studied at numerous institutes in the United States. How little this squared with the firm conviction among believers that the Soviet Communists unquestionably knew what they were talking about!

The most searing shock, of course, was to learn that over half of the delegates to the Soviet party's 17th Congress in 1934, the "Congress of the Victors

[3] *Paris to Peking,* New York, Cameron Associates, 1955.

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in Building Socialism," had never survived that decade; also, that two-thirds of the Central Committee elected by the Congress had been murdered on trumped-up charges originated by Stalin himself. For consider what the year 1934 signified for Communists of the West: it was a time when tens of thousands of new young militants flocked into the American, the French, the Spanish and even the Chinese Communist parties. The great anti-fascist upswing was at full tide. Yet two decades later we learned that the men and women identified with what seemed in retrospect the movement's finest hour were framed and murdered only a few years later, and by their own leaders at that.

Thus it was that millions of dedicated people who had stood up to attacks and persecution, whose boundless loyalty to the Soviet Union they had so proudly proclaimed, were suddenly confronted in 1956 with the admission of Stalin's coworkers that the Moscow Trials had no substance whatsoever. That *Verbatim Report*[5] in the dull, gray binding, which reverently went into the libraries of countless millions of homes and formed the basis of popularizations of the supposed "great conspiracy against Soviet Russia," turned out to have been a monstrous concoction. Even while writing these lines, I look up to my bookshelf to verify the title, and the mingled emotions which the sight of this unclean volume arouses make it hard to continue writing.

It turned out that hundreds of thousands of Soviet Communists (some have said millions[6]), the same ones who evaded the Tsarist police, languished in the Siberian camps, seized power from Kerensky, held the country together against famine and intervention and then built a new society with bare hands—the flower of a fabled revolutionary generation—had been shipped off to concentration camps, this time in "socialist Siberia," where they endured torture and death at the hands of the same party to which they had entrusted their deepest hopes and life itself. And all the while the charge that such was in fact happening had been denied all over the world on the grounds that it came from the enemies of socialism! It also turned out that Stalin was not the military genius the world had been led to believe. The Soviet people had paid for Stalin's comparative military unpreparedness with thousands of lives, and this unpreparedness was itself astonishing. Communists had argued that even such strange moves as the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 had been justified by the Soviet Union's need to gain time, to prepare itself better for the Nazi attack—and now it turned out that Stalin had indeed wasted that time!

Yet the trauma of 1956 rested on deeper ground. Not only the oversized statues and preposterous portraits of Stalin came crashing down, but the basic myths on which the structure of international communism rested—namely, that the Soviet party incarnated integrity, wisdom and knowledge, and hence deserved the admiration and obedience of all the other parties. Even today, a decade later, academic colleagues often ask me by what mechanisms Moscow maintained its hold on the "fraternal parties," as though the essence of the matter were to be found in secret orders, in Soviet gold, in the fealty of this or that leader, or even in the armies of liberation that stayed to occupy. All of these things played their part, of course. But to most Communists, the acceptance of the Soviet party's preeminence was at bottom voluntary, arising from something quite simple and on its own terms quite noble: millions of people believed in, and wanted, an *international* movement; and they thought they had it.

The Communist leaders from Europe, Asia and America deferred without question to the Russians because the Russians had supposedly upheld the ideal with honor. They had proven their mettle, their devotion, their foresight, and they were therefore entitled to a leadership commensurate with their hard-won power—a power intended as a bulwark and shield for others. Most Communists believed what they wanted to believe, and led themselves to disaster more than others misled them. Hadn't the Second International become a "stinking corpse," as the martyred Rosa Luxemburg said, because its leaders had failed to honor their pledges of mutual aid at the "moment of truth" in 1914? Lenin borrowed and repeated that phrase, and the Third International was going to be different. There was no holier moment in the average party member's experience then to hear the strains of the *Internationale* soaring above a forest of clenched fists

[4] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), March 2, 1956.

[5] *Report of the Court Proceedings, in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Centre*, People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, Moscow, 1937.

[6] Robert C. Tucker (with Stephen F. Cohen) in *The Great Purge Trial*, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965, cites the estimate of 9 million by Alexander Weissberg in *The Accused*, 3 million by Vladimir Dedijer in his *Tito*, and the late Boris Nicolaevsky's estimate of 5 to 8 million.

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and radiant faces, proclaiming "a better world's in birth" and the final line's prediction that "The Internationale will be the human race. . . ."

But at the 20th Congress, Comrade Khrushchev spoke in secret, to Russian ears only, and only to a few of them at that. The 55 foreign delegations had been given special receptions, had been wined, dined and well-lodged, and their most important figures had addressed the Congress, to the accompaniment of "stormy applause." Yet the Soviet leaders had so little regard for those movements which had staked everything on the leading role of the CPSU that they never bothered to inform the revered international leaders about the revelations concerning Stalin or to discuss with them the new ideas which the Congress projected.[7] Though the time was ripe and the occasion opportune, no debate seems to have taken place. Not even the proposition of diverse paths to socialism, nor the new prospects for coexistence and the maintenance of world peace (the strategic framework of global political evolution), were put forward for the consideration of fraternal parties, except as previously-adopted Soviet views, *ipso facto* binding on everyone.

Thus, upon returning from Moscow late that winter, the Western Communist leaders were making reports on the 20th Congress, still using the Aesopian phrase "cult of personality" but not mentioning the secret speech. The Communist audience outside the USSR was placed in the humiliating position of learning what had happened in Moscow from the "bourgeois press," although their leaders had been there, as honored guests, a few weeks earlier.

Was the speech a fabrication of the State Department, as some Communist papers suggested in a familiar reflex?[8] Were Togliatti or Thorez concealing from their own followers what they had known all along? That would have been bad enough, indeed shocking. Or had these intimates of Stalin also been kept in the dark? That was worse, incredible and intolerable. But if the Khrushchev speech was genuine, why did the Russians not make it public, in keeping with their assurances that they were turning a new leaf? Ten years later, it is something to ponder that the Soviet people have not yet had a full and authoritative text of so historic and meaningful a contribution to their own history.[9]

Having failed to make destalinization a common project, an uneven development then set in and took its fierce revenge. All the latent contradictions of the apparent monolith came to the surface, unevenly and explosively. The Russians could not control what they had themselves set in motion, for their own contradiction lay in continuing to cling to Stalinist methods even as they tried, by fits and starts, to destalinize. This spectacle placed the most basic tenets of the movement in question. Unable to lead, the "leading party" persisted in doing so, and its leadership—and much else with it—fell into discredit.

The famous interview of the Italian Communist leader, the late Palmiro Togliatti, published in *Nuovi Argumenti* in mid-June 1956, unwittingly accelerated this process.[10] Togliatti, it will be remembered, enjoyed great prestige not only as the chief of a powerful movement arising from the ruins of two decades of Italian fascism, but as the former secretary of the Communist International—the famous "Ercoli" whom an entire generation of Communists the world over held in great regard. In the interview Togliatti voiced the question whether, in the discussion as led by the Russians, "the true problems are evaded." He asked "why and how Soviet society could reach and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the legality which it had set for itself, even to the point of degeneration." The difficulty was, he said, that "our Soviet comrades, having limited themselves substantially to denouncing the facts and undertaking the proper correction, have neglected up to now the still-unfulfilled task of dealing with the difficult subject of an overall political and historical judgment."

What was needed, everybody thought, was a "Marxist-Leninist analysis." The Soviet leaders were asked before the bar of history and the entire movement to supply it. If the transformation of Lenin's heir and disciple into a Byzantine tyrant was to be explained on grounds of personal psychology,

[7] Wolfgang Leonhard in *The Kremlin Since Stalin*, New York, F. Praeger, 1962, says that a private conference of some top leaders did take place at the Kremlin in January 1956. See p. 160.

[8] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, edited by the Russian Institute, New York, Columbia University Press, 1956.

[9] Leonhard, *op. cit.*

[10] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, pp. 120-21.

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of paranoia, or if the deformations of socialism were the product of a specifically Russian backwardness (few Communists abroad even imagined that such backwardness could survive the "building of socialism" and the "transition to communism"), then Marxism-Leninism was itself in danger. It ran counter to every ideological precept that one individual could have abased the principles of so trusted and true a revolutionary party. And if specifically national factors could outweigh the universal power and truth of scientific socialism, the impact was equally disastrous.

In Togliatti's tormenting queries, the red thread ran backwards from Stalin to Lenin, toward the methods and ideas by which the Bolshevik party had won power and maintained it. The Soviet leaders were confidently talking about a return to "Leninist norms," but history was unreeling, as though someone had lost control of the film and the projector, and the camera suddenly focussed on the "ten days that shook the world." People began to talk about Rosa Luxemburg (who had been revered by young Communists in the 1930's but whose works had not been read until 1956). The accusing questions which she had addressed to Lenin in 1918 rose up again, and every question mark became a ghost. Suddenly the skeletons in the closet of the Communist International began to rattle in every country.

In the same *Nuovi Argumenti* interview, Togliatti broached some other notions which could not possibly have occurred to us before. "The whole system," he said, "becomes polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different." In some countries, socialism might be built without the Communists as the leading party, and indeed, "in still other countries, the march toward socialism is an objective for which there is a concentration of efforts coming from various movements, which, however, have not yet reached either an agreement or a reciprocal understanding." [11] Thus, perhaps a Communist party was not needed at all.

This was something quite intoxicating and novel. The concept of different roads to socialism, put forward at the Congress but advanced even earlier, in the declaration following Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in May 1955, was not an entirely new one: it was part of the memory bank of communism from the 1944-47 period. But polycentrism was a more challenging concept, although elusive like so many of Togliatti's ideas. It suggested that West European, North American, Latin American and Far Eastern parties might in fact be better off if they divested themselves of their ties to Moscow. It suggested further that Communist parties in many countries should enter into *genuine* partnerships with socialist parties and, most important, that they should change their character, fashioned during their long tutelage to the CPSU. Only then would their aims be trusted, and their cooperation accepted.

It was now that the hapless and helpless American Communist Party also played an unwitting and ironic role. "It is no accident," as we were wont to say, that the only article from abroad which the Soviet Communists thought fit to republish in *Pravda*, as a way of breaking the news of the Khrushchev report to a wider audience, came from the then General Secretary of the CPUSA—the late Eugene Dennis. I have it from many colleagues who lived in Warsaw or East Berlin at that time that the Dennis article was an eye-opener for them; appearing in *Pravda* (which reprinted it from *The Daily Worker*), Dennis' appraisal of the Stalin phenomenon seemed extraordinarily bold.[12] Dennis was faced with the difficult task of, on one hand, replying to his own party chairman, the late William Z. Foster, at that time entirely isolated in the American Communist leadership and, on the other, allaying the tremendous opposition which the Khrushchev report had caused among Dennis' comrades and which was being led by John Gates, then editor of *The Daily Worker*.

What the international public could not know was that, having published his piece, Dennis was then confronted by Togliatti's judgments, which made the American contribution pale by comparison.[13] With that tropism so peculiar to Lenin School graduates, and perhaps assuming that Togliatti was in fact speaking for Moscow, Dennis was on the verge of modifying his own article, since his own audience found it unsatisfactory, when *Pravda* gave it sanction by the very act of publica-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

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tion. What Moscow had not foreseen, of course, was the unhappy position in which Dennis had been placed: he never recovered authority within his own party.[14]

As for the Soviet Communists, they attempted to confine the discussion with their own declaration of June 30, 1956. Togliatti's projection of polycentrism, with all that it suggested, was sidestepped. At the same time, the Italian leader was rebuked for daring to suggest a "degeneration" of the Soviet system, as though he had touched an exposed nerve. To some Communists, the Soviet declaration went further than anything previously heard; to most, it was an apology, a refusal to undertake a systematic and probing analysis, a sign of resistance to the destalinization process.

At this point, events replaced discussion. In Poznan, Poland, a surprise protest of workers about rates of pay developed into a political demonstration against the regime. All those "dangerous thoughts" which had gripped the cadres of the Polish United Workers Party in 1955, and then spread through party ranks after the 20th Congress, now gripped the masses, and—to use a Marxist term—became a "material force." The first reactions of the Soviet leaders, and of their Polish counterparts, were typical: the events in Poznan were ascribed to "imperialist agents taking advantage of economic difficulties and grievances in certain factories in Poznan."[15] Yet so swiftly was this proven untrue that Communist power in Poland was saved only because of the availability of a group of leaders, with Wladislaw Gomulka at their head, who took matters out of the hands of the Polish Stalinists, in defiance of the top Soviet leaders who rushed to Warsaw in panic. The damage of an entire decade—and in the Polish case, the damage had its macabre inception with Stalin's arbitrary dissolution of the Polish Communist movement in 1938—could now be repaired only as the Soviet Union accepted the monumental criticism implicit in Gomulka's rehabilitation and his dramatic return.

In Hungary similar events developed at the same time, but matured a week or ten days later.[16] Here the blow was even more stunning. It would take us afield to review all the questions that wracked the Communist world at that time—whether the Imre Nagy government had in fact lost control of the uprising to counterrevolutionary elements, whether Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact should have been posed at all. Naturally, most believers were appalled by the spectacle of troops and tanks of the leading socialist nation smashing a working class which had risen in arms against what it felt were the traducers of the dream. They were also appalled at the treachery with which the Russians behaved, flooding the country with military power while at the same time promising to withdraw in deference to Hungarian Communist wishes—all of which contradicted the important declaration of October 30, 1956, in which the Soviet Union admitted its own mistakes in dealing with Eastern Europe.[17]

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[13] Much could be said about the striking differences between Togliatti's and Dennis' reaction to the 20th Congress, but suffice it to say that while both Communist leaders were, of course, concerned about the disastrous impact of Khrushchev's disclosures, Dennis was far more willing to "forget and forgive" than was the Italian leader; indeed, Dennis remained the unreconstructed True Believer. Thus he had no doubt whatsoever that Soviet history still represented "the heroic path to the most monumental and progressive advance in human history." "Who were the real architects of a policy of terror in respect to the Soviet Union?," he asked, and answered immediately: "Those who tried to invoke the wrath of heaven and earth to crush the first land of socialism. . . ." Indeed, the terror practiced by the GPU was, in his opinion, "similar" to that practiced by "the secret intelligence agencies in our own country, like the FBI and CIA. . . ." "The inherent spirit of socialism is human, national and social freedom"—and as for Stalin's "distortions," they hardly affected "the historic achievements of socialism and the grand panorama of a new world before us." The "major mistakes" of the American party consisted merely in the fact that "we too glibly, or idealistically, assumed that the great job of building socialism could take place without major mistakes." Just as piously, one might add, did he accept, as full truth, the nature and explanation of Stalin's crimes which "Khrushchev fearlessly disclosed." "Even a skeptic [*e.g.*, Togliatti?] must admit the fortitude, integrity, confidence and team spirit with which the present Soviet leadership has moved since 1953. . . ." Not a word of doubt beclouded his confrontation with the past, present, and future: "One of the key tests of political integrity and socialist strength is the frank recognition of error and, most important, self-correction. And by the record of the last three years and their present public disclosures, discussions and rectifications, it appears as a matter of fact, that the CPSU is meeting this test. . . . As this process continues, millions of Americans will begin to see socialism in a new light, and with the understanding that socialist society is a changing, evolutionary, and constantly improving system."

In fairness to Dennis, it should be noted that in discussing Stalin's crimes he referred specifically to "the persecution of the Jewish doctors and snuffing out the lives of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures"—a statement which *Pravda*'s editors "corrected" first by deleting the last part of it, starting with the word "snuffing," and secondly by adding a footnote to the effect that "prominent Russian and Ukrainian physicians" also were victims of the "Doctors' Case."

[14] One *Daily Worker* writer, its TV expert and book reviewer, exclaimed at the time that "Comrade Dennis does not even have the guts for a *peaceful* transition to socialism!"

[15] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), June 29, 1956.

[16] See *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, ed. by Paul E. Zinner, New York, Columbia University Press, 1956.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 485.

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But beyond these reactions, what dismayed so many Communists throughout the world was the incapacity of the Soviet leaders to learn from the Polish experience, or to accept the advice of the Yugoslav leaders which they had gone to such lengths to solicit.[18] What was destroyed in the flames over Budapest was the very conception of a Communist movement that, in so aping the Soviet model under Mátyas Rákosi, had painted itself into a corner. Despised and repudiated, the Stalinists had still not grasped the enormity of the debacle.

Paradoxically, however, the deepest blow was suffered by the Soviet leaders themselves. Having so long and so arrogantly treated their comrades-in-arms as flunkies, and having tried so desperately to keep the destalinization process from assuming a truly meaningful character, their mistakes could be rectified only by tanks and guns and planes—in itself, the most tragic mistake of all. To paraphrase Marx, the Communists had resisted the weapons of criticism and been forced in the end to resort to the criticism of weapons. After that, the line of division in the Communist world came to rest between those who realized the tragedy of the era and drew the fullest conclusions, and those who resisted the meaning of this tragedy, sinking into apologetics, and thus inhibiting the very process of change.

The year 1956 had, of course, its curious epilogue. The Russians were so far behind in coping with a changed world, and were proceeding so fitfully and erratically, that five years went by—and then all the issues of the 20th Congress were revived again at the 22nd, at the cost of new exasperations, soul-sickness and upheaval. Between November 1956 and October 1961 the Soviet Communists were still operating by iconography in dealing with their own audience. This was the measure of how reluctant the process of change had been and to what low political level the Soviet public had been reduced. For how was one to characterize the extraordinary performance of the Soviet leaders at the 22nd Congress: at the expense of a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," renaming the city of Stalingrad and shuffling the remains of the dictator from the mausoleum to an ordinary burial ground, while at the same time announcing a new program that heralded an early transition to communism?

Three years later, the nearly ten-year period of mystification was climaxed by the sudden removal of Nikita Sergeievitch himself, with so little explanation that the Communist parties of the world had to send delegations to Moscow to find out what was happening. This time, at least, no charge was subsequently pressed that the Ukrainian miner's son had been an imperialist agent since early boyhood. By now, larger issues hung over the Communist horizon like storm-clouds building into cyclones. Whereas in 1956 the Soviet Communists invariably quoted the editorials of the Chinese Communist press as justification of their course, and indeed the Chinese Communists tried to help them *in extremis*, the issues resulting from the frustrations of destalinization in the 1950's broke forth in a new shape and on a larger canvas—the mortal conflict between the two giants of contemporary communism, the end of which is not yet in sight.

It turned out that the changes within Soviet life—and no doubt they have been real—have been the product of struggles between factions, of rifts within the elite, of conflicts within the intelligentsia, of the uneven growth of forces within a totalitarian society that has produced its own gravediggers in strange forms. This, too, was something totally different from what we had been taught as the unique characteristic of the Marxist-Leninist direction of society. By definition, it was the conscious discipline of communism that distinguished it from the anarchy of bourgeois politics, and made possible the sublimation of ambition and personal inadequacy in the interests of a noble goal. It was by the conscious ability to direct change in social life that Marxism-Leninism was presumably so vastly superior to other, non-"scientific" ideologies. Yet the record abounds with fantastic zigzags, the murky politics of power, the struggle of groups and factions, the subjectivity of leaders. One need not be devoted to Kremlinology to realize that the claim of uniqueness for communism stands out—in the era of destalinization as in the Stalin era itself—as but a hollow boast, one of mankind's most cruel mockeries of man's eternal hope.

[18] Tito's address to the League of Yugoslav Communists, at Pula, Nov. 11, 1956, *ibid.*, p. 516.

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Khrushchev Before and After

By Peter Kenez

On October 15, 1964, while Moscow was preparing a huge reception for the three cosmonauts who had spent a day in space, Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev was suddenly removed from power. As Henry Tanner of the *New York Times* wrote:

. . . the men in the most exposed positions were those in charge of hanging pictures of the leaders in all the right places in preparation for the return of the cosmonauts.

The crucial hours found these men almost literally half way up their ladders with Mr. Khrushchev's pictures on their shoulders and not knowing whether to go up or down.[1]

The change in the leadership of the Soviet state and Communist Party found many Soviet historians in a similarly uncomfortable situation, for in the Soviet Union historians of the modern period often fulfill the same functions as the poster painters and picture hangers.

That fateful day in October 1964 changed not only Khrushchev's future, but his past as well. The historians were confronted with the difficult task of hastily sketching a new image of the man who had dominated the past ten years of Soviet history. They were experienced men who had handled ticklish biographical problems before. Yet this time they were faced not only with the factual contradictions typical of Soviet historiography but with a dearth of source material.

To be sure, during Khrushchev's reign his name would crop up in the most unlikely places and settings: there was hardly any history book, for instance, that did not manage to quote at least one public utterance by the then First Secretary. Yet despite this steadily mounting "cult of personality," there was a curious lack of full-scale biographies of Khrushchev—as there had been in the case of Stalin. While half-forgotten Communist leaders were being "rehabilitated," while, say, the man who succeeded Trotsky as Commissar for War, Mikhail V. Frunze (1885-1925), rated more than a dozen biographies, not a single *complete* study was devoted to the party and government leader, not even an article in any of the historical journals.[2] It is quite possible, of course, that Khrushchev never wanted an "official biography" published, engaged as he was for such a long time in destroying his predecessor's personality cult. Whatever the reason, printed sources re-

[1] *New York Times*, Oct. 25, 1964, section 4, p. 4.

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[2] A partial exception is the study entitled: *Rasskaz o pochetnom shakhtere* (A Story about an Honorary Miner), Stalino, 1961, produced by a writers' collective, and dealing with Khrushchev's connections with the Donets basin.

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vealed very little about his private life, and often the most informative material came curiously enough from foreign sources, such as interviews with foreign journalists and speeches made abroad.

The image we can put together, based on encyclopedia articles, histories of the party and the Soviet Union, and short references in other related studies published in the Soviet Union, has little in common with the shrewd, earthy, self-confident politician we had come to know. As portrayed by the Soviet historians, Khrushchev—who made headlines all over the world—becomes indistinguishable from other *apparatchiki*. Again one is reminded of the posters, which, incidentally, never showed the warts on the First Secretary's face: the picture is big, but it is not a good likeness. Some of the details are missing and the rest are fuzzy. What we have seen thus far of post-Khrushchevian historiography offers little hope that the picture will be any clearer. Indeed, it seems more likely that Khrushchev will fall further into colorless oblivion until an official attitude towards him becomes more fully developed in the future.

The Young Khrushchev

A generalization frequently made about Soviet historiography is that it calls for a projection of the present, often an idealized version of the present, into the past. Thus today's heroes, when written about today, have an exemplary past that is often a distortion if not always a contradiction, of the facts. The picture of the young Nikita Sergeievich that emerges from the pre-1964 editions of Soviet histories is so unreliable and stereotyped, that there is little we can accept with any degree of certainty about his first 25 years except the date and place of his birth.[3]

From the one source that is devoted entirely to Khrushchev's early years, the distortions are quite apparent. We learn, for example, that he had participated in the labor movement since he was 15 years old, that, even as a boy, he read Marx aloud to his young friends, that at the age of 18 he became one of the leaders of the strike movement in his factory, that three years later he agitated against the First World War, and that as one of the main strike organizers at the Rutchenkovo mine he was once saved from arrest by the action of the assembled miners who repulsed the police in order to save him.[4]

It is highly unlikely that any of these details is true. Contemporary documents say nothing of Khrushchev as a young labor leader, and the ex-Soviet premier himself once stated that he had never worked in trade unions.[5] Although he might have been involved in strike activity of some sort, his lack of prominence at that time makes it highly improbable that any mob would demonstrate—and effectively at that—in his behalf.

We are not on much firmer ground when investigating Khrushchev's activities during the Civil War. The 1962 English edition of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* states that N. S. Khrushchev was elected chairman of the Rutchenkovo Soviet in May 1917.[6] However, the 1959 Russian edition of the same work and encyclopedias of the same period do not make any mention of this event, referring to Khrushchev only as a member of the Bolshevik Party who "played an active role in the Civil War on the Southern Front in 1918." When the historians tried to be more precise about this period, they frequently contradicted each other. For example, in 1961, three different versions of Khrushchev's activities during the war were published. V. T. Sukhorukov, in his study of the 11th Army in the Civil War, maintains that in October

A Poignant Prophecy

We Communists highly value and support the authority of correct and mature leadership. We must safeguard the authority of the leaders who are recognized by the party and the people. But each leader must also understand the other side of the matter—never to plume himself on his position, to remember that in holding this or that post he is merely fulfilling the will of the party and the will of the people, who may have invested the greatest power in him but never lose control over him. (*Applause.*) The leader who forgets this pays heavily for his mistake.

—From Khrushchev's concluding remarks at the 22nd CPSU Congress, Pravda, Oct. 29, 1961.

[3] April 17, 1894, in Kalinovka.
[4] *Rasskaz o pochetnom shakhtere, passim.*
[5] Lazar Pistrak. *The Grand Tactician*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1961, p. 9.
[6] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, no date, p. 9.

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1920 Khrushchev was a military commissar in the 9th Division of the 11th Army.[7] *A Story About an Honorary Miner* claims that he left the front in May 1920 and that by the end of that year he was an assistant director of the Rutchenkovo mine.[8] On February 6, 1961, *Pravda* quoted V.P. Mzhavanadze as saying, on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Georgia:

The Georgian people know that Nikita Sergeievich came to Georgia for the first time in the memorable year of 1921, together with the legendary Eleventh Army which . . . rendered aid to the toilers who rose against the Menshevik government.[9]

The contradictions are, of course, minor. But they do demonstrate the total lack of seriousness with which Soviet historians regard the writing of contemporary history, their willingness to compile meaningless details provided they do not impair the bigger, more generalized picture. What is astonishing is that none of them seems to care about the conflicting evidence and its weakening effect on their credibility. When scholars must speculate about the effects of studying Marx at the age of 15 and are expected to write about the Civil War without mentioning Trotsky, it is possible that credibility no longer interests them.

Nevertheless, we find a more accurate picture of Khrushchev as a young party official after 1920. To be sure, there are still discrepancies, but the description of him as a party secretary who did not just sit in his office all day but who went out to meet the miners sounds authentic.[10] He was most probably a good organizer and a young man with an exuberant nature. Districts he worked in usually overfulfilled their norms, and because of his zealousness he became secretary of an important district of the Donets, moving up to "important party work in Stalino," the capital of the Donets, and later to party offices in Kharkov and Kiev.[11] But here again the idealized version of the leader at his peak has crept into the history of his early years. We are asked to believe, for example, that in 1922 Khrushchev advocated the utilization of reinforced concrete instead of wooden pilings in the mines,[12] an allegation as absurd as the praise lavished on him as the party secretary in the 1920's who best observed the "principle of collective leadership" in his district.[13]

On the Ladder of Success

When Khrushchev went to Moscow in 1929 to study at the Industrial Academy, he was still far from being an important figure. In the following ten years, he rose with amazing rapidity to the very top of the hierarchy. By 1939 he was a member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and hence one of the ten most powerful men in the Soviet Union. However, Soviet historiography has not dealt with this phenomenal rise. The historians who exaggerated his role in the Civil War and in the early 1920's skip lightly over this period.

For example, *A Short History of the USSR*,[14] published in June 1964, mentions Khrushchev as an assistant director of the Rutchenkovo mine in 1921-22, but refers to him again only in 1941 as the organizer of the defense of Kiev. One finds the same curious imbalance in the various editions of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* Encyclopedia articles on Khrushchev merely list without comment the various posts he held during this decade, while the sixth volume of the *History of Moscow*,[15] devoted to the Soviet period, quotes from the speeches of the First Secretary of the Moscow organization but gives little attention to the man. Khrushchev did not even receive credit for such "safe" achievements as the building of the subway and the industrialization of the Moscow district.

There can be only one explanation for the deflation of Khrushchev's role in the 1930's, in contrast to the exaggerated descriptions of his earlier career —that the Soviet leader chose to dissociate himself as much as possible from the crimes of the Stalin era which he later attacked, accusing Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich of personal responsibility for the purges. The only way to place himself in

[7] V. T. Sukhorukov, *XI Armiia v boiakh na severnom Kavkaze i Nizhnei Volge (1918-1920)*, Moscow, 1961, p. 239.

[8] *Rasskaz o pochetnom skakhtere*, pp. 52-59.

[9] As quoted in Lazar Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician*, p. 14. The invasion of Georgia took place in February 1921. It is conceivable that between October 1920 and February 1921 Khrushchev left the 9th Army and joined the 11th, but the fact that Sukhorukov says nothing about this makes it highly unlikely.

[10] *Rasskaz o pochetnom shakhtere*, p. 91.

[11] *Ibid.* p. 60.

[12] Khrushchev first made this suggestion in the 1950's. See Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev, A Career*, New York, Viking Press, 1966, pp. 17-18.

[13] *Rasskaz o pochetnom shakhtere*, p. 92.

[14] *Kratkaia istoriia SSSR*, Part Two, Moscow Leningrad, 1964, p. 158.

[15] *Istoriia Moskvy*, Vol. 6, Moscow 1957-61.

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a different category was to promote the implication that at the height of the "crimes of the personality cult" he was not a figure of national importance.

There is no ambivalence about the official Soviet attitude toward Khrushchev's role in the second World War. The Soviet historians of the period had an advantage over the historians of the Civil War, for Khrushchev was an important figure in 1941-45, although here again his importance often has been overemphasized.

There is little reason to doubt that Khrushchev was in fact a skillful political commissar (officially described as a "member of the Military Council"), that he established relations with ordinary soldiers and commanding officers and that he participated in crucial strategic decisions. However, historians have exaggerated his role as the strategist of important victories and have conspicuously dissociated him from any responsibility for failure. Who had exactly what role in devising the strategy at Stalingrad, for example, will probably remain an open question for some time. This author is inclined to believe A. I. Yeremenko, the front commander, who wrote in 1961 that it was the work of the Military Council of the front, of which Lieutenant-General Khrushchev was a member.[16] Other sources, on the other hand, again when dealing with specifics, tend to contradict each other. In an early account of the battle published in 1953,[17] Khrushchev's name is barely mentioned, all credit for the victory going to Stalin and Malenkov. The claims of the 1962 English edition of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* hardly inspire greater confidence with the claim that in April 1941, Khrushchev, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, warned Stalin that the defenses of the country had to be improved,[18] while earlier editions of this same work make no mention of this warning. Elsewhere, the authors of a six-volume study of the war, published over the period 1960-64, wrote that Khrushchev pleaded with Stalin to withdraw from Kiev in 1941 and Kharkov in 1942 to avoid the bloody defeats that brought such great losses to the Red Army.[19] These versions can only be interpreted as part of the campaign to discredit Stalin for the country's military unpreparedness and to absolve Khrushchev of the responsibility for the military defeats which occurred in his area.

The Summit

Since the postwar policies of the Soviet Union have immediate implications for the present, Soviet histories of this period have approached any evaluation of these policies with extreme caution, both in the pre-1964 and the post-1964 versions. In the case of the former, Khrushchev emerges only gradually as an important figure after the victory over Germany until he becomes undisputed master of the USSR.

While the histories of the early postwar years do not slight Khrushchev, the party clearly has the limelight, being collectively responsible for the "radically improved agricultural management," for the "reorganization of the management of industry," even for the "initiative in the improvement of relations with the US, Britain, France, Italy and other capitalist countries."[20] Eventually the phrase, "as Comrade N. S. Khrushchev has pointed out . . ." begins to proliferate, especially regarding the developments after 1957 when Khrushchev accepted credit for the "achievements and victories" of Soviet science, agriculture and industry. It will be recalled that even the cosmonauts in their inevitable telephone communications from space thanked him personally for making their feats possible.[21]

As might be expected, Khrushchev's image grew even larger after the elimination of the "anti-party" group. With the gradual disappearance of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Zhukov and Bulganin from the history books, Khrushchev's role prior to 1957 steadily increased. The treatment of the 19th Party Congress in the 1959 edition of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, for example, makes no mention of Malenkov, who gave the main report, or of the other speakers such as Molotov, Beria and Kaganovich. In the 1957 edition of another important textbook, *History of the USSR*[22] (which came out a few months after the "unmasking of the anti-party group), Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich receive no mention at all. From this volume of over 800 pages, a student would

[16] A. I. Yeremenko, *Stalingrad*, Moscow, 1961.

[17] B. S. Telpukhovski, *Velikaia pobeda sovietskoi armii pod Stalingradom*, Moscow, 1953.

[18] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 538.

[19] *Istoriia velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskovo Soiuza*, (Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union) 6 vols., Moscow 1960-64.

[20] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow 1960, p. 661. This is a translation of the 1959 Russian edition.

[21] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 13, 1964.

[22] *Istoriia SSSR*, Moscow, 1964.

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look in vain for the name of the man who became the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death.

Malenkov's reputation remains bad, his position comparable only to that of Trotsky. Although Stalin does receive credit for his achievements, Malenkov is only responsible for his and Stalin's mistakes. Kaganovich has fared less badly, but he is never mentioned in any neutral context. If his name appears at all, it is in connection with some error, poor planning or mismanagement. Molotov is in a different category. Although he is frequently blamed for "excesses" in collectivization and several "violations of socialist legality," his active Bolshevik past has not been minimized. Bulganin's punishment was oblivion. The premier of the country from 1955 to 1958 has virtually disappeared from the history books.

It is difficult to envisage the line of development that Soviet historiography might have taken had Khrushchev stayed in power. A "personality cult" has a dynamism of its own. One writer tries to outdo the next in seizing the essence of his subject, and once a "fact" is discovered and added to a biographical sketch, no one will challenge it while the subject is still "acceptable." On the other hand, during the period of Khrushchev's unchallenged leadership, the writers continued to denounce the personality cult in general and Stalin's in particular, just as they continued to pay lip service to the principle of collective leadership long after it had become a myth.

In assessing the nature of the Khrushchev cult, we must bear in mind its similarities to the cult of Stalin, as well as the differences between them. The last edition of *A Short History of the USSR* is a good case in point. Having come off the presses in June 1964, it suffered the indignity of almost instantaneous obsolescence—remarkable even by Soviet standards. On the one hand it differs from the volume published in 1959 in that Khrushchev appears on almost every page dealing with the events of the past ten years; the aims of Soviet society are defined almost entirely by his utterances, and the book is replete with phrases such as "The Communist Party, at the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev, decided . . ."—all of which is singularly reminiscent of the adulation once heaped upon Stalin.

On the other hand, even though the book may be taken as the ultimate expression of Khrushchev's personality cult, it contains none of the typical Stalinist extravagances such as "teacher of his people," "foremost historian," or "brilliant linguist." Similarly, in an article in *Voprosy istorii* devoted to Khrushchev's writings, he is described as a propagandist, a tribune of Leninist ideology—but significantly, not as a philosopher.[23]

The Post-1964 Image

It is difficult to find any precise image of Khrushchev in the historical studies published after October 1964. In the sources perused by the author no clear approach to the man has as yet developed, the rule of thumb being, one presumes, to say as little as pos-

[23] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, Moscow, 1964.

How History Is To Be Taught

. . . The teaching of history in the [Soviet secondary] schools is still not fully utilized for the purposes of indoctrination. It often boils down to the teacher's bland repetition of facts contained in the texts, without sufficient use of visual aids or vivid influences on the students' emotions. . . .

History courses in secondary schools must provide students with a scientific understanding of the laws of society's development in a form intelligible to them and must develop in them a conviction about the inevitable victory of communism, while revealing the role of the popular masses as the true makers of history and the historical significance of the individual.

In a history course, special attention should be given to explaining the role of the Communist Party as the directing and guiding force in Soviet society and to a study of the modern stage of Communist construction in the USSR . . .

History instruction in school is intended to bring up the young people in the spirit of Communist ideals, socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism and a deep respect for labor, and to facilitate the training of students for an active public life.

—From "On the Teaching of History in Schools," by the Russian Republic Academy of Pedagogy, Pravda. September 16, 1959.

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sible on a controversial subject for which no official line has been devised. Yet it is striking how much better Khrushchev has survived his fall than did his own victims. Stalin executed his opponents, while Khrushchev removed them from power and denounced them. Thus far the punishment accorded to Khrushchev has been *indirect* criticism and vilification, plus gradual "non-personalization"—which might be considered, perhaps, an improvement over past methods in dealing with disgraced political leaders.

The rule of saying as little as possible seems to obtain in the studies which appeared immediately following Khrushchev's demise. The first of these, the 1964 edition of the *History of the USSR*, was sent to the typographer in June and to the printer on December 3, 1964. Assuming that the typesetters needed at least two weeks to reset the last hundred pages, the writers had about a month to correct the "errors." There is nothing in the book which could be construed as even an oblique criticism of the ex-First Secretary. At the same time, the authors appear to have given way to the automatic reaction of ignoring him.

The book is 647 pages long, yet it mentions Khrushchev only three times: as one of the party leaders who went to the front in 1941, as a member of the Stalingrad front Military Council in 1942, and as First Secretary-elect of the party in 1953. All other references to the years of his "accomplishments" were obviously deleted. The seven-page discussion of the 20th Party Congress is particularly striking, in that Khrushchev, who played so crucial a role in this momentous event, is never mentioned at all!

The ex-First Secretary received much better treatment in a one-volume history of the Second World War which appeared in March 1965,[24] based on a larger six-volume work which came out between 1960 and 1964. In it, Khrushchev is mentioned eleven times and is even favored with a photograph. Whenever the outstanding leaders of the party are enumerated, he is invariably included, receiving credit for strategic decisions, for his role in organizing the partisan movement in the Ukraine, and for contributions to postwar reconstruction. Even the episode concerning his opposition to the Kharkov offensive in May 1942 is retained with only a minor variation.[25]

The relatively objective attitude with regard to Khrushchev's wartime activities—whatever the reason—is an exception to the rule. Far more characteristic is the treatment of Khrushchev's postwar career, for here current political issues and contemporary political figures are at stake. The safest course, then, is to refer to Khrushchev as infrequently as possible. The ironic result is that the period of Khrushchev's rise to the zenith of his career has become the period of his greatest obscurity. In contrast to commentary in purely political and journalistic writings, even his "mistakes" have been overlooked by Soviet historians. *The Handbook for Party Activists*, published in June 1965, had to take a position on his removal, and it did so briefly—with slightly veiled criticism of his "subjectivist policies which led to "mistakes in planning."[26]

A comparison of the three volumes of the *History of International Relations since the Second World War* published between 1962 and 1965[27] provides perhaps the clearest illustration of how quickly the Soviet leader has dropped out of historical sight. The first volume, which appeared in 1962, deals with the events of 1945-49 and mentions N. S. Khrushchev 24 times. Considering that in the immediate postwar years he had very little to do with foreign policy, one might say that the authors of the book did not neglect him. In the second volume, published a year later and covering the years 1950-55, there are 53 references to him, since he had by then assumed a more important role in foreign affairs. It is the last volume of this study which might surprise those who are unfamiliar with Soviet historiography. Published in September 1965, it describes the momentous events between 1956 and 1964, from Suez to Vietnam, but mentions the name of the powerful ruler of the Soviet Union only three times. (Henry Kissinger's name comes up twice as often.)

[24] *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovetskovo Soiuza*, Moscow, 1965.

[25] The story has three variants, the earliest from Khrushchev himself. In his secret speech to the 20th Party Congress, he said that as a member of the Military Council, he had asked General Vasilevski to persuade Stalin to stop the hopeless Kharkov offensive. When Vasilevski declined, Khrushchev called Moscow himself, but Stalin refused to speak to him. In the six-volume history of the war we get a slightly different version: there is no mention of Vasilevski. He reappears, however, in the one-volume version as the man who asks Khrushchev to telephone Stalin. Vasilevski, incidentally, was a consultant to the editors of the 1965 version.

[26] *Spravochnik KPSS*, Moscow, 1965, p. 318.

[27] *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, 3 vols., Moscow, 1962-65.

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The authors of this study refer to Khrushchev twice in connection with his visit to the United States, and they do mention his removal in October 1964. On the innumerable other occasions where his name should have been mentioned, however, the authors use the collective euphemism "Soviet government" or "Communist Party of the Soviet Union," or, at best, "the head of the Soviet government," even when referring to his talks with other heads of state who *are* named.

It is worth noting that the studies mentioned in this article to illustrate Khrushchev's treatment since 1964 (*History of USSR, Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Handbook of CPSU, History of International Relations Since the Second World War*) were all products of historians' collectives. It is here that one is likely to find new trends developing in the handling of politically sensitive matters. The historian in a collective enjoys a degree of safety partly because of the spread of responsibility and partly because the name of a well-known political figure is usually included among the editors.

The individual historian will probably soon be taking his cue from the collectives. However, too little time has passed since Khrushchev's ouster for a definitive approach to have developed. Consequently, in the works of individual authors Khrushchev's name appears even less often than in collective histories. The authors of the *Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (1965) explicitly credit Khrushchev with leading the partisan movement in the Ukraine as well as with achievements in postwar reconstruction. A. S. Kudlai, however, does not mention him at all in his 1965 article about the Ukraine in the years following the war.[28] P. T. Tronko and P. M. Ovcharenko also ignore the then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party in their discussion of the Kiev partisan movement in a recent volume entitled *Heroes of the Underground.*[29]

What may Khrushchev—demoted, disgraced, and living out his last years in almost total obscurity—expect from future Soviet historians? Will his final moments of both attainment and error, of glory and humiliation, ever be subjected to impartial scrutiny and judicious evaluation? Only time will tell. In the meantime, whatever the differences undergone by Soviet historiography since the days of Stalin, the maxim coined by the early Soviet historian Mikhail N. Pokrovski still holds sway: History in the USSR remains largely an exercise in "politics projected into the past."

* * *

POSTSCRIPT

As this article was about to go to press, a new book, *Ocherki istorii KPSS* (Essays on the History of the CPSU), was published in Moscow, in which Khrushchev's recent activities are subjected to a somewhat more objective and perhaps even more sympathetic treatment than heretofore. Designed as a textbook for party indoctrination schools, the new volume might best be compared to an earlier history, *Istoriia SSSR, 1917-1964* (History of the USSR), by I. B. Berkhin, which came out in February 1966. In the earlier volume, for instance, Khrushchev's speeches at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Congresses are referred to without any mention of their author. In the new volume, the author is no longer anonymous. Similarly, while the earlier textbook gives no credit to Khrushchev for the policies instituted by the new regime after Stalin's death, the new one acknowledges that "In September 1953, N. S. Khrushchev . . . actively fought to introduce into effect the [new] line. . ." Finally, Khrushchev's exit in October 1964 is described in the earlier book in a distinctly unfriendly fashion, while the new book refrains from any pejorative comments: "The Plenum granted N. S. Khrushchev's request to be released from his posts. . ."

Straw in the wind? It remains to be seen.

—The Editors

[28] A. S. Kudlai, "Bratskaia pomoshch narodov SSSR v vostanovlenii narodnovo khozaistva Ukrainy posle Velikoi Ostechestvennoi Voiny" (Brotherly help of the peoples of the USSR in the restoration of the Ukrainian economy after the Great Patriotic War), *Voprosy istorii*, No. 7, 1965, pp. 21-30.

[29] P. T. Tronko, P. M. Ovcharenko, "Soldaty kievskovo podpolia," *Geroi podpolia*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 366-408.

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A Marxist Heroine

J. P. NETTL: *Rosa Luxemburg*
London-New York-Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1966. 2 vols.

Reviewed by Abraham Ascher

THESE TWO VOLUMES are clearly a labor of love. Aside from reading widely in published sources, Mr. Nettl—lecturer in politics at the University of Leeds—sought out people who had information about Rosa Luxemburg, and he ransacked the archives in Warsaw, East Germany, Bonn, Amsterdam and Israel in the preparation of his study. It is hard to imagine that he missed anything of consequence relating to his heroine, who in her time, he believes, attracted more people to revolutionary Marxism than any other socialist leader. This is no doubt an exaggeration growing out of Nettl's strong emotional attachment to his subject—an understandable sentiment, yet one that seems to be the cause of the study's major weaknesses. For one thing, the work is too long and occasionally repetitious. Nettl had difficulty omitting the unessential; nor could he resist the temptation of correcting even inconsequential mistakes made by previous writers on Rosa Luxemburg. For example, he supplies a long footnote on a misdating of her arrest in 1916, although the error is of no particular importance. A thoughtful and imaginative writer with a strong analytical bent, Nettl raises many interesting problems, but unfortunately not all of them are quite relevant to his main subject, as he himself virtually acknowledges on one occasion.

Nevertheless, Mr. Nettl's work is extremely impressive and by far the most thorough and penetrating biography of Luxemburg. His task was far from easy. Rosa Luxemburg not only was a leader of German social democracy for over two decades and one of the founders of the German Communist Party, but she also participated in establishing Polish social democracy and wrote extensively on the Russian movement. Moreover, she was a subtle theoretician and frequently engaged in polemics with the major figures of European socialism. From 1898, when she moved to Germany, until she was murdered in 1919, Luxemburg maintained a lively interest in all these activities. Nettl has faithfully recorded her contributions, always taking care to place them within the broadest possible historical setting.

Through extensive use of Luxemburg's correspondence, the author has also been able to provide a detailed description of her private life and personality. She emerges as a cultivated person with far-ranging tastes in art, literature and the sciences. She was also passionate, strong-willed and, above all, courageous and independent. In 1907, when she felt betrayed by Leo Jogiches, to whom she had been romantically attached for many years, she broke off their personal relations —without, however, ending her political collaboration with him. In 1898, when she was only 27 years old, she did not hesitate to engage in polemics against Eduard Bernstein, already a highly respected figure in German social democracy, and in 1904 she wrote one of the earliest and most incisive critiques of Lenin's organizational views.

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After 1910, when her aim was to radicalize the German social democratic movement, she waged war against the leading theorist of European Marxism, Karl Kautsky. By now she was quite isolated in the movement, but this did not deter her from standing her ground. Nor did she flinch from opposing the party for its support of Germany's war effort after 1914, even though this brought on her not only the disapprobation of her colleagues but also imprisonment, often under very severe conditions.

Much as Nettl admires Luxemburg's views and courage, he does not neglect to point out that personal factors were often a consideration in her political stances. She was fiercely ambitious, and—as Nettl shows on the basis of an astute analysis of her private letters—she entered the lists against Bernstein largely in order to gain a reputation. "She was out to make a career for herself," he writes, "and almost everything she said or did was tailored to this end. The fact that she was a revolutionary, that she instinctively rejected Bernstein's thesis, was a secondary consideration." But Nettl is quick to stress that "this emphasis on the plain self-interest of her actions does not sully her motives." For she was not "interested in power for its own sake." A recurring theme of this study is that her primary concern was not power, but influence. More than anything else, she wanted to spread "those ideas which she held to be correct and important."

Through the years the name Rosa Luxemburg has come to be identified with opposition to nationalism and revisionism, an original analysis of imperialism, and a "sympathetic critique" of Bolshevism in power. But her most significant contribution, as Nettl rightly emphasizes, was her doctrine of participation by the masses in the struggle for socialism. To be sure, she was not a systematic political theorist in the orthodox sense; she was, rather, a strategist and tactician who gave her proposals a theoretical underpinning which she believed would incorporate them into the Marxist creed. After 1905, however, she discussed her idea of "mass action" in such detail and from so many different practical and theoretical angles that Nettl is justified in treating it as a distinct political doctrine and as the very essence of "Luxemburgism."

LUXEMBURG WAS PROMPTED to develop her ideas about mass action largely by her observation of the revolutionary turmoil in Warsaw late in 1905 and in 1906, especially the general strike of October 1905. After her return to Germany, she set herself the task of convincing her Western comrades that the mass strike—as exemplified by the events in Russia—was the most efficacious and highest form of revolutionary struggle against capitalism. The doctrine which emerged from her writings was bold, complicated, and subtle. She did not have in mind a single action designed primarily to procure better economic conditions. She expected the mass strike to embrace a whole series of mass actions, including, in her words,

. . . political and economic strikes, united and partial strikes, defensive strikes and combat strikes, general strikes of individual sections of industry and general strikes in entire cities, peaceful wage strikes and street battles, uprisings with barricades—all [of which] run together and run alongside each other, get in each other's way, overlap each other; a perpetually moving and changing sea of phenomena.

Reviewers in This Issue

ABRAHAM ASCHER—Associate Professor of History at Brooklyn College, New York.

ANTHONY SYLVESTER—Well known writer on Soviet and East European affairs; contributor to *East Europe* (New York) and other journals.

JERRY HOUGH—Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois (Urbana).

LEON HERMAN—American specialist on Soviet economic affairs and frequent contributor to this journal.

MORTON SCHWARTZ—Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California (Riverside).

GEOFFREY WHEELER—Director of Central Asian Research Centre, London, and author of *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (London, The Bodley Head, 1966).

MICHAEL RYWKIN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the College of the City of New York.

THOMAS WEISS—Pseudonym of a student of Soviet literature who recently defected from East Germany.

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Only objective conditions would produce such an outburst of activity; the leaders could never determine its timing artificially. Nor was the mass strike to be confined to a short period of time. It would be the proletariat's most potent weapon during the revolutionary era, lasting perhaps years or even decades. The salient point in her doctrine was its emphasis on the political initiative of the masses, in whose judgment she had profound faith, rather than on the socialist leadership or the party organization. Once set in motion, mass action would, in her view, have the effect of drawing more people into the struggle, ultimately creating an active oppositional movement embracing the vast majority of the people.

This tactic contrasted sharply with Kautsky's *Ermattungsstrategie* (strategy of attrition) which had become the guideline for the German movement. While Kautsky was willing to tolerate street demonstrations, he did not want to see them intensified to the point where a "head-on clash with society" would take place. Placing his trust in the electoral process, Kautsky confidently expected the Socialists to win at the polls, and then, with the Reichstag safely under their control, to stage a peaceful revolution. Once the issue had been joined between the two protagonists, Luxemburg became the most notable spokesman of the German Left.

Given her preoccupation with mass participation, it is not surprising that Luxemburg's attitude towards the Bolshevik regime was far from wholly approving. Despite her disillusionment with German social democracy and her yearning for proletarian action against the war and capitalism, she was "far more afraid of a deformed revolution than an unsuccessful one." While in prison in the summer of 1918, she set down her doubts in a pamphlet which her friend and colleague, Paul Levi, persuaded her not to publish on the ground that it could be misused by her enemies. The consistency of her assessment with her fundamental commitment is noteworthy:

. . . Freedom of the press, the rights of association and assembly all have been outlawed for all opponents of the Soviet regime . . . on the other hand, it is a well-known and indisputable fact that without a free and untrammeled press, without the unlimited right of association and assembly, the rule of the broad mass of the people is entirely unthinkable.

When the pamphlet was published posthumously, it gave rise to considerable polemics. The Communists denounced its "errors," and the Socialists hailed it as a remarkably incisive indictment of the Bolshevik regime. In his judicious comments on the pamphlet, Nettl may be right in warning against those who want to use it as a weapon against communism. For Luxemburg had not intended primarily to assess the Russian revolution, but to develop a general critique of the very notion of socialist revolution. Moreover, it was her conviction that the impending revolution in the West would make terror unnecessary in Russia. Still, it may be legitimate to speculate, on the basis of the pamphlet, that German "communism" would have been substantially different from the Russian form had Luxemburg's life not ended so prematurely.

IN ADDITION TO presenting a vivid portrait of Luxemburg, Nettl offers interesting interpretations of various aspects of Polish and German socialism. His frequent judgments about the views and personal traits of leading Socialists add considerable color to his account, and his comparisons between the positions of Luxemburg and those of her comrades raise his heroine's work into sharp relief. Nettl's study is so well-researched that it may seem churlish to question him on a detail, but his suggestion that Plekhanov was strongly anti-Semitic is too serious to be ignored. Nettl cites no evidence to support his charge, and from what we know about Plekhanov, it seems highly unlikely that the accusation can be substantiated. His wife was Jewish, as were some of his most intimate collaborators.

In sum, Mr. Nettl's work is a valuable addition to the growing list of studies on Marxism. If he has identified too much with his heroine, if he has been too ready to accept as relevant for our own day the somewhat mystical belief of Rosa Luxemburg in the "creative force of mass action," he has abundantly demonstrated that she was one of the nobler, more admirable and important leaders of European Marxism in the 20th century.

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Yugoslavia in Transition

DAVID TORNQUIST: *Look East, Look West; The Socialist Adventure in Yugoslavia.* New York, MacMillan Co.; London, Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1966.

Reviewed by Anthony Sylvester

THIS BOOK PROVIDES good background reading on the conflict and tensions in Yugoslavia between reformers and liberally-minded Communists on the one hand and diehard dogmatists and power-hungry bureaucrats on the other. The conflict, which has now led to a major shakeup in Belgrade, is not an isolated phenomenon. It has occurred all over the Communist world, and some of Mr. Tornquist's observations might apply to any Communist country, at any time since the Russian Revolution.

To a small extent, but certainly to a larger degree than any other Communist country, Yugoslavia is ruled by the consent of the governed. Yet, as Mr. Tornquist points out: ". . . the party is not the people," and it is precisely the power, organization and methods of the Yugoslav League of Communists that have blurred and frustrated the Yugoslav vision of democracy. He does try, however, to see the good, wherever possible, in the Yugoslav experiment in industrial democracy.

The author bases his observations on his two year sojourn in Yugoslavia where he worked as a translator, learned Serbo-Croatian, and adopted as nearly as possible a Yugoslav standard of living. He attended meetings of workers' councils, housing committees, pre-election meetings, battled to secure a flat for himself and his wife, and got to know first hand the underhanded methods of people in authority and all the little pressures and intrigues that go with everyday life in a Communist country.

The most illuminating chapters of the book deal with the system of workers' self-management. In describing the workers' administration of a publishing house, a hospital and a drug factory, among others, Tornquist makes the point that Yugoslav industrial democracy works only under strictly circumscribed conditions. For example, a director can and often does manipulate the workers' authority and get his own way, provided he works hand in glove with the party organization in the enterprise. But he must be "a politician on all sides." In addition, there are strict legal provisions regulating the distribution of profits and the fixing of employees' incomes. During the author's stay, one director actually was appointed by the local authorities, a procedure which has since been changed, formally at any rate, to permit the workers' councils of each enterprise to appoint its director. In practice, however, the local authorities no doubt continue to play a large role in the nominating process.

Workers' councils do exercise real power in labor relations. No employee can be discharged without the approval of the council, for example. In this connection, Tornquist notes that a kind of workingmen's solidarity often develops when layoffs are threatened. Workers' councils as a rule tend to oppose layoffs even when these may be necessary for economic reasons. Indeed, one of the crucial problems of the Yugoslav economy today, and a reason for Yugoslavia's persistent inability to pay her way in the world, is precisely the excessive number of uneconomic enterprises which employ more workers than they need.

The case of the Galenika drug factory provides a

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striking illustration of the problem. According to the author, economic experts recommended that some 200 workers in the factory be laid off. After considerable argument 85 were given notices, and it was clear that political considerations played an important part in the final decision as to who would stay and who would go.

Mr. Tornquist expresses some doubts about the economic advantages of democratic self-management by workers' councils and managing boards in Yugoslavia. Yet he maintains that the system "allows a man to get more than money out of his job. It offers him . . . a chance to move out of his atomic existence as a worker. It allows him to begin to comprehend the important workings of the society he lives in." One cannot help wondering, however, whether Yugoslavia can afford, under present conditions of international competition, the luxury of relegating economic efficiency to second place. Indeed, the entire recent emphasis of the economic reforms has been on the need to increase industrial efficiency.

The author's chapter on agriculture is something of a disappointment, for in this area he has taken much of the Yugoslav official line at face value. Although he notices that expensive foreign machinery is often used at a fraction of its capacity, and that the socialist agricultural enterprise in Yugoslavia (as indeed elsewhere in the Communist world) is heavily subsidized by the state and often does not justify the capital outlay, he presents an idealized picture of the agricultural "cooperatives." The "cooperatives" did function well in the late 1950's. But by the time the author was in Yugoslavia, in 1963 and 1964, farmers were greatly overworked, and as one Yugoslav journalist reported last July, "they are paid disgracefully low prices for their products." Another Yugoslav newspaper charged that the "cooperatives" were setting themselves up as "big capitalist enterprises," exploiting both the farmer and the consumer. Only some 12 percent of the land in Yugoslavia is in the socialist sector. The rest is farmed by peasants who in effect constitute about 50 percent of the Yugoslav population. The latest changes have been beneficial to the farmers, but many influential members of the League of Communists continue to regard the peasants as "class enemies" who must be treated accordingly, despite their numerical importance in Yugoslav society.

The author is at his best when he recounts his experiences and personal impressions. His style is vivid and his anecdotes often amusing. When he is obliged to draw on material provided by the authorities, however, he makes a number of sweeping generalizations about such subjects as "Germanized Slovenians" and "Moslem Macedonians" which betray his lack of thoroughness. He also apparently accepts the thesis that all patriotic Yugoslavs were on the side of the Partisans in the last war. The truth is that the loyalties of the Yugoslavs were sharply divided during this period. The Communists did win the civil war, defeat the invaders and unite the nation. But unity was often only a façade behind which many old ideas and feelings remain alive to this day, despite the monolithic appearance of the party.

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Reviews in Brief

Politics, Old and New

DEREK J. R. SCOTT: *Russian Political Institutions* (3rd edition). New York, F. A. Praeger, 1966.

DEREK SCOTT'S study, originally published seven years ago, has been known to specialists on the Soviet Union as a relatively short but solid survey of Soviet institutions. Although the book never really fulfilled the author's express intention of conveying a sense of "what it feels like to be another person in other circumstances" —it devoted too little attention to the processes of government and the position of the individual in the system— it did fulfill the promise of its title in providing a quite useful and reliable description of the formal party and governmental institutions.

Russian Political Institutions has now been published in a third edition, but unfortunately this edition is not nearly as satisfactory as the earlier ones. Perhaps the basic problem is that the seven years between the writing of the first and third editions saw greater changes in the Soviet Union than in the book. According to the jacket of the new edition, "Derek Scott has completely revised his original text, interpreting the impact of the Khrushchev era and the developments since Khrushchev's fall," but this claim only creates expectations which are not met.

The third edition was completed too soon after Khrushchev's fall to permit substantial analysis of the post-Khrushchev period, but the reader is justifiably disappointed to find that there is not even a systematic effort to assess the meaning of the Khrushchev era itself. If one compares the first and third editions, one finds page after page which are completely identical or nearly identical. Even in the concluding discussion of such general topics as the budgetary process, low-level decision-making, and the techniques used to secure performance, there are only two places in the last thirteen pages of the book where as much as a single word has been changed. One of these changes involved the addition of a phrase stating that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is now called the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order, the other the addition of two sentences indicating that certain economic offenders may now be executed.

To be sure, the descriptive sections of the book have undergone more changes than the analytical sections, for many of the statistics have been updated and institutional changes have been noted. In the two chapters on the soviets and the conventional state machinery, this has been done very thoroughly and accurately. The chapter on the party is also quite reliable, although it is regrettable that the author did not choose to incorporate the information we have learned in the last decade about the central party secretariat. It is difficult to understand why five pages are devoted to describing elections to the soviets, two pages to the commissions of the soviets, and then only sixteen lines to the organization of the Central Committee secretariat since 1948.

The chapter on "the web of management" is the most unsatisfactory. The statistics in this chapter have not been updated, and institutional changes (particularly in the legal and agricultural realms) are not adequately described. Here, for example, mention is made of the change in the name of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and functions are ascribed to the Ministry which are really performed by the Committee for State Security (KGB).

Russian Political Institutions remains a useful reference work on the soviets and the central governmental structure, but the undergraduate to whom this book is directed would be better advised to seek a more comparative book along the lines of those written by Alfred Meyer or Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington.

Jerry F. Hough

E. PREOBRAZHENSKY: *The New Economics*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965.

AT THE TIME of the original publication of this book in 1926, the author, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, shared honors with N. Bukharin as the leading Marxist scholar in the field of economics. He was thus a highly qualified contender for the right to enter the arena of national policy-making in the turbulent period following the October Revolution in Russia. This new translation of his work offers a clear presentation of the ideas which Preobrazhensky hoped to have accepted as a framework appropriate to the economic needs and ambitions of the new ruling elite. The work also portrays the intellectual excitement of a compulsively experimental decade in Soviet economic theory and practice.

Preobrazhensky's statement of economic principles and policy recommendations does not, however, ring with the self-confidence that one might have expected from an articulate member of the "inner circle." On the contrary, the tone is for the most part shrill and polemical, and it is clear that by this time the author had already been forced into a defensive position by his more

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politically agile Marxist colleagues. His argument reflects the fact that by 1926 the party leadership was already split into "right" and "left" deviations. Preobrazhensky was the principal economic spokesman for the "left."

In two of the three long chapters that make up the main body of the book, the author devotes himself to the development of two ideas which he considers to be fundamental to a "correct analysis" (and, by implication, to a correct policy) of how the Soviet economy should be guided during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The first of these ideas, formulated by the author as the "law of primitive socialist accumulation," aroused a violent reaction on the part of his critics in the party press. In his view, this economic "law" required that the "half-socialist" economy of Russia, established by Lenin as a result of the NEP compromise, be prevented from being in time "devoured" by capitalism by the undertaking of a forced expansion of the socialist half of the economy, namely the state industrial sector. Such rapid expansion could only be achieved at the expense of peasant agriculture—*i.e.*, by means of a systematic accumulation of a large volume of savings in the hands of the Soviet government, and by the transfer of the saved resources from agriculture to industry in the form of new capital funds for use in the rapid buildup of plant and equipment.

To support his argument, Preobrazhensky demonstrated, with the aid of many long quotations from Marx, that the capital funds which helped to build up industry historically in the West were acquired through a long process of accumulation which extended over the entire early, primitive phase of capitalism. With total obliviousness to the fine moral irony that mocked his argument, he reasoned that this was precisely the way in which the process of accumulation had to be organized during the early phase of socialism.

The second leading idea developed at length by Preobrazhensky related to the "law of value" (*i.e.*, the imperatives of cost, profit, and price). He argued that this law, which rules the entire production and exchange process under capitalism, must begin to atrophy during the period of transition to socialism. He saw this process of "liberation" from the dictates of the law of value as spreading outward from the state sector of the economy, where, he reported approvingly, "money is dying out in its role as one of the instruments for achieving spontaneous equilibrium in production."

It is a fair guess that modern readers will be more interested in the practical policy issues that were being hotly disputed within the ruling elite than in Preobrazhensky's own prodigious skill in applying the Marxian catechism of political economy to Russian economic conditions during the 1920's. These readers may find it profitable to concentrate on the materials in the Appendix, where the author addressed himself to the issues of practical politics raised by his opponents. Here there are a series of vigorous statements of his basic position on the hard choices confronting the new Soviet regime in the economic realm, qualified by some second thoughts regarding the incautious terminology he had used on occasion in presenting his case for the "subordination of the pre-socialist economic forms to the socialist forms."

Leon Herman

DESMOND DONNELLY: *Struggle for the World—The Cold War: 1917-1965.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965.

DESMOND DONNELLY, a Labor Member of the British Parliament, is a staunch friend of the United States, and a supporter of its policy in world affairs. "In this age of 'Cops versus Robbers,'" he writes, "who is the hero? History's answer will be: the American people."

For an American reviewer, therefore, it is hardly pleasant to report that Mr. Donnelly's book is highly disappointing. Whether judged in terms of style, presentation or analysis, *Struggle for the World* must be rated as a rather shocking failure. Mr. Donnelly's attitude towards historic personages is a case in point: Lenin was "decidely homely, if not ugly. . . . His broad face and thickish lips and unkempt beard gave him the appearance of a bulldog. . . . There was also the man's wide forehead, showing that he ought to be a thinker." Woodrow Wilson was a man who "liked to patronize little people." And more. Or take the author's evaluation of the 1917 Revolution in Russia. "Perhaps the most apt comment," he writes, "was made by Philip Jordan, the Negro butler of David R. Francis, the American Ambassador. Writing home, he stated: 'On last Tuesday [he meant Wednesday] the Bolsheviks got the city in their hands and I want to tell you that it was something awful'!" Can Mr. Donnelly possibly be serious?

Despite its title, the book is not a history of Soviet-Western relations since 1917. It is, at best, a personalized commentary on people and events, particularly since World War II. (The period 1917-38 is cursorily dealt with in 49 pages.) The commentary, furthermore, tends to be exotic, playing up scandalous interpretations wherever possible. For example, the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) between Weimar Germany and Lenin's Russia is ominously referred to as "the first warning shot that could signify the opening of the Second World War." We are also informed that Stalin had "decided . . . to make common cause with Hitler" as early as 1936. (The Nazi-Soviet Pact itself is crudely labeled "Idiot's Delight.")

Mr. Donnelly's best chapters are devoted to the 1947-52 period, but only because in dealing with it he largely steers clear of analysis and interpretation, contenting himself with a detailed factual accounting of events. Wherever he does go beyond the facts, Mr. Donnelly yields to the unfortunate penchant for "fundamental" explanations. Thus his explanation of "the puzzling and indeed extraordinary" Soviet absence from the Security Council in June and July 1950 (which forestalled a possible veto of United Nations' action in Korea) "is simpler than many realize—it lies in the basic incompetence that stemmed from the overcentralization of major decisions in the Soviet Union, an inevitable consequence of the authoritarian regime." Simpler perhaps—but hardly more plausible than the fact that Stalin probably discounted the importance of the United Nations as a defender of the Republic of Korea, since, as Prof. Marshall Shulman has pointed out elsewhere, the organization "as a military power was as yet untried; nor were there any effective military preparations then in sight."

More examples could be cited, but as an American it might perhaps be best for this reviewer to rest his case right here.

Morton Schwartz

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The Muslim East

MAXIME RODINSON: *Islam et Capitalisme.* Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1966.

AS MIGHT BE expected from Professor Rodinson, this is a work of great erudition. It deals with problems related to economic practice in the Muslim world, in particular examining to what extent, if at all, the capitalist system as practiced in Muslim countries has been induced or impeded by the ideology of Islam.

The author is described by his publisher as a "militant progressivist and anticolonialist" and as a "specialist with the views of a Marxist sociologist." His declared purpose is to help "the intellectuals of those countries coming within the orbit of the Muslim religion and civilization . . . to understand their destiny." Whether or not his Muslim readers will accept this help in the spirit in which it is offered, there can be no doubt that the book contains a great deal of original and stimulating thought on a subject about which there has been much misunderstanding.

Outlining the economic doctrine set forth in the Qur'an and the Sunna, the author concludes that it neither condemns in principle nor interferes with the practice of what is now known as the capitalist sector of a country's economy. He next compares Islamic economic prescriptions with those of Christianity and expresses the opinion that Islam has no more inhibited the development of capitalism on modern lines than Christianity has promoted it.

The longest and perhaps the most important chapter deals with present-day capitalism in Muslim countries. Here the author's conclusion is that the Muslim East has modeled its capitalism on the West. If it has failed to reach Western standards, this is not attributable in any way to Islam. Reluctance to invest money in industry, for example, is not due to Islamic injunctions on the subject but to the unsettled conditions prevailing in Muslim countries—a product, in Rodinson's view, of the pressure of European colonialism.

Having rejected the notion that Islamic doctrine precludes capitalism, he naturally proceeds to consider whether it is conducive to socialism. He maintains that in spite of Islamic precepts enjoining compassion towards suffering, "these precepts have so far served more often to justify societies based on privilege." He therefore sees no reason to suppose that they will play any part in leading the way either to socialism or to étatism.

Somewhat surprisingly Professor Rodinson makes no mention of the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union where, it is claimed, Marxist socialism has been preferred to capitalism. If it is true that the Western capitalist system was imposed on the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia by colonialist Europe, it is surely also true that socialism was imposed on the Muslim colonies of the Tsarist empire by the Soviet regime. Professor Rodinson's cautious references to "the Soviet experiment" and his conclusion that Lutskiy, the well-known Soviet writer on Middle East economics, is no true Marxist suggest that he might agree with this proposition.

Whether or not one accepts the arguments advanced and the conclusions reached, this is a remarkable book and a notable contribution to the study of economic practice and possibilities in the Muslim East.

Geoffrey Wheeler

Soviet Nationalities

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, US LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: *The Soviet Empire. A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power.* Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

THIS STUDY LEAVES the reader with highly mixed feelings. On the one hand, its 200 tightly packed pages are obviously the product of an assiduous effort of compilation and documentation, providing a large variety of source materials bearing on the nationalities problem in the USSR, supplemented by statistical tables and maps. On the other hand, except in the short chapter on "Economic Retardation," the material is presented in a most undiscriminating fashion. No attempt is made to distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources, and a variety of genuine and less genuine experts are quoted in and out of context. The end result is a smorgasbord of extremely uneven quality.

The study also suffers at times from a regrettable lack of objectivity. There are certainly more than enough valid criticisms to be made of Soviet nationality policy, but there are some crimes which were *not* committed by Moscow, and not every single Soviet move has a hidden nefarious meaning. Is there anything unusual, for example, about the fact that "Russians hold a commanding position within the RSFSR" (p. 13)? Or, whatever the bad features of kolkhoz life, can one say without exaggeration that "the Soviet peasant remains a collectivized serf" (p. 66)? Again, granted that there are elements of colonialism in Moscow's relationship with the nationalities of Central Asia, can it simply be assumed that "politically the Soviets have created a strictly colonial relationship with clearly racial overtones" (p. 144)? Or can one properly define the economic relations between Russia and the non-Russian republics as "imperial-colonial . . . reminiscent of the European experience during the age of exploitation and empire building" (p. 163)?

We are told that students from the provinces are admitted to Moscow institutions of higher learning on the basis of some regional or Union Republican quotas (p. 137). Doesn't much the same thing apply to the Ivy League schools in the United States? What is wrong in the fact that most Soviet universities are located in Russia (p. 139)? Where else would one expect them to be located? What is so unusual if Russians, who account for 54.9% of the total population of the USSR, constitute 58% of the professionals? Is it really surprising that almost four times as many books per capita are published in Russian as in Kazakh (p. 125)? Since when are the Kazakhs such voracious readers? It sounds impressive to say that "in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, the Russian influx has reduced native Lithuanians to a minority" (p. 158), but how many centuries ago was it that Lithuanians last constituted a majority in Vilnius? Are Uzbeks really suffering "total discrimination in art" (p. 135)?

Prerevolutionary conditions are treated with scarcely any greater sophistication. The Ukraine is said to have been "an ordinary colony of the Russian Empire" (p. 130), which is at least controversial; and Russian expansion from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean

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is equated with the overseas expansion of the European colonialist powers rather than with the expansion of the United States from the Appalachians westward (pp. 5-6).

Some situations are not so much factually misrepresented as they are simply misunderstood. The retrogression of the Karelo-Finnish SSR to the status of an autonomous republic within the RSFSR (p. 166) is mistakenly attributed to something other than foreign policy considerations; the creation of the Central Asian Bureau is explained in terms of an "unceremonious lumping together of the historic national communities" (p. 103), ignoring not only the common cultural, religious and linguistic heritage of the peoples of Turkestan, but even the fact of Turkestan's prerevolutionary as well as postrevolutionary existence as an administrative unit.

It is unfortunate that the authors of this study, having compiled a considerable amount of valid, useful and interesting material, did not see fit to weed out sources that were either obviously biased or emotionally motivated —or at least accompany such questionable information with some evaluative comment.

Michael Rywkin

Soviet Literature

HELEN VON SSACHNO: *Der Aufstand der Person, Sowjetliteratur der Gegenwart* (The Rebellion of the Individual, Contemporary Soviet Literature). Berlin, Argon Verlag, 1965.

HELEN VON SSACHNO'S book is an attempt to interpret the overall trend of post-Stalin Soviet literature in order to show the connections between "literature, cultural policy, and the spiritual history of the [Russian] nation." While this theme has a sweeping sound to it, the book is a scholarly, documented volume which carefully avoids meaningless generalizations.

Miss Ssachno achieves her aim by using a selective approach based on her Dostoievskian view of the essence of literature. She maintains that the "vision of Russian literature" has always been a search for the absolute, for the eternal human ideas of truth and justice. She looks for signs of this fundamental outlook since the end of the 19th century, though her book concentrates mainly upon the 1954-64 period of Soviet literature.

In tracing the trend, she finds that in prerevolutionary Russian literature it manifested itself in the expectation of the coming storm. The literature of the early 1920's retained the apocalyptic vision but added to it a sense of metaphysical tragedy and doubts. If anything from the 1920's is still readable, it is the literature of this bent. Without it, she says, we would have "no short stories on the Civil War, no Soviet novel nor Soviet satire, since the naive edifices of the so-called proletarian school of an Ostrovsky, Panfyorov, Serafimovich, Furmanov or Artyom Vesyoly have today, as they did in their own times, only a documentary value" (p. 38). The Stalinist period, which she dates from 1929, gradually killed off not only the vision, but also the writers of that vision. Literature was degraded to political propaganda. The trend, interrupted briefly by the war, continued until Stalin's death.

The essence of the thaw period, as Miss Ssachno sees it, consists of a return to the original vision, even though with modification. If the prerevolutionary vision consisted of an expectation of the "rebellion of the masses," then the present trend puts the emphasis upon the "rebellion of the individual." (Her book's title, by the way, is taken from a quote from Boris Pilniak's *The Naked Year*, p. 22.) The Pomerantsev and Ehrenburg articles of 1954 on "sincerity in literature" focused attention on exactly this question—the responsibility and freedom of the individual.

Miss Ssachno divides the "thaw" literature into two basically different categories: sociological, anti-Stalin protest-literature (prototype, Ehrenburg's *Thaw*) and non-polemical humanistic literature (prototype, Vera Panova's *Seasons of the Year*). Though both trends work in the same direction, aiming at the erosion of the *ersatz* values of Socialist Realism, it is only the second trend which, in Miss Ssachno's opinion, will in future decades be remembered as literature. Both trends have a twofold aim: to achieve the spiritual emancipation of the intelligentsia, as the conscience of the nation, and to give a fair account of the Stalinist past and post-Stalin present of the nation.

The party—which only partially approves of the "thaw" literature—wishes to retain control over it by using pressure, compromise, and whatever other means it has left. However, with Stalinist terror gone and at least under present conditions unlikely to return, Miss Ssachno envisages a losing battle for the party: the new values created by contemporary Soviet literature will increasingly influence and change the moral outlook of the nation.

Miss Ssachno's book is written in stylistically excellent and highly sophisticated German. Her style should also be mentioned for another reason. To designate milestones or phases of Soviet literary policy, she frequently uses a vocabulary which was coined in Germany during or after the Nazi era (for example, the term *"Gleichschaltung"*—most closely translated as "bringing into line"—with reference to the Stalinist policy of the late 1920's). It is interesting that the similarity in the political approach to literature in totalitarian states produced a vocabulary which can be used interchangeably to describe comparable phenomena; yet to translate such terms into the language of countries which have not gone through the totalitarian experience is often extremely difficult.

For those students of Russian literature who can read the German language, Miss Ssachno's book should be considered essential reading.

Thomas Weiss

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NOTES & VIEWS

Peking and the Indian CP

By Hemen Ray

When the Communists seized power in China, they believed that their victory established the pattern for further anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolutions throughout Asia and the rest of the underdeveloped world. Only two weeks after the birth of the new regime on October 1, 1949, they already were showing interest in India. In a message to B. T. Ranadive, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Mao Tse-tung promised Chinese Communist aid to the CPI in order "to free" India from the "yoke of imperialism and its collaborators." [1] In early 1950 the Cominform called upon the Indian Communists to follow the Chinese path with the aim of establishing a "people's democracy" in India.[2]

Some elements within the CPI were in fact already interested in the Chinese Communist revolution before its final triumph. In mid-1949 the left-wing Andhra Communists were advocating adoption of the Chinese revolutionary model in order to capture power in India. In December 1953, however, the CPI officially rejected the applicability of the Maoist strategy of revolution to India. This change in the party's attitude was the direct result of Soviet opposition to Mao's claim that the Chinese revolution should be recognized as the "prototype" for future revolutions in underdeveloped areas. Soviet pressure, however, failed to eradicate Chinese influence.

Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin caused new ferment in CPI ranks and led the party to look again to the Chinese Communists for guidance. Ajoy Ghosh, who had become CPI General Secretary in 1951, urged members of the party to study the CCP's statement "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" as the "most elaborate" and "satisfactory statement" regarding Stalin's role and as a "guide" for resolving the troubles and doubts caused by Khrushchev's action.[3] Throughout the period 1956-58, the CPI was under pressure from both Moscow and Peking. On the one hand, it deferred to Soviet advice in giving support to Nehru's foreign policy, while on the other hand it continued to take a friendly attitude toward Communist China.

In the spring of 1959, the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations caused by Communist China's armed suppression of the Tibetan re-

[1] *Communist* (Bombay), Vol. III, No. 1, January 1950, p. 110.

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[2] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), Jan. 27, 1950, p. 1.

[3] V. B. Karnik, ed., *Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956*, The Democratic Research Service, Bombay, 1957.

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volt created new difficulties for the CPI. In spite of Indian sympathies for the Tibetans, the party at first adopted a line supporting the Chinese action and echoing Peking's charges that "the commanding center of the rebellion" was in the northern Indian town of Kalimpong, where the Dalai Lama had taken refuge after fleeing Tibet. Secretary Ghosh criticized statements made by Prime Minister Nehru on the Tibetan situation as "heavily biased in favor of the rebels" and denied that "all the blame lies with the Chinese." [4]

In August of 1959, when Nehru revealed that Chinese forces had occupied some 15,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), the CPI again tried to minimize the affair. However, an official note from Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai to Nehru on September 8 repudiated the entire Sino-Indian border and laid claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.[5] This rendered the CPI's position even more awkward, and immediately thereafter Ghosh left for Moscow to seek Soviet advice. While he was there, an official statement released by TASS announced a neutral Soviet position in the Sino-Indian conflict. The statement deplored the armed clashes which had taken place along the Sino-Indian border and urged both sides to seek a settlement.[6]

In these circumstances, serious dissension arose when the CPI's Central Executive Committee met at Calcutta in late September to discuss the party's stand on the border dispute with China. Encouraged by the Soviet statement of neutrality, right-wing Politburo member S. A. Dange criticized Chinese actions towards India and demanded that the CPI declare its support of Nehru's stand on the border issue, including recognition of the McMahon Line as the frontier between India and China. Leaders of the left-wing factions, on the other hand, charged that such action would be a violation of the party's proletarian-internationalist obligations. Ghosh, who was still in Moscow, hurriedly returned to India in order to mediate between the opposing factions. At his urging, the Central Executive Committee finally adopted a compromise resolution criticizing the conduct of both India and China in the border conflict.[7]

Soon afterward Ghosh left for Peking to participate in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, hoping at the same time to persuade the Chinese leaders to change their policy towards India. The visit, however, proved to be a personal disaster for Ghosh. A day after his return from Peking, Chinese troops massacred nine members of an Indian border patrol in Ladakh. Right-wing CPI leader Dange immediately condemned the Chinese action and declared his support of the Nehru government's policy towards China. A few days later, the Central Secretariat of the CPI issued a somewhat milder statement which nevertheless criticized the Chinese action as "unjustified" and joined in "the feelings of deep resentment and indignation of the Indian people" over the "heavy loss of life." [8] Meanwhile, in a report to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, Khrushchev expressed deep regret over the Ladakh incident and appealed for friendly negotiations to settle the conflict "to the mutual satisfaction of both sides." [9] Later he described the dispute as a "sad and stupid story." [10]

Encouraged by Khrushchev's statements, the right-wing CPI leaders intensified their pressure on the centrists to amend the Calcutta resolution and denounce the Chinese action in Ladakh. When the party's National Council met at Meerut in November, Dange renewed his demand that the CPI should support the McMahon Line as the rightful border between India and China, while the pro-Chinese group again opposed the proposal. After week-long discussions, the Council finally produced another resolution seeking to reconcile the opposing groups.[11]

For a while thereafter, the CPI gave the impression of being in a state of suspended animation. Then, at the Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in June 1960, Khrushchev himself raised anew the subject of the Sino-Indian border dispute. On the one hand, he chided the Chinese for "stabbing the Communist movement in the Afro-Asian world in the back for a few hundred square miles of Indian territory," and on the other hand he urged the Indian Communist delegates to "go home and convince your countrymen of the just nature of the Chinese action." [12]

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[4] *The Statesman* (New Delhi), May 11, 1959.

[5] *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Govrenments of India and China, September-November 1959*, Government of India White Paper No. 2.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 10, 1959. The Soviet statement was issued in spite of last-minute Chinese diplomatic efforts to dissuade Moscow from releasing it and was regarded by the Chinese as a Soviet betrayal of the CCP. (See *New China News Agency Supplement No. 45*, Nov. 2, 1963.

[7] *New Age* (Weekly: Delhi), Oct. 4, 1959, p. 2.

[8] *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1959, p. 1.

[9] *Pravda*, Nov. 1, 1959. Prior to the Supreme Soviet session, Khrushchev had visited Peking to attend the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. During his stay, the Chinese leaders gave him an explanation of "the true situation" in Ladakh, maintaining that the armed clash there had been provoked by India and that it would be a mistake to yield to the "Indian reactionaries." According to the Chinese, however, Khrushchev still insisted that the Chinese armed action was wrong. (See *NCNA Supplement No. 45*, cited above.)

[10] *New Age* (Weekly), Nov. 15, 1959.

[11] *Ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1959, p. 7.

[12] *Link* (New Delhi), Oct. 16, 1960. According to the Chinese, Khrushchev also told the Chinese delegates at Bucharest: "I know what war is. Since Indians were killed, this means that China attacked India. We are Communists; for us it is not important where the frontier runs." (See *NCNA Supplement No. 45*, cited above.)

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In the face of Khrushchev's exhortation, the CPI could not remain silent. The party's National Council, meeting in September, passed a resolution asserting that "China has lost the sympathy of millions of Indians in return for a few miles of worthless territory," but at the same time blaming India for the trouble.[13] This, however, did not satisfy the pro-Chinese elements in the party. The regional Communist organization of West Bengal accused the CPI's pro-Soviet leaders of "immaturity in Marxist understanding" and charged the National Council with "appeasing Indian chauvinism."[14] The pro-Chinese Punjab party organization took a similar stand, demanding withdrawal of the National Council resolution.

The action of the West Bengal and Punjab party organizations was followed by the visit of a two-man CPI delegation to Hanoi to attend the Congress of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party. While in Hanoi, the Indian delegates were approached by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, and one of the former, Harekrishna Konar, a leader of the West Bengal party organization, accepted an invitation to visit Peking, where he met with Mao and other CCP leaders.[15] Upon his return to India, Konar parroted Chinese views with regard to both the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. This marked the first direct attempt by the CCP to extend its influence within the Indian party.

Soon afterwards a five-man CPI delegation led by Secretary Ghosh left for Moscow to attend the Conference of 81 Communist Parties. While in the Soviet capital, the delegates were received by Mikhail Suslov, who criticized the CPI for its anti-Chinese policy and urged the party to follow the Moscow conference declaration in its relations with the CCP. The outcome of the talks represented a clear-cut victory for the pro-Chinese wing of the Indian party. When the CPI National Council met again in January 1961, the pro-Chinese elements demanded the repudiation of the council's Meerut resolution, citing Suslov's advice in support of their stand. Ghosh, however, mustered enough right-wing support to block the demand. Enraged at this, Promode Das Gupta, Secretary of the West Bengal party organization, circulated a document entitled "Revisionist Trend in the CPI," which attacked the policies of the Ghosh leadership as a "surrender" to the bourgeoisie and imperialism and demanded that the CPI "follow the lead of the CCP."[16]

Despite this pro-Chinese opposition within the party, the leadership reacted sharply when Nehru revealed new Chinese armed incursions into Indian territory in November of 1961. In a statement, Secretary Ghosh assailed the Chinese aggression and demanded that Peking "immediately put an end to such acts" and "take effective measures to insure that such incidents do not occur again."[17] A short while later the CCP central organ *Jen-min jih-pao* countered with an editorial attacking Ghosh for having "trailed behind Nehru and having hurriedly issued a statement condemning China without bothering to find out the truth or look into the rights and wrongs of the case."[18] This unprecedented Chinese Communist attack upon Ghosh served to heighten tension within the CPI and prompted the Indian party leader to strike back by pledging CPI support of action by the Nehru government to repel any Chinese invasion.[19] Thus, by the end of 1961, the pro-Soviet leaders of the CPI were openly criticizing the Chinese Communist leadership and in turn were being bitterly attacked by Peking.

The massive new attack launched by the Chinese in the North-east Frontier Agency and Ladakh regions on October 20, 1962, precipitated a fresh crisis in the Indian party and led to a decisive showdown between the dominant right-wing forces and the pro-Chinese opposition. S. A. Dange, now occupying the newly-created post of Party Chairman, and other right-wing CPI leaders promptly reacted with public denunciations of the new Chinese aggression. However, eleven days of internal debate intervened before the party decided its official position.

During this interval, two important developments took place within the Communist world. In a sudden shift of attitude, evidently caused by the Cuban missile crisis, a *Pravda* editorial on October 25 voiced strong support of Communist China's stand towards India, repudiated the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian boundary, urged Indian acceptance of China's proposals for settling the border dispute, and called upon Indian "progressives" to restrain themselves and their government. Two days later, on October 27, *Jen-min jih-pao* denounced Nehru as an out-and-out agent of imperialism, and Dange as a "self-styled Marxist-Leninist" who "trails closely behind Nehru and falsely accuses China of encroachment on Indian territory." In addition, the CCP organ implicitly rebuffed *Pravda's* gesture at concili-

[13] *Link*, Sept. 11 and 18, 1960.
[14] *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Oct. 14, 1960.
[15] The other CPI delegate was K. Damodaran, of the Kerala party organization. Before their departure for Hanoi, both delegates were instructed by Secretary Ghosh to stay away from the Chinese but, if approached by the latter, to tell them frankly how the CPI viewed the CCP's general political line and Chinese policy towards India. Damodaran declined to meet with the Chinese delegates at Hanoi, but Konar did and was then invited to Peking.
[16] *Link*, Feb. 5, 1961.
[17] *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1961; *New Age* (Weekly), Nov. 26, 1961.
[18] Dec. 7, 1961.
[19] *The Hindu* (Madras), Dec. 17, 1961.

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ation by insisting upon complete abandonment by Moscow of its past policy of friendship toward the Nehru Government.[20]

On November 1 the CPI National Council finally passed a resolution which branded China as an aggressor, repudiated the Chinese claims to Indian territory, endorsed the Indian government's decision to buy arms abroad to resist the Chinese aggression, and gave full support to the government's conditions for entering into negotiations with China on the border issue.[21] Thus the CPI took a position that not only defied Peking but also rejected *Pravda's* advice that India should agree to negotiate the border dispute on China's terms.

Following the National Council's action, the CPI secretariat addressed a letter to the Communist parties of other countries explaining the Indian party's stand on the border dispute and asking them to exert their influence to restrain China in her "adventurous course." The secretariat also appealed to Indian Communists abroad to explain India's case to their host countries.[22] Shortly afterwards Dange himself left for the Soviet Union and other East European countries to explain the CPI's position, conferring before his departure with Nehru and Indian Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. (Peking later charged that the CPI chairman had gone to Moscow to act as an "agent" of the Nehru government.[23] While Dange was in Moscow, Khrushchev made a report to the Supreme Soviet in which he again criticized the Chinese armed invasion of India, reaffirmed Soviet neutrality, and appealed for the peaceful solution of the border conflict.[24] The Chinese promptly denounced this statement as a betrayal of the Soviet Union's obligation to support a fellow socialist country in a dispute with a bourgeois-national government.[25]

Apparently assured of Moscow's backing, Dange continued to take a strong anti-Chinese line after his return to India, reaffirming the CPI's full support of the Nehru Government. In February 1963, the CPI National Council issued another resolution denouncing China's aggression against India and accusing the CCP of violating the principles of Marxism-Leninism.[26] This called forth a furious counterattack from the CCP, which assailed Dange as a "Titoist revisionist" who had betrayed and split the CPI by capitulating to Nehru and the Indian bourgeoisie. The statement accused the Indian party leader of planning "to turn the CPI into an appendage of India's big bourgeoisie and big landlords and a lackey of the Nehru Government," and expressed CCP support of the left-wing elements in the party.[27]

After a lapse of more than six weeks, Dange replied to the Chinese attack in a 30,000-word statement published in the CPI's weekly organ *New Age*. Entitled "Neither Revisionism nor Dogmatism Is Our Guide," the statement began in an almost apologetic tone, as from a small party without much revolutionary experience to a great party. After retracing the course of Sino-Indian relations and the evolution of the CPI's stand on the border conflict, however, the statement went on to castigate the CPI leadership for creating a problem not only for India but for the Communist movement throughout the world.[28]

In August 1963, Dange again journeyed to Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU. While he was there, *Pravda* (August 10) published an article condemning the Chinese leadership for its "aggressive policy" towards India and for "openly interfering" in the internal affairs of the CPI. Returning home, apparently with renewed assurances of Soviet support, Dange launched a violent campaign against the CCP and called Communist China an "inimical force" threatening the security of India.[29]

With the CCP openly encouraging left-wing Indian Communist opposition to the CPI leadership, tensions within the Indian party reached a critical point early in 1964. In January the CPI Central Executive Committee, dominated by the right-wing leaders, circulated a letter calling for "vigilance" against attempts by individuals or groups to split the party in response to "open directives from Chinese or Indonesian Communist leaders."[30] The threatened crisis did indeed materialize at the next meeting of the National Council in April, when 32 left-wing and centrist members walked out and called for repudiation of the party leadership. The dissidents, subsequently expelled by the National Council, were charged by Dange with identifying themselves with the political and ideological positions of the CCP.[31] On July 7 the pro-Chinese

[20] In view of Peking's intransigence, Moscow returned to its neutral position toward the Sino-Indian conflict after the termination of the Cuban missile crisis. On November 5, a *Pravda* editorial declared that China and India should "cease fire and, without advancing any terms, sit down at roundtable negotiations." The paper dropped its earlier contention that the McMahon Line was invalid and that India should accept Peking's terms as the basis of negotiations.

[21] *Indian Express* (New Delhi), Nov. 2, 1962.

[22] *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1962.

[23] *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 15, 1963.

[24] *Tass*, Dec. 12, 1962.

[25] *Jen-min jih-pao*, Dec. 15, 1962.

[26] *New Age* (Weekly), Feb. 24, 1963, pp. 5-10.

[27] *Jen-min jih-pao*, March 3, 1963.

[28] For full text of the statement, see *New Age* (Weekly) *Supplement*, April 21, 1963.

[29] *The Statesman*, Aug. 17, 1963.

[30] *The Times of India* (New Delhi), Jan. 16, 1964.

[31] *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 1964, p. 5811. Following the National Council meeting, Jyoti Basu, one of the dissidents, declared: "We are out of it. We are the Communist Party. We do not recognize them (Dange's supporters) as the Communist Party."

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leaders met at Tenali, in Andhra Pradesh, and formed a second CPI (hereafter referred to as the Left-CPI). The right-wing party leadership responded with a furious attack on the CCP for instigating the split in the Indian party. Dange called Mao a "well-developed warmonger" and again denounced Chinese policies of "expansionism and aggressiveness."[32]

In October the Left-CPI convened an all-India conference at Calcutta which, claiming to act as the Seventh Congress of the CPI, voted to expel the "renegade Dange" from the party —a move immediately applauded by Peking as a "significant" act. The regular Seventh Congress of the CPI, convened by the right-wing leadership, met at Bombay in December, with the CPSU represented by Boris Ponomarev. At the Congress, Dange defended the action taken by the National Council in November 1962 to condemn China's aggression against India, claiming that this action had "saved the democratic movement in our country." The Congress then passed a resolution repudiating the CCP's stand on all major issues and accusing the Chinese Communist leadership of being "dogmatic and disruptive" and indulging in "narrow nationalism" and "chauvinistic distortions." The resolution also charged the CCP with open interference in the affairs of the CPI.[33]

Peking responded to these criticisms with a massive attack on the "renegade Dange group," which it said had "usurped" the CPI leadership in November 1962 and had since "pursued a line of national chauvinism and mass capitulationism," opposed by "the mass of CPI members." Referring to the Seventh Congress of the Right-CPI, the Chinese statement said that the Dange group and its "handful" of supporters, "acting in the service of imperialism and the Indian reactionaries," had loudly prated revisionist ideas, poured venom on China, and boosted Lal Bahadur Shastri's government. The statement also criticized Ponomarev for "boosting" the Dange group.[34]

The war of recrimination between the CCP and the Right-CPI leadership continued through 1965. In February Dange accused the Chinese Communist leadership of "wrecking" the revolution in India and bluntly declared that the CPI would never "bow down to the thought of Mao," however profound it might be for the Chinese people. He also criticized the Chinese for having expressed "indignation" at the Indian government's arrest of Left-CPI leaders in late 1964, defending the government as one "freely elected on the basis of adult franchise."[35] Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai retorted by again calling Dange a "renegade" who had become the "favorite" of the reactionary Indian government. Chou asserted that "most of the leaders" of the CPI had quit Dange's party, and that "a great number of these Indian revolutionary Communists have now been imprisoned by the Indian Government."[36]

In September 1965, a three-day Chinese ultimatum to India demanding the dismantling of military installations along the China-Sikkim border reunderlined the division in Indian Communist ranks. Dr. Z. A. Ahmed, a Right-CPI leader, denounced the Chinese as "crooks, opportunists, imperialists and saboteurs,"[37] while Left-CPI leader E. M. S. Namboodiripad merely called the Chinese ultimatum "unfortunate" and urged that the Indian Government settle the whole border conflict by ceding the Aksai Chin to China in return for Chinese recognition of all territories south of the McMahon Line as belonging to India.[38]

The split in the party was again manifested when Communist China carried out its third nuclear test explosion in May this year. On the one hand, the weekly organ of the Right-CPI denounced China for pursuing "militaristic and hegemonic ambitions."[39] On the other, Left-CPI spokesmen defended China's right to develop nuclear weapons and again pressed the Indian government to take the initiative towards reaching a negotiated settlement of the border conflict. B. T. Ranadive, now a member of the Left-CPI Politburo, declared that India faced a clear option—either a peaceful settlement with China or ruin.[40]

Thus, the Communist movement in India today finds itself more seriously and openly divided than at any time in its long and checkered history. Confronted by the steadily mounting tide of anti-Chinese public sentiment at home resulting from China's acts of aggression against India, the CPI leadership was finally forced to opt for a policy of supporting India's national-bourgeois government against an outside Communist power. By choosing this course, the Dange leadership may well have saved the CPI from losing all its gains in popularity achieved over the past decade, if not from total extinction, but it has not brought India closer to the goal of socialist revolution, and it has split the party in two.

The rupture between the two segments of the party is now open and complete. Both claim legitimacy as the sole Communist Party of India,

[32] *The Statesman*, Sept. 17, 1964.
[33] *The Times of India*, Dec. 17-22, 1964.
[34] *Peking Review*, Jan. 22, 1965, pp. 18-19.
[35] *New Age* (Weekly), Feb. 4, 1965.
[36] Interview published in *New Statesman* (London), March 26, 1965, p. 476.
[37] *Patriot* (New Delhi), Sept. 19, 1965.
[38] *Ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1965; also, *Hindustan Times*, Nov. 11, 1965.
[39] *New Age* (Weekly), May 15, 1966, p. 15.
[40] *The Statesman*, May 12, 1966.

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the pretensions of the Right-CPI having the endorsement and sympathy of Moscow while those of the Left-CPI are recognized and supported by Peking. Yet the split is more than just a reflection of the ideological division between the Soviet and Chinese parties, or of the differing attitudes of the two CPI's with respect to the Sino-Indian border conflict. More important is the fact that they disagree profoundly on fundamental issues of Communist strategy in India—so much so that their respective leaders now see slight chance of reunifying the party through a reconciliation of differences.

There is little reliable information as to the relative numerical strength of the two CPI's. Both claim memberships slightly in excess of 100,000 (the Right-CPI, 107,763; the Left-CPI, 104,421), but chances are that these claims overlap each other, while estimates from non-Indian sources (including Moscow and Peking) are so conflicting as to shed scant light on the situation.[41]

Whatever the relative strengths of the two rivals in terms of membership, there is little doubt that the Right-CPI has been steadily losing ground in the inter-party struggle. The chief reason for this is that the Right leadership is torn by personal rivalries which the Left has been quick to exploit. Even in the top echelon of the Right-CPI, there are individuals who personally dislike Dange and have become restive under his leadership. Consequently, the Left leadership has systematically concentrated its attack on Dange in an effort to undermine his image among his own followers, and this effort has met with considerable success. The Left-CPI leaders, who include such able and down-to-earth Communist political strategists as E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu, and P. Ramamurti, evidently calculate that if they can dislodge Dange from his controlling position in the Right-CPI, the way will be opened for them to recapture the rival organization and reunify the Communist movement under their own militant leadership.

With the approach of new general elections in India, the really burning and basic issue between the two CPI's is the strategy that should be adopted to advance the cause of domestic Communist revolution—and, more specifically, the position to be taken towards the Indian National Congress. Meeting at Tenali in June of this year, the Left-CPI Central Committee labelled the Congress as "the main enemy of the people," and the party leaders are now laying the groundwork for a concerted anti-Congress electoral strategy which they hope will enable the Communists to win governing power in those Indian states where the party's influence has been relatively strong. As part of this strategy, the Left-CPI has been actively seeking alliances not only with other leftist organizations like the Praja Socialist Party and the Forward Bloc in West Bengal, but even with various reactionary communal organizations such as the Moslem League in Kerala, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras, the Akali Party in the Punjab, and the Janata Party in Bihar.

As opposed to the Left-CPI strategy of militant opposition to the National Congress, the Right-CPI stands for a continuation of cooperation with the Indian nationalists because it is optimistic about the chances of gradually pushing the Congress farther to the left and strengthening the position of such left-wing Congress politicians as Krishna Menon and his friends. The Right-CPI leaders believe that the national strategy they advocate is the best, if not the only, way for the Communists to achieve eventual ruling power in India, even though it may require a long and difficult political struggle.

Thus, the line is sharply drawn between the rival standard-bearers of Indian communism. While the Sino-Indian conflict has receded into the background, at least for the time being, there is little question that the Left-CPI's strategy of militant opposition to the National Congress has the full blessing of Peking.

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[41] An official American estimate places the membership of the Right-CPI at 55,000, and of the Left-CPI at 70,000. US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations*, January 1966.

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Pravda, Herr Goebbels, and *Problems of Communism*

EDITORS' NOTE: Soviet attacks on Problems of Communism *are no longer a rarity. Sometimes we disregard them. At other times we reproduce them, with the suggestion that our replies, in turn, be reprinted for the benefit of Soviet readers—a suggestion that has yet to be taken up by our critics (see, for instance, "'Frying Snowballs' in the Soviet Press—A Reply to the* New Times," *January-February 1961; "*Literary Gazette *on* Problems of Communism," *March-April 1963; and "From Russia* Sans *Love," September-October 1964). For sheer artlessness, however, the article reproduced below eclipses anything that has appeared in Cyrillic heretofore. It was published in the September 12, 1966, issue of* Pravda *under the title "Old Tunes, Mister Bramberg" (Why transliterate the name with an "a" rather than the usual "u," one wonders—does it perhaps render it more Germanic to Russian eyes?) and is offered here without any abridgments, though with a few apposite editorial footnotes.*

As is known, American journalists are not to be trifled with. As far as pushiness is concerned, it is hard to find their equal. The situation is pressing, of course. Competition and the like. But I think the boys from the staff of USIA's *Problems of Communism* magazine are the shiftiest. The chief of them, a certain Brumberg, has recently beaten all records in indelicacy. He penetrated—where, do you think?—into the nether world and interviewed Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels. That same one who said that a lie repeated millions of times becomes, in the end, believable. The text of the interview follows:

Brumberg: Hello, Herr Goebbels! Allow me to introduce myself. I am Brumberg, from the American magazine *Problems of Communism.*
Goebbels: Heil Hitler, Mr. Brumberg! What may I do for you?
Brumberg: I, as a matter of fact, would like to talk to you about something. Though we have traveled a long way from you. These are new times, of course, and so are our anti-Communist tunes.
Goebbels: I detect, Mr. Brumberg, more self-satisfaction than evidence in your words. The new, as Johann Wolfgang Goethe used to say, is the old that has been thoroughly forgotten. Sometimes I feel as if I am guiding the hands of many of your authors.
Brumberg: What on earth are you talking about?
Goebbels: Do you remember my book *Communism Unmasked?* It was published in Munich in 1936. Among other things, I stated there: "International communism is striving to eliminate all the national and racial features which nature has provided." You are elaborating this thesis in many materials, and in particular in the article "Soviet Colonialism: Does It Exist?" [1]

I noted further that communism comes out against property and expropriates it systematically, on a broad scale, and by refined and cruel methods. Your special issue on "Law and Legality in the USSR" sounds like an echo of my words.[2]

I always used to say that communism denies the value of the individual. And you repeat this theme in different ways in every issue. My very words on communism's elimination and annihilation of all high spiritual aspirations of human beings and nations with the aid of materialist principles have been kindly translated into English and flavored

[1] The reference here is to a symposium under the collective title "Soviet Colonialism: Does it Exist?," with contributions by Richard Pipes, Michael Rywkin, Hugh Seton-Watson, and commentaries by B. D. G. Folson, Wang Gungwu, and Frank Moraes (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1964). For an earlier Soviet reaction to the symposium, see "From Russia *Sans* Love," March-April 1964.
[2] See *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1965.

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Praise from a Master

There is one sphere in particular wherein Bolshevism has shown its mastery. *i.e.*, that of negative propaganda. It gains a foothold among the nations by means of lies and hypocrisy . . . [The Bolsheviks] speculate on the incapacity of the average truthful person to imagine that it is even possible to lie with such bold and brazen-faced nonchalance as they lie.

It is possible to lie like that. Bolshevism has shown it to be possible. . . .

—*From* **Bolshevism in Theory and Practice, by Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, M. Mueller & Sohn K. G., 1936, pp. 5-6.**

with contemporary illustrations. The result was "The Poverty of a Dialogue" —not a bad piece at that.[3]

Brumberg: It is difficult not to agree with you, sir. Especially, when you write on race. On ours, the white one, of course.

Goebbels: Correct. Moreover, I had always read the concept of the white race in a more narrow sense. A Nordic, Aryan race! Everything belongs to it— and to the lower races, nothing, but the obligation to be the scum for the race of masters. I regard the population of Russia as the lowest race. I was very much pleased, by the way, when I found corroboration for my thesis in your travel essay published in the second issue of last year, which clearly brings out the manifest inferiority of the peoples inhabiting Russia.[4]

Brumberg: Herr Goebbels, you are extraordinarily well informed about our magazine. Would you forgive my curiosity, if I ask you how you have managed that?

Goebbels: With the help of your countryman, Senator McCarthy. Instead of flowers, they put fresh issues of your magazine on his tomb. He shares them with me after he has read them. According to his words, the reading of your magazine raises the tone.

Brumberg: Sir, can you add anything else to what you have said?

Goebbels: With pleasure. In my capacity as Reichs-Minister for Propaganda, I effectively exploited all the hue and cry about the "iniquities of communism" in order to soften the impression that our concentration camps and storm-trooper pranks had produced on public opinion. I must say that you haven't done badly at this game.

Brumberg: It is a pleasure to listen to you, sir. What you say is highly instructive. But don't you think that we have made certain new contributions, too?

Goebbels: My dear friend, what you certainly excel in is your scholarly apparatus. What an abundance of sources, including Soviet ones! Each anti-Communist concept is coupled with a whole heap of references. Just try to say that there is no objectivity or scientific character in it! I know the average reader well. With such a sauce he will swallow up any lies. Only you have to handle it more delicately. Take "totalitarianism," for instance, which you scold. . . .

Brumberg: Herr Goebbels, but it is convenient and customary for us, in our polemics with the Communists,

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[3] The article which ostensibly comprised a distillation of Goebbel's views on communism was actually a report, written by Professor Carl Cohen of the University of Michigan, on an informal discussion between a number of American and Soviet philosophers, held during the Thirteenth Congress of Philosophy in Mexico City in September 1963 (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1964). It might be of interest to our readers to know that in view of the fact that the questions and answers represented, in Prof. Cohen's words, "not literal quotations," but rather "a careful reconstruction of the two-and-a-half hour discourse," we asked all the participants in this discussion—American and Soviet alike—to read the manuscript in advance of publication so as to ascertain the accuracy of the remarks attributed to them. All of the Americans responded, some of them suggesting certain alterations which were incorporated in the text. The Soviet participants—Academicians P. N. Fedoseiev, F. V. Konstantinov, M. B. Mitin, and T. I. Oiserman—were not only requested to check the manuscript, but given an opportunity to rebut it. The following was contained in identical letters addressed to the four scholars, dated June 21, 1964: "Since the comments and interpretations of Professor Cohen represent a point of view to which you are, of course, opposed, would you care to offer us a commentary on his article *in toto?* Should you accept our invitation —which we sincerely hope you will —we shall publish your commentary without any changes whatsoever. Your manuscript, which we hope, for reasons of space, will not exceed 2000 words, may be submitted either in English or in Russian. In the latter case, we would translate it here in Washington and then submit the English version for your approval."

Of the four, Professors Fedoseiev and Oiserman did not choose to reply at all. Professor Mitin replied, on September 22, informing us that Professor Cohen's "treatment . . . is one-sided. Insufficiently objective, sometimes even distorting. Due to this fact it is impossible to make only separate corrections . . . . We shall try, when the first opportunity offers, to give an objective analysis of this discussion" (sic). Professor Konstantinov also responded, in a letter dated September 12, which might be worth reproducing in full:

Via the USA Embassy in Moscow, we have received your letter of the 21 June, 1964, as well as Carl Cohen's article about the Soviet and American philosophers' meeting in Mexico in September 1963.

We carefully acquainted with the article and would like to give our remarks concerning the contents of the article.

May be you will find it advisable to write C. Cohen's article together with our answer, which now is preparing and will be sent you in the near future. We believe that in the interest of truth it would be the more true way for treatment of the questions touched during the joint meeting the Soviet and American philosophers.

With respect
F. KONSTANTINOV
Academican, The Director of the Institute of Philosophy, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Prof. Konstantinov's letter was received on October 14 and Prof. Mitin's two days later. In reply, both were informed that in view of the fact that we had no heard from them for so long, Prof. Cohen's article had been placed in the September-October issue (copies of which were enclosed), but that "there is nothing to prevent us," from publishing their articles "in another issue of the journal," subject, of course, to the same conditions as outlined earlier. There has been no word from either Mr. Mitin or Mr. Konstantinov since.

[4] See "When Comrades Sit in Judgment," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1965.

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to accuse them of "totalitarianism."
Goebbels: Deep down you yourselves are totalitarians. And one reads it between the lines. Some day you will proclaim this openly. The sooner, the better. The fellows from the "John Birch Society" and your Nazi party are just waiting for the signal to establish a new order in America, to smash the hydra of liberalism, as we did in 1933.
Brumberg: It isn't so easy these days. . . .
Goebbels: It doesn't matter, you've got the grip. Learn from us! Remember how we called our party: "The National-Socialist German Labor Party?" There you have both "socialism" and "labor interests." Just try to prove that we are not for the working people and that we are against socialism! We caught many credulous people with this bait. Once you've got them, you can start using the club!
Brumberg: And tommy guns. . . .
Goebbels: Right. But let me tell you one thing: don't go too far! The 5th issue of 1964 says: "The United States, in moving towards collectivism, is developing more nearly in accordance with the basic principles of Marx, than the USSR." Familiar words. To steal the enemy's slogans and turn them against him is a highly profitable business. But, gentlemen—lie, but don't overdo it! In the first issue of 1965 you declared Marxism dead as a system of political thinking and action.[5] What is the result? Dead-alive Marxism? Let me assure you, as an expert, that even a lie must have its logic.
Brumberg: Thank you with all my heart for your advice and assistance.
Goebbels: Don't mention it! I'm happy to do it for the sake of our common cause. Before I forget—there is one more danger. You write a good deal about the inefficiency of the Soviet economic system, about the comparatively low war potential of the USSR. But I suppose you yourself don't believe in all that you are ramming into the rabble's heads? No sooner did I and my beloved Fuehrer embark upon this slippery road than the day of reckoning came. In 1945. In the form of cyanide. As you say in America, put that fact in you pipe and smoke it.
Brumberg: Aufwiedersehen, Herr Goebbels!
Goebbels: Goodbye, goodbye. . . .

* * *

We readily concede that something or other in this interview might not have happened precisely that way. Perhaps there was no interview at all. But the indisputable fact is that the Washington magazine *Problems of Communism* (as, by the way, other trumpets of anti-communism) is taking its geneology straight from Hitler's propaganda machine.

A. Mikeshin

[5] The first quotation is taken from a question addressed by Professor Carroll Hawkins, of Michigan State University, to the Soviet philosophers at the meeting in Mexico (see f.n. 3). The full text (p. 16) reads as follows: "But what would you say to a remark I have heard (which is not the view of most Americans, I am sure) that the United States, in moving toward collectivism, is developing more nearly in accordance with Marx's general views than the USSR, which has now embraced a form of state capitalism that is more severe and oppressive than private capitalism?" (Prof. Fedoseiev hotly rejected this question as no more than an attempt "to engage in anti-Communist polemics.") The second reference is to a review, written by Professor Hans Morgenthau, of Professor Richard Lowenthal's *World Communism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), which appeared in the January-February 1965 issue of this journal. In it, Mr. Morgenthau asserted that Lowenthal's book constitutes "a penetrating analysis of the intellectual decay and political disintegration which have befallen communism during the last decade" (p. 51). The statements, of course, are not mutually exclusive, and neither is necessarily representative of this journal's point of view—all of which makes one wonder whether Mr. Mikeshin has really assimilated his own observation "that even a lie must have logic."

Pages from the Past

Some Exchanges that *Did* Take Place

In the course of the conversation, Herr Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Fuehrer, as follows:
"I know how much the German nation loves its Fuehrer; I should therefore like to drink to his health."
—*Hencke, Moscow, Aug. 24, 1939.*

* * *

. . . the sudden alteration in the policy of the Soviet Government, after years of propaganda directed expressly against German aggressors, is still not very well understood by the population. . . . The Soviet Government is doing everything to change the attitude of the population here toward Germany. The press is as though it had been transformed. . . . In a judgment of conditions here the realization is of importance that the Soviet Government has always previously been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude of the population in the direction which it has desired, and it is not being sparing this time either of the necessary propaganda.—*Schulenberg, Moscow, Sept. 6, 1939.*

* * *

I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov:
"I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov."—*Schulenberg, Moscow, Sept. 9, 1939.*

(continued next page)

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. . . Stalin, with his characteristic clarity and precision, replied spontaneously: "Germany was taking a proud attitude by rejecting at the outset any armed assistance from the Soviets. The Soviet Union, however, was interested in having a strong Germany as a neighbor and in the case of an armed showdown between Germany and the Western democracies the interests of the Soviet Union and of Germany would certainly run parallel to each other. The Soviet Union would never stand for Germany's getting into a difficult position." I thereupon thanked Stalin for his clear and precise statement and told him that I would report to the Fuehrer on this broad-minded attitude of the Soviet Government.—*Ribbentrop, Berlin, Oct. 18, 1939.*

* * *

Instruction carried out with Molotov today at 10:30 a.m. European time [the reference here is to a message from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Moscow asking him to inform the Soviet Government that due to "absolutely reliable reports regarding an imminent thrust of Anglo-French military forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts," Germany "had to act without delay"—*i.e.*, attack the two countries—Ed.]. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far; they had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In conclusion, Molotov said literally: "We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures."—*Schulenberg, Moscow, April 9, 1940.*

* * *

I called on Molotov; instruction carried out. Molotov appreciated the news [concerning the impending invasion of the Low Countries] and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success. —*Schulenberg, Moscow, May 10, 1940.*

* * *

Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Armed Forces. Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet action against the Baltic States. He referred to the reasons published in the press and added that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.—*Schulenberg, June 17, 1940.*

* * *

I received the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, today and strongly remonstrated with him regarding the article, published in Riga in the newspaper *Jaunakas Zinas* on the 5th instant entitled "German Communists Against Dictate at Compiegne." The attacks on the German Government contained in that article were not calculated to further good German-Russian relations, which after all were desired by both sides. . . . I requested the Ambassador to inform his Government immediately of this talk and to notify it that the Reich Government considered it appropriate to suppress such articles in the future.—*Ribbentrop, Berlin, Aug. 6, 1940.*

* * *

The Russian Ambassador made an appointment with me today . . . . He said that he had instructions from his Government to inform me that the appearance of the article was due to a misunderstanding. His Government had given instructions to Latvia, which now belonged to the Soviet Union, that in the future such articles were to be suppressed.

I answered the Russian that I took note of that . . . In the German press in turn we would not tolerate articles against Russian conditions either.—*Ribbentrop, Berlin, Aug. 14, 1940.*

* * *

Molotov summoned me to his office this evening at 9:30 p.m. After he had mentioned the alleged repeated border violations by German aircraft . . . Molotov stated as follows:

There were a number of indications that the German Government was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government. Rumors were even current that a war was impending between Germany and the Soviet Union. . . . The Soviet Government was unable to understand the reasons for Germany's dissatisfaction. If the Yugoslav question had at the time given rise to such dissatisfaction, he—Molotov—believed that, by means of his earlier communications, he had cleared up this question, which, moreover, was a thing of the past. He would appreciate it if I could tell him what had brought about the present situation in German-Soviet Russian relations.—*Schulenberg, Moscow, June 22, 1941.*

—From German documents quoted in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, edited by R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, Washington, D.C., US Department of State, 1948. Persons cited: Andor Hencke, Under State Secretary in the German Foreign Office; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister; Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenberg, German Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communisn, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C., 20547.

Castro and Expediency

TO THE EDITORS: May I take the opportunity offered by Professor Stanley Rothman's comments ("Understanding Marxism"—July-August 1966) on my interpretation of Castroism to try to clarify the point at issue? I hope, however, that he will not think that I am unmindful of his kind words.

Professor Rothman wrote: "Draper is convinced that Castro's move to the left between 1959 and 1961 is to be explained by the fact that Castroism is simply 'power in search of an ideology' —in other words, that the Cuban leader's conversion to Marxism-Leninism was dictated purely by expediency."

It may be well to put the phrase cited by Professor Rothman in its context. The full sentence reads: "Historically, then, Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology."

This sentence did not refer merely to the period between 1959 and 1961. It summed up an attempted reconstruction of Castro's political development from 1953 onwards. I started with 1953 because "Castroism," as distinct from Castro, did not exist before then. Professor Rothwell tends to emphasize Castro's personal role, and for this it would be necessary to go even farther back—at least to 1945, when he entered the School of Law at the University. In any case, a study limited to the shorter period, 1959-61, might well give one a somewhat different view of Castro's relationship to the "old-line Communists" than a historical sketch of the longer period, 1953-64, which was the case in my necessarily foreshortened essay.

Also, the quotation of only part of the sentence may have done some unintentional violence to my thought. The entire sentence suggested four elements in a consideration of Castroism: the leader, the movement, power and ideology. Professor Rothman tended to reduce these to two—power and ideology. Moreover, the sentence was merely a shorthand way of summing up a mess of detail that had gone into the body of the essay. Professor Rothman could not, of course, go into these details, which fill out for the reader the context of the phrase which he chose to quote.

This leads me to the main questions posed by him: Was my formula, even in its truncated form, equivalent to saying that Castro's "conversion to Marxism-Leninism was dictated purely by expediency?" And if so, what truth is there in his translation of my thought?

I do not quite see why even "power in search of an ideology" adds up "purely" to expediency. Indeed, "expediency" may often be quite complex in its causation or at least its constituent elements. . . .

In effect, I think that "expediency" was often a most important factor in Castro's actions and policies. Anyone who studies Castro's entire political career closely, especially the years before 1951, must be impressed, I believe, with the strange blend of opportunism and extremism that went into it. If "opportunism" and "expediency" are somewhat intimately related, I would plead guilty to thinking that Castro has often followed the path of expediency. But not always, certainly.

In one of his last public statements—an interview published in the Egyptian magazine, *Al-Tali-'ah* (Cairo, April 1965)—Ernesto "Che" Guevara seemed to ascribe the Castro leadership's amalgamation with the old-line Communists in 1959-61 to the need for experienced cadres.[1] If so, "expediency" rather than "ideology" might be closer to the truth even in this instance.

It is even possible that Professor Rothman's own explanation might well be classified under "expediency." He writes: "For example, it is at least arguable that Castro started out as a romantic with vaguely socialist ideas and later found himself pushed to the left by the consequences of his own actions."

If "started out" refers to the beginning of Castro's political career in the university after 1945, then it might be closer to the truth to say that he started out as a member of a group devoted to a peculiar kind of political gangsterism. After that, he went through several different stages, not always consistent with one another, though his memory has been extremely selective in the past few years. Still, this point aside, . . . I am entirely in agreement with Professor Rothman that it is "at least arguable" that Castro was "pushed to the left by the consequences of his own actions."

"Arguable," yes, but that is not going very far. If the consequences of Castro's own actions were responsible, then he pushed as much as he *was* pushed. Obviously, the two were reciprocal. But if Castro permitted himself to be pushed, a measure of "expediency" begins to creep into Professor Rothman's own theory.

The trouble is that "expediency," "ideology" and "power" are not so mutually exclusive. I agree wholeheartedly that "while Castro was undoubtedly motivated by a desire for power

[1] Most of the interview has been translated into English (it was never published in Cuba) and appears as an appendix to a memorandum entitled "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation," by Daniel Tretiak, written for the RAND Corporation, July 1966.

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per se, the ideological factor and the logic of the revolutionary situation cannot be so easily discounted." The only thing I object to is the suggestion that I easily discounted them. On the contrary, I went to some trouble to say that Castro was not a traditional *caudillo*, that he was "a new type of *caudillo* with a need to justify his power ideologically" (p. 49). And this statement came in the paragraph immediately following the phrase quoted by Professor Rothman.

Nevertheless, I am convinced that there is more to Fidel Castro than I or anyone else, or all of us put together, have yet managed to capture on paper. The crying need in this field is for a serious, responsible study of Castro's entire political career, and even an old-fashioned "life and times." I would not want anyone to think that my own interpretation of Castro and Castroism can be reduced to pure "expediency," but I would not want anyone to think that expediency was not an important factor in much of his career.

THEODORE DRAPER
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Lenin's Elite

TO THE EDITORS: In your July-August 1966, issue Mr. George Lichtheim commented interestingly upon "The Transmutation of a Doctrine, Marxism into Leninism." One of his points needs further discussion.

He remarked (p. 21): "What he (Lenin) failed to see was that the political equation to which he committed his party ('a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry') would come out only if the 'toiling intelligentsia' kept control of the movement. Or perhaps he did. It is difficult to tell."

Lenin knew no later than 1905 that his equation called for the movement's being firmly in the hands of the "toiling intelligentsia," the professional revolutionaries he was organizing into the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. He denied "that by his strategy he was subordinating the labor movement to the political dictation of another social stratum." But his program required precisely that. His denial was simply that the professional revolutionaries constituted another social stratum, which they became once the revolution was accomplished.

By the time Lenin wrote "What Is To Be Done," in 1902, he had declared himself against the "spontaneous" politics of both the intelligentsia and the working class. Both had to be subordinated to an unrepresentative group—a party of professional revolutionaries. His critique of workers' capacity—that it does not "solely by its own force" go beyond "trade union consciousness"—has been quoted often enough. In a footnote he added: "It is often said that the working class is spontaneously attracted towards socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that the socialist theory most profoundly and most correctly defines the cause of the miseries of the working class and therefore the workers for their part absorb it so easily, provided that this theory itself does not give in to spontaneity, provided it subordinates spontaneity to itself."

The agency for protecting socialist theory from workers attracted to it but still susceptible to the appeal of "the most widely spread bourgeois ideology" was to be the party. Excluding "bad" intellectuals and recruiting those workers who "participate not as workers but as theorists of socialism," the party was to be one of "people whose profession consists of revolutionary activity. . . . In the face of this common feature of the members of such an organization, any distinction between workers and intellectuals must be completely obliterated. . . . This organization must inevitably be not very wide, and as secret as possible."

S. V. Utechin reminds us in his translation of the famed pamphlet that while Lenin was working on it he also published a "Letter to a Comrade on our Organizational Tasks." It was reprinted in 1904, along with a letter to Lenin from a comrade, Vilonov. The two letters spell out the "democratic centralism" that the party was to incarnate. Its structure was capped by an editorial board whose task it was "to develop theoretical truths, tactical postulates, general organizational ideas, general tasks for the whole party at any given moment." This elite core was to dominate party local organizations through "agents." [1]

In those years, Lenin's greatest fear had been of the workers and their "spontaneous" economism. When, belatedly, the other exiled luminaries of the RSDWP shied away from Lenin's "transmutation" of Marxism, it was against them and their "class" that Lenin directed his wrath, discovering a new love for the workers, and particularly for the factory proletariat.

By May 1904, when Lenin published "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," it was "the presence of large numbers of radical intellectuals in the ranks of our Marxists" that was making "the existence of opportunism, produced by their mentality, inevitable." But, thought Lenin, the proletariat would teach the "unstable intellectuals" the "discipline and organization" which it has "acquired just because of its factory schooling." Hence the very limitations of the proletariat became virtues.

The following year neither Lenin nor his faction played much of a role in the pre-revolution. The most exciting interpretation of the experience was that of Trotsky, then a dissident Menshevik, in his fragments on "the Permanent Revolution." He seriously, if not too successfully, tried to reconcile "classical Marxism with Russia's non-Marxist revolutionary potential.

Nonetheless the decisive adaptation of Marxist thinking to the events of 1905 was Lenin's. In "Two Tactics of Social Democracy In The Democratic Revolution," he declared that a bourgeois revolution is "in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat." Why? After the briefest reference to its opening the way for capitalist development of the economy and the organizational progress of the working class, he raced on to say that, unlike constitutional reforms, a violent "bourgeois revolution" would open the way for the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" and the struggle for socialism. That such haste to be rid of capitalism, denying a period of grace to the bourgeoisie, would deprive Russia of those benefits Marxism attributed to the "democratic revolution" did not trouble Lenin. The loss would be more than compensated for by the maximization of revolutionary disorder, preventing all classes from pushing forward reformist, representative leadership.

[1] V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done*, translated by S. V. and Patricia Utechin, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963. In his introduction, S. V. Utechin also develops Lenin's half-admission that his concept of revolutionary party organization stems from a revolutionary terrorist offshoot of the intelligentsia-based Narodnaia Volia movement, not from Marx.

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"The Russian Revolution will begin to assume its real sweep," he predicted, "only when the bourgeoisie recoils from it, and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletarians. . . . Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. . . . It is therefore the slogan of dictatorship that the genuinely revolutionary class must advance."

Lenin at no time revised *What Is To Be Done*'s low estimate of the workers' revolutionary creativity. It was to "people whose profession consists of revolutionary activity" that his call for a new slogan—"dictatorship"—was addressed. He resisted Trotsky's plea in October 1917 that the Bolshevik revolution be made in the name of the broadly-based soviets rather than in the party's.

Even John Reed, whose *Ten Days That Shook the World* Lenin called the best account of the Bolshevik *coup*, reported that it was the soviets, not the Bolshevik party, which the workers and the soldiers expected to become the fulcrum of power in the new society. How quickly many of them became disillusioned with the edifice of restraint which Lenin's one-party rule imposed upon them is indicated in the recollections of Abramovitch.[2]

But Lenin had decided between 1901 and 1905 that revolution was the property of professional revolutionaries who must *not* be representative of either of the two strata from which they were drawn, nor reflect the "opportunism," the "spontaneity," or the "individualism" of either intellectuals or wage workers.

This formula, a party setting its own goals, ignoring the "spontaneous" aspirations of the social strata from which its leaders come, or of the idealized class whose mystic interests they pretend to serve, is Russian Bolshevism's principal legacy to less developed lands. It matters not from what discontented class or what combination of social or ethnological groups such a party derives its social dynamism. Leninism, as Lichtheim says, is drained of whatever Marxist content it once had.

WILLIAM C. GAUSMANN
Washington, D C

[2] Raphel R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution, 1917 to 1939*, International Universities Press, Inc., New York, 1962, particularly pp. 100-129.

Counterrevolution in Hungary?

TO THE EDITORS: Thank you for a very interesting article on Pal Maleter in your March-April 1966 issue. My only complaint is that the author omitted to differentiate between the two well-defined phases of the 1956 rebellion (highlighted by the quite different sets of refugees from Hungary).

First, there was the popular action against the Stalinist regime of Rakosi, which was at the verge of success when —as I understand, by an unauthorized individual action—Cardinal Mindszenty was released from prison and started rabble-rousing with anti-Semitic slogans. When the Soviet Army noticed that there developed a real danger to the maintenance of socialism and that Nagy was too weak to stem the fascist threat, they decided—comparable to the US presence in Vietnam—to take things into their own hands. Accordingly, we had two streams of refugees: first the Communists and Jews (together with a sprinkling of those who just made use of the opportunity to get abroad), and then the second wave of fascists. These two had to be kept strictly apart in different camps.

That the second act of this tragedy was not a preconceived provocation was made clear by the violent—and partly even criminal—behavior of the last wave of refugees.

I hope you will be able to give, in a future issue, an assessment of this second aspect of the rebellion which had no relation to the causes of the initial movement.

May I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the high standard of your articles which I find very educating.

TOM HILL
London, England

MR. GOSZTONY REPLIES: Mr. Hill brings up three questions which are of sufficient importance to warrant a detailed reply.

There were actually two phases to the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956. One revolution took place from October 23 to October 31, the other from November 1 to November 4. Their continuity should not obscure the fact that while one grew out of the other, each had its own goals. The first movement sought to bring about a cleansing of the thoroughly corrupt Communist Party and a reform of the Rákosi-Gerö system (see the demands made by the Budapest students on October 23, especially points Nos. 2 and 3 of the so-called 16-point program).[1] The aim of the second movement was national sovereignty in the form of neutralization of the country in foreign affairs—*e.g.*, after Austria's example—and democracy, or social democracy, in domestic affairs.

The question is often posed: Did the revolution begin to change its character as of November 1, becoming essentially pro-capitalist or even counterrevolutionary? The answer is a decisive *NO*. Virtually no one in the country could conceive of a restoration of the conditions that existed under Admiral Horthy: a return of the large estates to the feudal lords and the return to private ownership of the banks and factories.[2] On those issues, moreover, the leading and now reviving democratic parties of the country took an unequivocal stand. In the party platform of the "Petöfi" (Peasant) Party, which was broadcast by the Miskolc radio (in northeast Hungary) on November 3, it was expressly stated: "We announce that we fully accept the 1945 Land Reform Law, that we will not return the land received by our peasantry, that we will fight relentlessly against any attempt to cast doubt on the correctness of that great national achievement, or against attempts to attack measures in the field of land reform . . ."[3] At the constitu-

[1] "We demand the election by secret ballot of new leaders at the lower-middle and upper echelons of the MDP (Communist Party of Hungary), beginning at the bottom and extending upward. The top leaders are to call a Party Congress in the very near future and elect a new Central Committee. The government is to be reorganized under the leadership of Comrad Imre Nagy; all of the guilty leaders of the Stalinist Rákosi epoch are to be replaced immediately!" Published in the German language by Kalman Konkoly and Aurel Abranyi: *Ein Land in Flammen* (A Land in Flames), Munich, 1956, p. 29.

[2] See *The New Statesman and Nation* (London), Nov. 17, 1956: "Nobody who was in Hungary during the revolution could escape the overwhelming impression that the Hungarian people had no desire or intention to return to the capitalist system."

[3] Published in *A Magyar Forradalom és Szabadságharc a Hazai Rádióadások tükrében, 1956 October 23-November 9* (The Hungarian Revolution and Liberation Struggle as Reflected in the Domestic Radio Broadcasts), New York, 1957, p. 355.

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ent assembly of the Smallholders' Party, once the largest party in the country after 1945, Secretary General Béla Kovács said: "No one must dream of going back to the world of counts, bankers and capitalists; that world is definitely over. A true member of the Smallholders' Party cannot think along the lines of 1939 or 1945 . . ." [4] In the name of the Social-Democratic Party Anna Kéthly said: "The factories, the mines, and the land are to remain in the hands of the people." [5] And the government spokesman of the Nagy Cabinet, Géza Losonczy, said in the presence of domestic and foreign newspapermen as late as the evening of November 3:

The Government has declared unanimously that it will not make any concession as far as the positive achievements of the past twelve years are concerned: for example, the agrarian reform, the nationalization of factories, and the social legislation. It demands also that the conquests of the present revolution remain intact: notably national independence, equality of rights, and the building of socialism not on the basis of a dictatorship but on the basis of democracy. The Government is determined not to tolerate the restoration of capitalism in Hungary! [6]

Such were the trends which Moscow, after the forcible suppression of the uprising, called "a counterrevolution of the landowners and capitalists"!

Why does Mr. Hill assert that Imre Nagy was much too weak to defend the socialist achievements in Hungary and repel a fascist threat? The fact is that Nagy relied on the Hungarian people as a whole, and that the people had placed complete confidence in him. The people—workers, farmers, students, and soldiers—were armed. They had the guns, the tanks and the ammunition. Their leaders (General Maléter of the National Army, General Király of the National Guard, and Colonel Kopacsi of the Police—all of whom happened to be Communists) were faithful adherents of Imre Nagy. The morale of the insurrectionists was good. They were more than capable of dealing with any coup that might be attempted. But they never had the opportunity to prove this! Did the Soviet troops, who opened their insidious attack against Hungary by Hitlerian methods on Sunday (November 4), go into action to fight "fascists" and "capitalists"? It is an indisputable fact that they were not "joyfully" received by the people—as the Soviet communiques assert—but by the furious patriotic anger of a people that was up in arms, and that it was the industrial workers of Csepel and Dunapentele who resisted them till November 15. In Ózd, in Diósgyör, and in Salgótarján—cities inhabited predominantly by workers and salaried employees—clashes broke out as late as December 1956 between the people and the militia of the Kádár clique that allegedly "relied on the confidence of the majority of the people." [7] These workers demanded simply the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary and the retention of Nagy as Prime Minister.

Regarding the role of Mindszenty in the Hungarian uprising, there has been a great deal of debate during the past 10 years, both in the West and in the East. Not even the Soviet spokesmen dared to assert, however, that in his radio talk of November 3 he made anti-Semitic statements (that was his first public appearance after he regained his freedom). In 1944, when Cardinal Mindszenty was still bishop of Veszprém, he was himself imprisoned by the fascists for having courageously protested against war, displacement of people, and devastation of the country. Contrary to Mr. Hill's assertion, he was not "released from prison" in October 1956, but was freed by a Hungarian army unit commanded by Major Palinkás, an anti-fascist and a resistance fighter against the Nazis. We also happen to know the names of the officers of this unit, including a Hungarian Jew, First Lieutenant Spitz.[8] Mindszenty's speech of November 3, which Mr. Hill criticizes, incidentally also included sentences like these:

. . . we, even in our extremely severe situation, hope that we have no enemy! For we are not enemies of anyone. We desire to live in friendship with every people and with every country. . . . We, the little nation, desire to live in friendship and mutual respect with the great American United States and with the mighty Russian Empire alike, in good neighborly relationship with Prague, Bucharest, Warsaw and Belgrade. . . . We are neutral, we give the Russian Empire no cause for bloodshed.[9]

The Jews had nothing to fear in Hungary during the uprising. Apart from the fact that the intellectuals who paved the way for the revolution included not a few Hungarian Jews (Déry, Háy, Gyimes, Ignotus, etc.) or Jews who, with weapon in hand, fought against the Russians (as, for example, the iron worker István Angyal-Engel, commander of a large insurrectionist group in Budapest, who was executed by Kádár in the spring of 1957), the revolutionists were cautious in their actions even against such Jews as were found to be AVH officers. There was a special reason for this. As the reporter of the Budapest revolutionary newspaper *Igazsag* wrote on October 30, 1956:

The youth of Budapest, who demonstrated in support of the justified demands of the people, have recently been repeatedly branded as "fascist trash." The following episode shows clearly that no fascist rabble marched through the streets of Budapest. A furious crowd which came upon an AVH officer was about to beat him up when some armed demonstrators noticed that he was a Jew and immediately came to his defense. A noble gesture! The freedom fighters, these "fascists," defended an officer, so that their revolution could not be branded as an "anti-Semitic and fascist" demonstration.[10]

And the provisional revolutionary committee of the Hungarian Jewish religious community, in conjunction with the Supreme Council of Rabbis, issued the following statement November 2:

The Jewish community of Hungary, which has regained its religious liberty, enthusiastically welcomes the achievements of the revolution. It pays tribute to the memory of the fallen heroes with reverence and devotion. It feels united in spirit with the independent, free homeland. It appeals to the foreign Jewish organizations to furnish speedy and effective economic aid to the sorely tried and heroic Hungarian people.[11]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[5] In *Nepszava* (Budapest), Nov. 2, 1956.
[6] Free Radio Kossuth (Budapest) on Nov. 3, 1956, and the Hungarian News Agency.
[7] *Nepszabadság (Budapest)*, Dec. 9, 1956.
[8] Reported in *A Magyar Forradalom és Szabadságharc*, p. 274.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 343.
[10] See *Igazság* (Budapest), Oct. 30, 1956.
[11] See *A Magyar Forradalom és Szabadságharc*, p. 305.

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It should be added, moreover, that in the Nagy cabinet there were also Hungarians of Jewish descent, just as there were among the victims of the counter-revolutionary justice under Kádár, only one of whom we shall mention here by name: the editor Miklos Gyimes, who was executed on June 17, 1958, together with Imre Nagy and General Maléter.

In view of all this, it is easy to refute Mr. Hill's mistaken assertion that the first wave of refugees streaming to Austria consisted of "Communists and Jews." In the first place, it should be noted that the number of refugees who found political asylum in Austria numbered more than 170,000. Of these, 400 (four hundred!) persons left Hungary between October 29 and November 4 (before that, the boundary was rigorously guarded by Hungary). According to the reporter of *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, who at that time was in Klinzbach, at an Austrian border station, these people belonged to various strata and groups. Among them were former political prisoners who could not as yet feel confident about the revolution, children who were placed by their parents with farmers of Burgenland so that they might be sheltered from any further disorders, as well as persons who wanted to await further developments in Austria.[12]

The actual stream of refugees ("the second wave") began after the second Soviet military intervention, *i.e.*, after November 4, 1956, when *several thousand* people fled to the West daily to escape the Soviet troops. I have not yet been able to ascertain exactly how many Jewish refugees there were. According to reliable information given by the Vienna "Joint" (relief organization for Jewish refugees) the relief work for Hungarian refugees of Jewish descent was not started until *after November 4, 1956*, since relief was provided for only a few persons before that date.[13] And, as far as I know, the refugees were not billeted in "strictly segregated camps" according to their religion; nor is it true that the "second wave" of the refugee stream from Hungary was made up of fascists.[14]

I must emphatically reject the idea that from the viewpoint of a big power the case of Vietnam and the case of Hungary are the same. However, a detailed statement of the reasons for this opinion would require more space than is available in this letter of reply.

[12] See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Oct. 31, 1956, p. 2, evening edition.

[13] Letter to this writer from "Joint."

[14] Even the brochure published by the Austrian Communist Party, *Ungarn: Tatsachen die zu denken geben* (Hungary. Facts Which Give Food for Thought), Vienna, 1956, had to admit that "the refugees included many skilled workers and university men" (p. 26).

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